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Restoring peace and stability and establishing democracy in Cambodia
will require more than an eighteen-month lull in the fighting, a single election,
and the new constitution that the United Nations can bring to the situation.
As such, the UN mandated peacekeeping plan for Cambodia, as it has
unfolded, has exposed so many shortcomings of good intentions gone awry
that it cannot be adopted as the universal model for a peacemaking process in
the new world order.
The elections of May 1993 are not be a solution to Cambodia's political
difficulties, although they may serve as a milestone on a longer road of
development and reconciliation. Whatever the future may hold, the
Cambodian people will have to work out their own fate. They may choose to
seek help from the outside, but they must reconcile their differences at least to
the extent that they can live together in peace.
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This thesis examines the peacemaking process as it has unfolded in
Cambodia. The end of the Cold War has engendered a new spirit of
multi-lateral activism in the international community. Intervention in
the domestic affairs of a sovereign country is deemed legitimate,
necessary, and desired to secure more worldly goals of peace, stability
and respect for human rights. The United Nations-sponsored
peacemaking process brought to Cambodia sought to achieve these goals
by establishing a cease-fire and setting Cambodia upon the road of a
comprehensive political settlement through democratic self-
determination in the form of elections in May 1993.
The analysis of this study has identified the Cambodian peace
plan as flawed in content and context as an externally imposed solution
to an internal problem entrusted to an institution without the ability to
enforce peace and order. The mandate establishing the UN mission in
Cambodia simply did not vest it with the proper authority to enforce
compliance with the terms of the peace plan. Cambodian political




MONTEREY CA 93943 5101
The winner-take-all mentality of the Khmer deva-rajas is poor soil for
democratic pluralism to take root.
Restoring peace and stability and establishing democracy in
Cambodia will require more than an eighteen-month lull in the fighting,
a single election, and the new constitution that the United Nations can
bring to the situation. As such, the UN mandated peacekeeping plan for
Cambodia, as it has unfolded, has exposed so many shortcomings of
good intentions gone awry that it cannot be adopted as the universal
model for a peacemaking process in the new world order.
The elections of May 1993 are not be a solution to Cambodia's
political difficulties, although they may serve as a milestone on a longer
road of development and reconciliation. Whatever the future may hold,
the Cambodian people will have to work out their own fate. They may
choose to seek help from the outside, but they must reconcile their
differences at least to the extent that they can live together in peace.
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The end of the Cold War has engendered an optimism, a bolstering
of expectations for a new world order of peace and stability. Ideology has
been augmented by moral and humanitarian impulses together with the
realization that internal conflicts can adversely affect regional security
and stability to form the basis of a new doctrine of interventionism calling
for international mediation in conflict resolution. An unprecedented
amount of interventionism is now deemed legitimate, necessary, and
desired to secure political goals. Graphic media images flame the
indignation and demands for action. As yet ill-thought out in its
implications and its chosen instruments, this doctrinal call for a new world
order in an unstable and inhumane world has increasingly turned to its
UN to act as judge, jury, and now executioner in conflict resolution.
Background to the Cambodian Conflict
The current Cambodian intervention is the prime example of this
new activist doctrine operationalized, capitalized, and set into motion.
Cambodia's history of misery and destruction dates from the early 1970s
when it became a sideshow to the efforts in Vietnam. Suffering and ruin in
Cambodia continued through the Khmer Rouge holocaust; the Vietnamese
invasion and subsequent occupation; and most recently in the civil war
involving factions backed by the various regional players and former
superpowers. War in Cambodia has developed in stages from a sideshow to
a puppet show, the country seemingly merely a backdrop against which
superpower competition for security was played out through Cambodian
surrogates.
In the latest stage of the conflict, the Cambodian drama emerges as
an epilogue to the Cold War as the formerly competing puppeteers come
full circle to cooperating in an attempt to end the civil war. Perm Five
members of the UN Security Council had supported opposing sides in the
fighting; in agreeing to end the outside intervention that was fueling the
conflict, the former puppeteers and their factions thought they had the
power and means to bring peace and stability to Cambodia. The
successfully negotiated settlement signed in Paris in October 1991 gave
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rise to hope that ballots, not bullets, would finally end the civil war in
Cambodia, and that such an example of outside mediation and
intervention could serve as a blueprint for order in the post-Cold War
world.
The importance of the Paris Peace Settlement cannot be overlooked:
for the second time in as many decades (the first being the Khmer Rouge
attempt at an agrarian Utopia in the late 1970s), Cambodia has become a
test bed for some of this century's more radical political ideas. The
experiment mandated by the Paris settlement marks the UN's first attempt
to go beyond simply keeping a peace: the UN is attempting to impose a
peace and then create a nation. After nearly fifty years of existence, the
UN for the first time is attempting to fulfill the ideal and vision of its
founders (and the new interventionists) as the agent of peace and stability
in a new world order.
The Peacemaking Process
The requirements laid on the United Nations Transitional Authority
in Cambodia, UNTAC, and its Japanese managers to end the fighting are
daunting; the process has in fact run into major problems and delays.
Having ended their own rivalry, the superpowers are frustrated to find
that they cannot push on the strings which they used to pull their
Cambodian clients into conflict: the puppets have taken on a life and
agenda of conflict, grievances, and rivalries of their own. Superpower
reconciliation, while a necessary condition, is not a sufficient condition for
peace in Cambodia.
The real challenge in Cambodia will be making the political results
stick after the elections. The impulse for crusading interventionism is not
as yet accompanied by the political will nor economic resources to
shoulder the burden of world policeman. The international community is
much more comfortable with the role of volunteer fireman: charging out
in response to an emergency, stamping out the brush-fire, then quickly
returning home until the next alarm. If Cambodia is to serve as a blueprint
for a new world order, then the UN must be prepared and equipped and
empowered for the long haul presence and armed occupation. The
evidence does not show that the UN is willing or able to perform this
function.
Towards a Conclusion
My original hypothesis was that the UN could be successful in
bringing about a peace and building a new nation in Cambodia; as
research progressed, the antithetical evidence emerged to indicate that
the chances for real and meaningful success were poor. In my opinion,
any peace plan must meet the criterion set by, and have the cooperation
of, all the players; in Cambodia's case this means the UN, the great
powers, the neighbors, and finally the factions within. Factional in-
fighting remains the most intractable of the problems stalling the peace
process.
Cambodian political culture possesses a dynamic which has
proven resistent to external efforts at conflict resolution. The winner-take-
all mentality and political culture of the Khmer deva-rajas will be
difficult to supplant despite the apparent desire for a western sense of
democratic pluralism. Order, however imposed, is only a remedy and
not a cure; nations working through the UN can provide relief from the
ills of civil war, but only by way of providing an army of occupation
which might become another faction in the civil war. The nagging
question remains, can a civil war be resolved by outsiders?
Any acceptable role model for peacemaking in a new world order
must find a way of addressing problems of ethnic strife, nationalism, and
political legitimacy. If Cambodia is to arrive at a political settlement, a
true end to the civil war, then it must find a way internally to resolve





A. THE NEW INTERVENTIONISM
The end of the Cold War has engendered an optimism for a
renewed internationalism in the world community, a bolstering of
expectations for a new world order of peace and stability. Ideology has
been augmented by moral and humanitarian impulses in the realization
that even localized internal conflicts can adversely affect regional
security and stability. These impulses and realizations form the basis of
a new doctrine of interventionism calling for international mediation in
conflict resolution 1 . An unprecedented amount of activism is now
deemed legitimate, desired, and necessary to secure the political goals of
stability, respect for human rights, and assurance of self-determination
for indigenous peoples.
Graphic and immediate media images of violence and strife, of
innocents injured and killed in wars around the world, flame the
J For an excellent discussion of this topic, see Stephen John
Stedman, "The New Interventionists," Foreign Affairs 72 (Winter 1993), 1-
16; the political science, international relations,and national security
literature has been inundated with papers seeking to come to grips with
the new paradigms of interventionism.
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indignation and demands tor action by an outraged world community.
As yet ill-thought out in its implications and chosen instruments, the
doctrinal call for intervention on moral or humanitarian grounds in an
unstable and inhumane world has increasingly led the peoples of the
world to turn to their United Nations for answers and action as judge,
jury, and executioner in conflict resolution and national reconciliation.
The Conflict in Cambodia
Cambodia serves as a prime example of this new interventionism
operationalized, capitalized, and set into motion. Cambodia's
contemporary history of misery and destruction dates from the late
1960s when violence spilled over into the country as a sideshow to the
anti-communist efforts in Vietnam. Suffering and ruin have spread since
then as Cambodia experienced the Khmer Rouge holocaust; the
Vietnamese invasion and subsequent occupation; and most recently the
civil war. The conflict in Cambodia evolved from a sideshow to a puppet
show, the country seemingly a mere regional stage upon which first
international competition, the Cold War, and later intra-regional
struggles for security was played out through Cambodian surrogates.
Epilogue to the Cold War?
In the latest stage of the conflict, the Cambodian drama emerges
as an epilogue to the Cold War as the formerly competing puppeteers
have come full circle to cooperate in an attempt to end the civil war
there. Permanent Five members of the UN Security Council had
supported opposing sides in the fighting; in agreeing to end the outside
intervention that was fueling the conflict, the puppeteers thought they
had the power and means to bring peace and stability to Cambodia.
The successfully negotiated settlement signed in Paris on 23
October 1991 gave rise to hopes that ballots, not bullets, would finally
end the civil war in Cambodia. In the surge of optimism that
accompanied the agreement and the attendant international
commitment of resources to the effort, it was widely hoped that such
outside mediation and intervention for peace in Cambodia,
implemented by the UN, could serve as a blueprint for order in the post-
Cold War world. Ambitious and bold in its approach, UNTAC was
initially held up as the model for a peacemaking process in a new world
order.
B. THE PEACEMAKING PROCESS
Comprehensive Political Settlement
The United Nations Transitional Authority in Cambodia, UNTAC,
was created in response to the Agreement on a Comprehensive Political
Settlement of the Cambodia Conflict signed in Paris on 23 October 1991 2 .
The signing of the Agreement capped a long and complex series of
negotiations and discussions among the involved and interested factions
and powers party to the conflict in Cambodia.
The importance of the Comprehensive Political Settlement cannot
be overlooked: for the second time in as many decades (the first being
the Khmer Rouge attempt at an agrarian communist Utopia in the late
1970s), Cambodia has become a test bed for some of this century's more
radical political ideas. The experiment mandated by the Paris settlement
marks the UN's first attempt to transform the nature of peacekeeping
into a comprehensive form of conflict management known as
peacemaking or peace-building: the UN is attempting to impose a peace
and then create a government in Cambodia based upon democratic
principles for a people who know little of either.
Role of the United Nations
In backing and funding the Security Council Resolution that
established UNTAC, member nations have empowered its UN to step
beyond the traditional role of peacekeeper to the more comprehensive
one of peacemaker in seeking an end to the fighting in Cambodia. After
nearly fifty years of existence the UN is attempting to fulfill the ideal and
2 see Appendix A for a reproduction of the text of this agreement.
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vision of its founders as the agent of peace and stability in a new world
order.
The challenges UNTAC faced in fashioning a peace in Cambodia
were daunting: the Agreement called on UNTAC to create, enforce, and
monitor a cease-fire in a country saturated with armaments; to canton
belligerents and demobilize 70% of the troops; to monitor and in some
areas run the Cambodian government; to repair and reconstruct an
economic and social infrastructure shattered by years of warfare; to
prepare the country intellectually and politically for democracy; and
finally to conduct free and fair elections that allow Cambodians a
measure of self-determination. Other major components of the UNTAC
mandate calls for the clearance of mines, safe-guarding of human rights,
and the repatriation of refugees displaced by the conflict.
C. TOWARDS A RESOLUTION OF CONFLICT IN CAMBODIA
If the political and economic development of a society can be
thought of in terms of an upward climb, the appropriate imagery for
Cambodia is that of an aspirant perched on a precarious ledge poised for
the try at the next level up, the leap to peace, self-determination, and a
measure of self-sufficiency. The imagery of the risk Cambodia faces, the
long fall back into darkness, in failing to make that leap and achieve a
lasting resolution of the internal conflict is also most appropriate given
Cambodia's recent brushes with genocidal revolution, foreign occupation,
and civil war.
The peacemaking process has in fact run into major problems and
delays since its inception, not least of which is factional intransigence to
national reconciliation. Having ended their own rivalry, the superpowers
are frustrated to find that they cannot easily manipulate the strings
which they used to pull their Cambodian clients into conflict. The
puppets have taken on a life, an agenda of grievances and rivalries, of
their own. Superpower reconciliation, while certainly welcome and
necessary, is not a sufficient condition for peace to break out in
Cambodia.
The real challenge in Cambodia will be making the political results
stick after the UN-supervised elections, overcoming factional resistance to
reconciliation and pluralism. The crusading interventionism that
pervades the international community is not yet accompanied by the
political will nor economic resources to shoulder the burden of world
policeman that interventionism entails. The international community
seems more comfortable with the role of volunteer fireman: charging out
in cases of emergency to stamp out the brush-fires and then quickly
return home until the next alarm.
The current UN effort, if it is to be truly successful, must resolve
centuries of conflict between the tribes and races inhabiting the region,
peoples who have been vying with one another for territory and
resources since the beginnings of their history. The problems of the
Cambodian people, the bombings, killing fields, civil war, and refugee
exodus, have an internal dynamic that has little to do with the regional
confrontation and cold war maneuvering that the UN is addressing
directly. The UN is attempting to create and impose a state in
Cambodia, a state as defined in the West. As such, the international
political solution being pursued does not address regional and internal
issues of ethnic strife, nationalism, and legitimate power.
The UN can be successful in externally imposing a peace if it is
prepared to take on the role of policeman, the dreary day-in, day-out
task of maintaining order in the hamlets and villages. Such success,
however, will require an indefinite if not permanent UN garrison. If
Cambodia is to serve as a blueprint for an imposed world order, then the
UN must be prepared and equipped and empowered for the long haul
presence and armed occupation to impose that order as the policeman
on the corner. The evidence does not show that the UN is willing or able
to perform this function.
Order, however achieved, is ultimately only a remedy and not a
cure for the ills that cause civil war; nations working through their UN
can provide relief from the effects of civil war in becoming an army of
occupation, another faction in the civil war, but cannot remove or
relieve the causes of civil war 3 . The nagging question remains, can a civil
war be resolved by outsiders? Cambodian political culture possesses a
dynamic which has proven resistent to external efforts at conflict
resolution. The winner-take-all mentality and political culture of the
Khmer deva-rajas will be difficult to supplant despite the apparent
desire for a western sense of democratic pluralism.
Any internationally supervised model of political resolution and
national reconciliation must find a means of adequately addressing the
problems of ethnic strife, nationalism, and political legitimacy that
bedevil internal political processes. Means of resolving such problems in
Cambodia remain murky at best, as does the prospect for long-term
stability. If Cambodia is to arrive at a political settlement, a true end to
the civil war, then a way must be found to resolve these internal issues.
Any peace plan must meet the criteria set by, and have the cooperation
of, all the players. In Cambodia's case this means the UN, the great
powers, the neighbors, and finally the factions themselves. Intervention
3 Stephen John Stedman, "The New Interventionists," Foreign Affairs
72 (Winter 1993), 14.
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by an international actor such as the UN is a technique of conflict
resolution that must be tailored specifically to the situation with great
sensitivities paid to the context of the problem. As such, a system of
international intervention by the UN is not a magic formula for conflict
resolution and the imposition of a new world order in being unable to
take on the never ending job of resolving conflicts that have existed for
ages.
II. FRAMEWORK AND METHODOLOGY
A. THE RESEARCH QUESTIONS
The focus of this thesis is the peacemaking process as it has
unfolded in Cambodia. The research problem is an analysis of the forces
and interests, international, regional, and local, that have come together
in an effort to achieve a resolution of the conflict that has plagued
Cambodia for so much of its contemporary history. This study hopes to
arrive at a prognosis of the chances for a political solution to the
violence in Cambodia, and an assessment of the viability of the
negotiated peace process in Cambodia. The basic research question is one
of feasibility: can the Comprehensive Political Settlement work?
Making the Peace Process Work -- the Role of the United Nations
Assessments of the prospects for successful peacemaking in
Cambodia turn to the question of implementation of the provisions of
the Comprehensive Political Settlement: just how well the UN has
managed to remain impartial and neutral as a mediator to the factions
in Cambodia. The successful negotiations that initiated the peace
process bred a certain optimism for a successful peace. Implementation,
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actually taking the steps towards that peace in stark contrast, has bred
pessimism and mistrust all around.
Analysis of UN handling of the peacemaking process, the successes
and failures it has overseen, gives rise to questions concerning the
capability of the UN to take on an activist role as an agency imposing
peace and stability in a New World Order. The UN is certainly the proper
forum for bringing conflicting parties to agreement, but is it the proper
venue to see out the terms agreed to? In the Cambodian context the
efficacy of the UN as the executive institution carrying out a doctrine of
interventionism is evaluated against its ability to carry out the
peacemaking mandate. Can the UN institution make peace and stability
happen in Cambodia?
Sources of Conflict in Cambodia
Conventional Cold War-era paradigms of conflict are rooted in bi-
polarity: local and regional conflicts are seen as outgrowths of super-
power competition. In this line of thinking, the Cambodian conflict and
national disintegration was caused by the intervention of competing
foreign interests. It is therefore logical and consistent to expect that the
intervention of cooperating foreign interests can bring about the opposite
of conflict, peace and stability. The question remains, however, as to just
how comprehensive the Political Settlement is, whether it really resolves
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the root causes of conflict of Cambodia. What are the grievances and
disagreements of the Cambodian factions, and can such be resolved by
outsiders?
A New World Order
As it was introduced in 1991, the UN Security Council mandate to
supervise and implement the Cambodian Political Settlement was hailed
as an ambitious and expansive effort marking a quantum leap forward
in international mediation of conflict. In Cambodia, the UN would be
moving out of its traditional role as peacekeeper and on to that of
peacemaker. The optimistic hopes for a New World Order are pinned to
the belief that an enlightened and humanitarian-oriented
interventionism can serve as a template for national reconciliation and
reconstruction.
Given the high expectations alluded to in the previous section for
a New World Order, the question arose whether the multi-laterally
negotiated and UN-supervised peace process as exemplif; 1 by the
Cambodian experiment could apply to other conflicts au>und the world.
The hypothesis of this study is that the peace plan as carried out in




A meaningful understanding of the peace process in Cambodia
requires more than an examination of the diplomatic history and
content of the Paris Peace Plan and UNTAC mandate. Attention must be
paid to the environment in which Cambodia's troubles unfolded and to
the indigenous Cambodian political culture.
Policy Analysis
In terms of political science methodology, this study is conducted
as an analysis and evaluation of the policy and process 4 that began with
the signing in Paris of the Agreement on a Comprehensive Political
Settlement of the Cambodia Conflict in October 1989. This analysis will
serve to examine and question the efficacy of the UN as an institutional
actor in its attempts to carry out the policy of imposing peace.
The study of the formulation of the peace process in Cambodia
illustrates the difficult nature of interventionism. External actors have a
complex impact on changing societies, an effect that is not readily
transparent if the society, the context, is not clearly understood. Failure
4For a discussion and definition of this type of research, see Jarol
B. Manheim and Richard C. Rich, Empirical Political Analysis . 3rd ed.,
(New York: Longman Publishing Group, 1991); Charles O. Jones, An
Introduction to the Study of Public Policy . (Monterey, CA: Brooks/Cole,
1984); Edward A. Suchman, Evaluative Research . (New York: Russell Sage
Foundation, 1967); Leonard Rutman, ed., Evaluation Research Methods .
(Beverly Hills, CA: Sage, 1977).
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of the peace process has important implications for the future prospects
for a new world order.
My original working hypothesis was one of optimism about the
chances for success of the Paris peace plan as negotiated for
implementation by the UN. Further research and study of the efforts to
effect national reconciliation and build a new government in Cambodia
caused me to reverse my hypothesis 180 degrees. The barriers and
problems encountered as the process has unfolded appeared to be
insurmountable.
Political Culture
As an academic inquiry, this thesis emphasizes the importance of
considering political culture in foreign area research, an approach and
perspective developed by Lucian Pye 5 . A striking trait that distinguishes
Pye's work is a deep-seated instinct not to take things at face value. After
listening to what people write and say about themselves, their motives,
and their actions, Pye delves below the sanitized societal explanations
5 Recent works wherein Pye outlines the conceptual and
methodological issues pertaining to the study of political culture include
The Mandarin and the Cadre: The Political Cultures of Confucian
Leninism
. (Ann Arbor, MI: Center for Chinese Studies, University of
Michigan, 1988), and Asian Power and Polit ics: Cultural Dimensions of
Authority. (Cambridge: Harvard University Press, 1985).
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and rhetoric to examine overt behavior for hints and clues as to what
may really be going on 6 .
Political culture encompasses the deep-rooted attitudes,
dispositions, orientations, expressive symbols, and values of a people.
The local cultural context, difficult to grasp, calculate, and quantify, yet
very real nonetheless, is of vast importance influencing the outcome of
the plots and plans of regional and great powers. These factors are
important determinants of human social behavior, including political
development.
A clearer perception of the cultural factors at work in the
Cambodian situation can result in clearer insights into the prospects for
a successful peace and meaningful political dialogue in Cambodia. It is
therefore the spirit of the political cultural perspective of Lucian Pye, as I
understand it, which grounds and guides this examination of the
Cambodian peace process.
C. ORGANIZATION
This thesis has been sectioned into four main areas made up of
nine chapters. The first section, consisting of two chapters, is
6Donald L. M. Blackner, "An Appreciation of Lucian W. Pye," in The
Political Culture of Foreign Area and International Studies , Richard J.
Samuels and Myron Weiner. eds., (Washington: Brassey's (US), 1992),
xviii.
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introductory in nature as the research problem and the conceptual
framework guiding this study is presented. The introduction considers
the basic concept of peacemaking and the interests and impulses driving
the interventionist doctrine that forms the basis and rationale for the
peace process in Cambodia. The second chapter in this section discusses
the intellectual framework and research methodology this study
employs.
The body of this thesis, the second and third sections, lays out
chronologically the Cambodian Peace Process as it has unfolded. The
second section deals primarily with the historical background of the
peace process in Cambodia, one chapter dealing with the period of the
cold war and another with developments since the end of the cold war.
The third section reviews the international solution from
negotiation through to operationalization. Separate chapters consider
the terms of the 1991 Paris Peace Accord; the mandate, structure, and
mission of the United Nations; and the problems of implementation that
the UN has faced.
The fourth section is one of assessment of the efficacy of the peace
process as it has developed up to the UN-sponsored elections of May
1993. It remains to be seen whether the results of this election,
conducted and validated under political conditions vastly different from
16
the free and neutral environment envisioned by the Paris Peace
Agreement signatories, will stand. The government arising from the peace
process will undoubtedly face opposition and challenge, not least of
which is a Khmer Rouge insurgency and a possible division of the entire
country. The international community faces the dilemma of how much
more blood and treasure to spend in order to make its program work.
17
III. INTO THE MAELSTROM
Few nations have known suffering as intensely as Cambodia has.
Cambodia's contemporary history is one of tragedy, an endurance of
over twenty years of war, civil strife, and revolution. A recurring
characteristic of the conflict in Cambodia has been the regional and
international forces underpinning the local competing parties. External
interests have wielded an undue influence in the strife between
Cambodian factions, at best aiding and abetting the carnage, at worst
precipitating the next round of violence.
Sideshow
Warfare ostensibly spilled over from the Vietnam War into
Cambodia in late 1969 as the US initiated Operation Menu, a massive
bombing campaign aimed at eliminating the use of Cambodia as a
sanctuary and headquarters area by North Vietnamese and Viet Cong
forces 7
. Lasting until 1975. Operation Menu expanded in its subsequent
7 For an excellent, authoritative, and perhaps controversial account
critical of the US role in expanding the Vietnam War into Cambodia, see
William Shawcross, Sideshow (New York: Simon and Schuster, 1979); for
an understanding and appreciation of the Administration view of the
situation in Cambodia, see Henry Kissinger, White House Years (Boston:
Little, Brown, 1979).
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phases to include ground troops entering Cambodia in "hot pursuit" of
enemy forces and US aircraft attempting to sever the logistical re-supply
route, the Ho Chi Minh Trail, that began in North Vietnam and ended in
Cambodia's border areas adjacent to South Vietnam. Cambodia had
nominally been neutral until this time in accordance with the Geneva
Conference agreements on Indochina in 1954 8 .
King (Prince after 1955) Norodom Sihanouk, the monarch installed
by the French in 1941 during Cambodia's political hiatus as a French
Protectorate, had in the months and years following the Geneva
Conference attempted to pursue a nonaligned foreign policy for
Cambodia and himself. This emphasis on nonalignment, distinct from
neutrality per se, cannot be understood without reference to Cambodia's
history of foreign subjugation and its very uncertain prospects for
8The Geneva Conference was attended by representatives of
Cambodia, North Vietnam, the Associated State of Vietnam (precursor to
South Vietnam), Laos, the People's Republic of China, the Soviet Union,
France, Britain, and the United States. On July 21, 1954, an agreement
had been reached calling for the cessation of hostilities in Indochina
with stipulations pertaining to Cambodia that all French and Viet Minh
military forces would be withdrawn by October 1954, that Cambodian
communist resistance forces would be demobilized, and that Cambodia
would enjoy a pseudo-neutrality in vowing not to join any military
alliance "not in conformity with the principles of the Charter of the
United Nations," nor allow the basing of foreign military forces on its
territory "as long as its security is not threatened." Russell R. Ross, ed.,
Cambodia: A Country Study . 3d ed., Area Handbook Series (Washington
D.C.: Library of Congress, 1990).
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survival as the war in Vietnam intensified. In pursuing a less-than-
perfect pragmatic nonalignment, neutrality only in the sense of
continually flirting but not staying aligned with any one faction or
power for too long a time. Sihanouk displayed the remarkable aptitude
for political survival that sustained him time and again in the -ears and
Shifts in political fortunes that followed.
By the mid- to late 1960s, Sihanouk's delicate balancing act of
maintaining himself in power by maintaining Cambodia's neutrality
began to go aw r> as the pressures md demands : wamng neighbors and
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began to back-fire. Resentments grew in the late 1960s in response to his
high-handed and two-faced ways 9 . After Sihanouk publicly claimed
credit for achieving independence from France in 1953 and formed the
Sangkum Reastr Niyum (Popular Socialist Community) political party in
1955, organized political opposition to the prince had virtually
disappeared. The leading opposition Democratic Party was disbanded in
1957 after its leaders, having allegedly been beaten by government
troops, respectfully requested the privilege of joining the Sangkum* .
Sihanouk's main supporters in the Sangkum were virulently anti-
communist, yet his attitude towards the left was strangely conciliatory
as he dabbled with socialist policies and welcomed prominent and
capable leftists into his government. Towards the end of the 1960s,
Sihanouk and Cambodia faced an increasingly volatile political
predicament as both left and right became increasingly alienated from
the government, and mobilized for conflict.
9David P.Chandler, The Tragedy of Cambodian History (New
Haven: Yale University Press: 1991), 159.
lOMichael Vickery, "Looking Back at Cambodia, 1942-76," in
Peasants and Politics in Kampuchea. 1942-81
. eds. Ben Kiernan and
Chanthou Boua (London: Zed Press, 1982), 98.
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Challenges From the Left
By early 1967, the combination of regional developments (the
widening conflict in Vietnam and use of Cambodia as a base area), the
competing interests among Phnom Penh's politicized elite, and the
deteriorating economic situation and resulting social tensions created an
environment favorable for the emergence of a small scale Communist
insurgency in the rural areas. The Samlaut rebellion broke out in
Battambang Province and. while dealt with harshly by the royal armed
forces, spread rapidly to the provinces of Pursat, Kompong Chang,
Kompong Cham, Kampong Speu, Kampot, and Kampong Thum. By the
end of 1968, unrest was reported in eleven of the country's eighteen
provinces 11
. Sihanouk, seeing the uprisings primarily as a personal
insult, personally supervised the counter-insurgency measures. Sihanouk
later noted offhandedly that peace had been restored but that
approximately 10,000 people had died, although this number was later
revised to the hundreds 12 .
11 Russell R. Ross, ed.. Cambodia: A Country Study 3d ed., Library of
Congress Area Handbook Series (Washington D.C.: US Government
Printing Office, 1990), 42.
12David P.Chandler, The Tragedy of Cambodian History (New
Haven: Yale University Press: 1991), 166.
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The Samlaut rebellion serves as an excellent example in microcosm
of the pathology of political conflict in Cambodia. The uprising sprang
from local grievances against injustice and social change, corruption,
and ham-fisted government behavior^. Leftist students and teachers
from the provincial city, Battambang, undoubtedly encouraged the
peasants to blame their troubles on feudalism, Lon Nol (the rightist
Prime Minister), and the United States. The communist party acted as
facilitator of the local armed struggle 14 , seizing upon the uprising as an
opportunity to organize and spread the discontent. The government's
harsh response to the local cause likely made it easier for the communist
opposition to recruit adherents and gain supporters for its wider agenda.
The situation is one wherein outside players have descended on a "local"
dispute to exploit the circumstance for the advancement of a larger
cause. This pattern of outside players coming in to Cambodia to work
nibid, 166.
14Chandler (1991) notes that Pol Pot plays down the role of the
party in the affair, praising instead the spontaneous revolutionary zeal
of the participants, in his history of the Communist Party of Kampuchea
published some ten years after the incident (1977). However, Ben
Kiernan states that "the insurrection was clearly organized in advance."
How Pol Pot Came to Power (London: Verso, 1985), 250. The CPK Center
was unwilling to associate itself with military failure, which the Samlaut
Rebellion turned out to be, and so denied its own involvement. Pol Pot's
version of events can be seen to be self-serving and so less credible.
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through surrogates is a recurring theme this thesis will revisit in
illustrating the Cambodian conflict as a puppet show.
In January 1968, communists led by Pol Pot established the
Revolutionary Army of Kampuchea (RAK), precursor to the Khmer Rouge
armed forces. It is interesting to note that during this period the RAK
received minimal assistance from the world communist movement. The
North Vietnamese were extremely reluctant to alienate Sihanouk at a
time when vital supplies were passing through Cambodia along the Ho
Chi Minh Trail and through the port of Kampong Sam (then
Sihanoukville). Beijing and Moscow were supplying Sihanouk's
government with arms, which were in turn used against the communist
insurgents, as an enticement to further direct cooperation with the
communist superpowers. The indifference of their communist brethren
to the Cambodian communist struggle was to make a lasting impression
on Pol Pot and the other Khmer Rouge leaders.
The Khmer Republic
In August 1969 Sihanouk appointed a Government of Salvage that
was far to the right of his previous Government of the Last Resort 15 in a
move calculated to appease the right, which included the urban elite
and the military, who had grown increasingly discontented and
15William Shawcross, Sideshow (New York: Simon and Schuster,
1979), 113.
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alienated with Sihanouk's handling of Cambodia's deepening economic
malaise and his weak response to the challenge from the left. The Prime
Minister for this government was General Lon Nol, head of the
Cambodian armed forces.
As economic and military problems multiplied, opposition to
Sihanouk from both radical (Pol Pot) and conservative (Lon Nol)
movements increased and gained momentum. In early 1970, Sisowath
Sirik Matak, the prince's cousin and Cambodia's vice premier, began
engineering a coup d'etat while both Lon Nol and Sihanouk were out of
the country. Matak, eight years older than Sihanouk, had been passed
over for the throne by the French in 1941. Efficient, aloof, and relatively
pro-American, Matak was convinced that Cambodia's economy needed
to be freed from state control, and that
Vietnamese Communist troops should not be allowed to take shelter in
the countryis.
Lon Nol returned from medical treatments in France in February
1970 to find that discontent with Sihanouk was widespread, and that
plans for a coup were well advanced among the army officer corps.
Government-planned demonstrations (a recurring tactic in Cambodian
politics) against the two Vietnamese embassies in Phnom Penh on March
16David P. Chandler, The Land and People of Cambodia (New York:
Harper Collins Publishers, 1991), 128.
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11, 1970 turned into vicious riots of racist anger by Cambodian mobs.
The embassies were sacked and the mobs turned on the ethnic
Vietnamese residential neighborhoods of Phnom Penh to continue
venting their rage. The mobs were angry about Vietnamese occupation of
their country, the Vietnamese use of Cambodia as a sanctuary, and
blamed Sihanouk for allowing this state of affairs to come to pass. The
right saw in these outbursts an opportunity to consolidate the leftist
Khmer Rouge threat with the endemic anti-Vietnamese sentiments of the
people as a foundation for popular support.
While Sihanouk was away on an extended trip to Moscow and
Beijing, Sirik Matak and his supporters had been pressuring Lon Nol to
support a coup. Finally, during a predawn confrontation on March 18 in
which Matak threatened to shoot him, Lon Nol signed a decree as Prime
Minister approving the overthrow of Prince Sihanouk. The National
Assembly was hastily convened that same day and voted unanimously
to depose Sihanouk as chief of state. The Assembly went on to grant Lon
Nol emergency powers while confirming Matak in his position as deputy
prime minister. The new government christened itself the Khmer
Republic, and emphasized that the transfer of power had been totally
legal and constitutional. Perhaps most importantly, it enjoyed
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immediate acceptance and recognition by most of the diplomatic
community. All this was clearly a "sideshow" to the Vietnam War.
While the question of American complicity with the coup has
never been completely laid to rest, several writers have noted that the
coup marked a final stage in a rather drawn-out process of Cambodian
de-neutralization 17 . Cambodia emerged from the coup solidly pro-
American as the anti-Communist stance of the newly formed republican
government sought and attracted massive amounts of American foreign
aid 18 . The turning on of the dollar faucets proved a quick remedy to
Cambodia's deepening economic woes, but in light of subsequent events,
the cure proved worse than the disease. As Chandler notes: "The main
17 See T.D. Allman, "Anatomy of a Coup," and William Rosoff,
"Dissension in the Kingdom," in Cambodia: The Widening War in
Indochina , ed., Jonathan S. Grant, Laurence A. G. Moss, and Jonathan
Unger (New York: Washington Square Press, 1971), and William Shawcross,
Sideshow (New York: Simon and Schuster, 1979).
18The question of cause and effect remains a subject open to
debate as commentators, noting the widespread corruption of the new
regime, cynically wondered if the anti-communist ideology of the Khmer
Republic's leaders extended past their own pockets. The Khmer Republic
received a total of $1.85 billion in US economic and military aid over its
five years of existence, almost exactly one million dollars a day. William
Shawcross, Sideshow (New York: Simon and Schuster, 1979), 350. In June
1975, the Defence Intelligence Agency noted that supplemental military
aid would not have changed the outcome due to "corruption in all
segments of society ..." undermining "the effectiveness of the military as
well as the government." Defense Intelligence Agency, Cambodia: The
Military Campaign that Defeated the Cambodian Armed Forces
(Washington D.C.: US Government Printing Office, 1975), 6.
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effects of the coup and of Sihanouk's response to it were to free
Vietnamese forces from the restraints imposed by their alliance with
Sihanouk and to pull all of Cambodia into the Indochina War" 19
The Widening War
Sihanouk had been in Moscow at the time of the coup, en route
home to Cambodia from another of his frequent sojourns abroad.
Initially distraught and indecisive over which course of action to pursue,
whether or not accept the coup as a fait accompli and seek asylum in
France, Sihanouk continued on to Beijing. There he was approached by
Chinese Premier Chou Enlai who offered to mediate with the Khmer
Rouge and Vietnamese communist20 in the creation of a unified
i^David P.Chandler, The Tragedy of Cambodian History (New
Haven: Yale University Press: 1991), 201.
20 In his memoirs, Sihanouk presents a much more pleasant picture
of his arrival in Beijing and his meeting with his erstwhile allies:
"Western press reports spoke of some 'negotiations' with Pham Van Dong
[North Vietnamese Premier] and 'mediation' by Chou Enlai. This was
nonsense! Our solidarity had always been there. Now it was moved up to
a higher level and buttressed by the force of events." Mv War With the
CIA
. (New York: Pantheon Books, 1973), 30. Writing in June 1970, the
beginning of his struggle with the Khmer Republic, the literal veracity
and accuracy of the Prince's remarks and recollections is questionable.
Certainly he would have had a motive to make a virtue of the necessity
of allying himself with the communists at the time he was writing.
28
resistance movement 21 . On May 5, 1970, the establishment of a National
United Front of Kampuchea {Front Uni National du Kampuchea — FUNK)
and a Royal Government of National Union of Kampuchea
(Gouvernement Royal d'Union Nationale du Kampuchea -- GRUNK) was
announced in Beijing 22 . Nominally headed by Sihanouk, this partnership
was by all objective accounts a marriage of expediency and convenience.
The communists gained a measure of legitimacy and popular support in
having Sihanouk as a front man, while Sihanouk in turn kept alive his
chances of being a player in Cambodian politics.
From Beijing, Sihanouk broadcast an appeal urging resistance to
the usurpers in Phnom Penh. Still popular among the villagers and in
the countryside, Sihanouk's call elicited a response of widespread
demonstrations and riots 23 . The regime's response was swift and sure. In
one incident on March 26, several thousand Khmers decided to converge
on the capital to express their support for the prince; they were met at
21 This version of events is presented by David P. Chandler, The
Tragedy of Cambodian History . (New Haven: Yale University Press, 1991),
199-201.
22 Russell R. Ross, ed., Cambodia: A Country Study . 3d ed.,
(Washington D.C.: US Government Printing Office, 1990), 44.
23Ben Kiernan, "The 1970 Peasant Uprising Against Lon Nol," in Ben
Kiernan and C. Boua, eds., Peasants and Politics in Kampuchea. 1942-
1981 (New York: M. E. Sharpe, Inc., 1982), 218-219.
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the approaches to the city and fired upon. Roughly one hundred
demonstrators were killed or wounded outright, and the survivors who
sought refuge in the ethnic Vietnamese villages along the Mekong River
were hunted down and arrested over the next few days24 . Similar
popular demonstrations in Takeo and Kampot provinces were also
brutally suppressed.
The appeal of the Sihanouk-communist coalition grew immensely
after October 9, 1970 when the Lon Nol regime formally abolished the
monarchy and redesignated Cambodia as the Khmer Republic. In the
ensuing resistance to this change, the republicans miscalculated the
traditional orientation of the Cambodian people. To the average
Cambodian peasant the concept of a republic was foreign, something
quite apart from the political culture they had grown up and felt
comfortable with. Sihanouks appeal as a living symbol of Khmer
nationalism and unity, his connection to the people of Cambodia and
their identification with him in turn, was something Sirik Matak and Lon
Nol could not reproduce in their five years in power. The government of
the Khmer Republic remained systemically weak and hollow as a result.
One of the major grievances precipitating the coup against
Sihanouk was his soft response to the two-fold communist threat: the
24Chandler, Tragedy of Cambodian History . 202.
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indigenous Khmer Rouge insurgency and the de facto Vietnamese
occupation of the Cambodian border areas. Sihanouk had pursued a
weak policy of accommodation in his negotiation with the Red Khmers
and his toleration of Vietnamese use of Cambodia as a sanctuary from
the war in South Vietnam; the Lon Nol regime was determined not to
make the same mistake. Beating back the communist threat became the
central focus of those in power in Phnom Penh, the cause and cure of
Cambodia's problems.
It must be stressed that the Khmer right made little distinction
between the Vietnamese communists and the Khmer communists, the
Khmer Rouge, seeing instead two sides of the same face. This perspective,
simplistic and less than accurate in light of later events, is perhaps
understandable given the bi-polar zero-sum ideology of the Cold War
prevalent at the time. Also, in lacking the political-cultural legitimacy
that Sihanouk's persona conferred, the regime saw in communism an
issue exploiting the prevalent and virulent anti-Vietnamese sentiments
of the populace for the purpose of rallying support for the regime. This
rationale worked in the international arena as well: anti-communism
was a crusade that in that era the United States eagerly supported with
military and economic assistance on a massive scale.
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The conflict in Cambodia escalated through the early 1970s as the
government troops, renamed the Khmer National Armed Forces {Forces
Armees Nationales Khmeres -- FANK) engaged first the North Vietnamese
and Viet Cong, and later the old RAK, revitalized and renamed the
Cambodian People's National Liberation Armed Forces (CPNLAF)25. While
the conflict was nominally a civil war, from the start foreign powers
played an active role with a heavy hand. Here again the common
themes of Cambodian conflicts come to the fore: long-standing rivalries,
alliances of convenience, foreign involvement and intervention.
Despite infusions of American funds and American bombs into
Cambodia, the Khmer Republic remained a weak and hollow regime
rendered ineffectual by endemic corruption and incompetence. The
million dollars a day in aid going into Cambodia and the increasingly
intense aerial bombardment campaign known as Arclight26 could only
25Russell R. Ross, ed., Cambodia: A Country Study . 3d ed.,
(Washington D.C.: US Government Printing Office, 1990), 44.
26United States official documents give a figure of 75,959 sorties by
B-52 and
F-lll aircraft dropping a total of 539,129 tons of ordnance -- about 350
percent of the tonnage dropped on Japan during World War II. Most of
the bombs fell on relatively uninhabited regions of Cambodia, although
some of the most densely inhabited areas of the country, such as
Siemreap and Kampong Chang provinces and the countryside
surrounding Phnom Penh, were targeted and hit. Estimates of the
casualties range from 30,000 to 500.000 before the missions were halted
in August 1973. Russell, Cambodia: A Country Study . 46. William
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buy time for the Lon Nol government. The outcome of the battle between
the Khmer Republic and the Khmer Rouge-dominated GRUNK coalition
was never really in doubt. The CPNLAF inexorably swept FANK from the
provinces as the government collapsed upon itself in Phnom Penh. By
late 1974, the Khmer Rouge had their enemies essentially bottled up in
their capital. On January 1, 1975, they initiated the final dry-season
offensive which culminated in the fall of Phnom Penh and the Khmer
Republic on April 17, 1975.
The debt owed to the North Vietnamese by the Khmer Rouge for
their efforts in Cambodia is illuminating. On the one hand, without
North Vietnamese and Viet Cong assistance after the March 1970 coup,
the revolutionary struggle would have dragged on much longer than it
did (five years). Organized into companies, the RAK insurgent forces
probably numbered somewhat less than the 4,000 regular troops and
50,000 guerrillas Pol Pot claimed. It seems certain that the RAK had
neither the strength nor the armament to stand up even against the
30,000-strong ceremonial and civic action force the government
Shawcross, Sideshow , provides a powerful insight to the havoc these
missions wrought, both in Cambodia and the United States.
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fielded 27 . The North Vietnamese army, in engaging FANK for the first two
years after the coup, formed a shield in eastern Cambodia behind which
the Khmer Rouge developed its infrastructure and the CPNLAF trained its
troops.
On the other hand, from the perspective of the Khmer Rouge, the
severity of the American bombings was matched only by the severity
with which the Vietnamese betrayed Cambodia. The Cambodian
communists had refused to participate in the Paris peace talks,
preferring instead to play out their winning military hand. When North
Vietnam and the United States signed the Peace Accords on January 27,
1973, bombing missions over Vietnam and Laos were supposed to be
terminated. No mention was made of Cambodia, however, and the
American bombing effort was freed up to concentrate its efforts on
Khmer Rouge positions in Cambodia. The Khmer Rouge understandably
interpreted this as yet another example of outright hostility on the part
of the Vietnamese, and insensitivity on the part of the world communist
movement, to the plight of the Cambodian party.
27Timothy Carney, "Unexpected Victory," in Cambodia 1975-1978:
Rendezvous with Death . Karl D.Jackson, ed., (Princeton NJ: Princeton
University Press, 1989), 19.
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Pnl Pot Time rs
For nearly all adult Cambodians, April 17, 1975, was the last day
of a war and the first day of a revolution, the beginning of a strange and
new Cambodia. It was on this day that the Red Khmers, the Khmer
Rouge, entered Phnom Penh and announced, "We did not come here to
talk. We enter Phnom Penh as conquerors." 29 The Khmer Rouge victory
marked the beginning of the end of society as the Cambodian people
had known it.
From this ominous beginning until December 1978, over one
million30 Cambodian people perished at the hands of the Khmer Rouge
due to malnutrition, overwork, mistreatment, torture, and execution.
Much has been written by scholars and journalists about the horrors and
28 As Cambodians struggle with an explanation for the brutal and
sad tales that emerge from the period 1975-1979 when the Khmer Rouge
ran their country, Pol Pot is the only answer most can come up with
about who is to blame. Such an answer obscures the issue of what really
happened and why in the simplicity of laying all responsibility at the
feet of Pol Pot. Margaret Scott, "War and memory: Cambodians confront
the legacy of the Khmer Rouge," FEER, 16 April 1992, 36.
29"Phnom Penh Surrenders to Rebel Forces After Cease Fire Offer is
Rejected," New York Times . 17 April 1975; and "Rebels Set Up Phnom
Penh Rule," New York Times . 18 April 1975.
30This number is simply the most common estimate by legitimate
and reasonably objective sources -- various agencies have put forth
estimates ranging from the low hundred thousands to three million out
of a pre-war population estimated at seven and one-half million.
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brutal conditions of the seemingly insane social and economic
revolution the conquering Khmer Rouge imposed on the country 3 1.
Driven by a vision to completely re-order society and create an agrarian
communistic Utopia, the Khmer Rouge simply astonished the world with
their single-minded determination, the lengths to which they were
willing to go, to follow through on their rhetoric of curing the ills of
Cambodian society. The speed and scope of the implementation of their
revolution, the willingness of the Khmer Rouge to use terror and genocide
as a means to achieve their ends, is horrifying and shocking by all
modern standards.
The revolution's ideology was dominated by four interrelated
themes: 1) total independence and self-reliance even unto extremis; 2)
preservation of the dictatorship of the proletariat with terror simply as a
methodology of maintaining power; 3) total and immediate economic
revolution in the form of collective agrarianism; and 4) complete and
immediate transformation of traditional Khmer social values -- family
31 For particularly excellent narratives and reporting on this era of
Cambodian history, see Chandler, Tragedy of Cambodian History :
William Shawcross, The Quality of Mercv: Cambodia. Holocaust and
Modern Conscience (New York: Simon and Schuster, 1984); Nayan
Chanda, Brother Enemy: The War After the War (San Diego: Harcourt
Brace Jovanovich, 1986); Elizabeth Becker, When The War Was Over (New
York: Simon and Schuster, 1986); Karl D.Jackson, ed., Cambodia 1975-
1978:Rendezvous with Death (Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press,
1989).
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life, religion, work habits -- into a revolutionary morality 32 . The catch-
words 'total' and 'immediate' capture the operational spirit and theme
of this ideology. Heartless beyond all human compassion in the
ruthlessness of its application, this ideology subjected the Cambodian
people to the most intense, rapid, and far-reaching social experiment the
world has ever seen. Impatience led to intolerance of "reforms" as the
Khmer Rouge sought to rebuild Cambodia from the ground up. Most
teachers, doctors, artists, monks, intellectuals, even those who wore
spectacles were murdered in the eradication of any and all hold-over
counter-revolutionary elements that might impede the revolution. The
view of the Khmer Rouge as a fanatical band of neo-Maoist or Marxist
killers who engineered a bizarre campaign of genocide will probably
never be altered: the Khmer Rouge has never made a serious attempt to
defend their actions during their three year experiment, let alone launch
a counter-propaganda campaign.
The uniquely fascinating and ultimately frightening characteristic
of the Khmer Rouge is the degree to which theirs remained an
ideologically pure movement. Uncompromising in its determination to
carry out its master plan to recreate Cambodia, even after the political
32 Karl D. Jackson, "Ideology of Total Revolution," in Cambodia
1975-1978: Rendezvous with Death , ed. Karl D. Jackson (Princeton, NJ:
Princeton University Press, 1989), 39.
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victory and the creation of Democratic Kampuchea (DK), the Khmer
Rouge, however, were by no means a monolithic organization. On the eve
of its 1975 victory over the Lon Nol regime, the Khmer Communist Party
was quite diverse in terms of personnel, ideological viewpoints, and
factional loyalties 33 . The clandestine nature of the Cambodian
communist movement, taken at times to paranoid extremes, makes it
difficult to pin down precisely the number and nature of the factions
associated with this period 34 . Of the various factions identified in this
time period, the split of interest in this discussion is the division of the
Khmer Rouge into the Pol Pot and pro-Vietnamese factions.
The Mayaguez incident 3 ^ had initially convinced Pol Pot and the
33 Russell, Cambodia: A Country Study . 63; Timothy Carney, "the
Organization of Power," in Cambodia: 1975-1978 . 95.
34Craig Etcheson, The Rise and Demis e of Democratic Kampuchea
(Boulder CO: Westview Press, 1984), identifies six factions; Ben Kiernan,
"Pol Pot and the Kampuchean Communist Movement," in Peasants and
Politics in Kampuchea. 1942-1981
. eds. Ben Kiernan and Chanthou Boua
(New York: M. E. Sharpe, Inc., 1982), identifies three such factions. The
importance of differences of ideology in party splits should not, however,
be overemphasized. Behind doctrinal differences lay the dynamics of
personal rivalry and the strong sense of patron-client loyalty that has
always characterized Cambodian politics. Russell, Cambodia: A Country
Study . 63.
350n May 12,1975, an American merchant ship, the S.S. Mayaguez
was boarded and seized by Khmer Rouge naval units protecting the
island of Puolo Wai from Vietnamese encroachment. Washington
declared the Mayaguez an international crisis of Cold War confrontation.
Failing to receive a timely response from Phnom Penh, the US launched
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DK leadership that US imperialism remained the primary threat to their
revolution — once again the Americans seemed to have bombed their
country wantonly, after they had declared they would return the seized
ship 36 . As the American threat faded, or rather as the Vietnamese threat
emerged in the form of territorial encroachment, Cambodia's policy
towards Vietnam became the major point of disagreement within the
ranks of the Khmer Rouge. Pol Pot considered Vietnam to be Cambodia's
main enemy, whereas his opponents, mostly cadres from the Eastern
Zone 37 , wished to maintain the policy of alliance and cooperation that
bombing raids on the port of Kompong Som and the naval base at Ream,
and naval gunfire barrages and a Marine assault of the island of Koh
Tang. Thirty-eight American servicemen lost their lives to save the thirty-
nine crewman, with most of the casualties occurring after the crew
members had been released.
36The lines of communication between Phnom Penh and the rest of
Cambodia, much less the outside world, were tenuous at best and
certainly not direct. The timely ending and receiving of messages,
conducting the diplomacy of responding to demands and deadlines,
may have simply been beyond the capability of the Khmer Rouge.
Becker, When the War was Over . 208-210.
37The Khmer Rouge abolished the old provinces (khet) and instead
organized the country into seven zones and two regional-level units
(phumipeak). These administrative units were headed by a politico-
military committee appointed by the CPK. The leadership of these zones
had operated more-or-less autonomously during the war and often
reflected the different revolutionary background and tendencies of the
cadre. The Eastern Zone, for example, was heavily staffed by old
revolutionaries who had cooperated with Vietnam in the anti-French
struggles of the First Indochina War and the anti-American struggle of
39
had characterized the relationship between the Vietnamese and
Cambodian communist movements prior to victory 38 .
A major change occurred in April 1976 as Pol Pot emerged as the
dominant leader of the tightly disciplined Angkar, the Organization, that
formed the vanguard of the communist party 39 . Still shrouding itself in
secrecy at this time, still behaving like a party of revolution rather than
a party of governance, the communist leadership began feeding upon
itself. Disagreements over policy issues, particularly the Vietnamese
question, turned into matters of treason and justification for execution40 .
Attempted coup d'etats and purges became the format of political
dialogue in Cambodia. Torture-induced confessions, mostly ludicrous in
the Second Indochina War. Chandler, Tragedy of Cambodian History .
266-267; Vickery, Cambodia. 1975-1982 . 82-143; Carney, "The
Organization of Power," in Cambodia 1975-1978
.
93-94.
38 Michael Vickery, Kampuchea: Politics. Economics and Society
(London: Frances Pinter (Publishers), 1986), 34.
39Clark D. Neher, Southeast Asia in the New International Era
(Boulder, CO: Westview Press, 1991), 180.
40Chandler, Tragedy of Cambodian History . 286-7.
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the scope of crimes admitted to, provided fuel for the fires of angst over
enemies real and imagined 41 .
Even in revolutionary Democratic Kampuchea, the influence of
outside players on internal politics remained a crucial factor, especially
as the KCP turned on itself in purges and coups. Radicals in the Chinese
Communist Party had backed the pro-Vietnamese elements of the KCP42
because they were interested in maintaining good relations with Hanoi43 .
The arrest of the "Gang of Four" in Beijing in October 1976 led to the rise
41 See Chandler, Tragedy of Cambodian History . 273-318, for an
excellent chapter of primary source material regarding the prison-torture-
execution facility at Tuol Sleng Incarceration Center in Phnom Penh.
Becker, When the War Was Over , is filled with individual stories
concerning confessions and the fate of KCP members who entered Tuol
Slang. The three acknowledged western experts of events at Tuol Sleng
have published as follows: Stephen Heder, "Democratic Kampuchea: The
Regime's Post-Mortem," Indochina Issues 13 (January 1981); David Hawk,
"International Human Rights Law and Democratic Kampuchea,"
International Journal of Politics 16 (Fall 1986); and Timothy Michael
Carney, Communist Party Power in Kampuchea (Cambodia): Documents
and Discussion (Ithaca, NY: Department of Asian Studies, Cornell
University, 1977).
42 leading to two abortive coups involving Eastern Zone troops
against the center led by Pol Pot in July and September 1975. Russell,
Cambodia: A Country Study . 64.
43Etcheson, The Rise and Demise of Democratic Kampuchea ; and
Kiernan, in "Wild Chickens, Farm Chickens and Cormorants:
Kampuchea's Eastern Zone Under Pol Pot," in Revolution and Its
Aftermath in Kampuchea eds. David P. Chandler and Ben Kiernan, (New
Haven: Yale University Southeast Asia Studies, 1984).
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of the moderates led by Deng Xioping. Deng was inclined to be suspicious
and wary of Vietnam's territorial ambitions, regarding it as an outgrowth
of Soviet "hegemonism." Recognizing the geopolitical threat of having a
Soviet-Vietnamese client in power in Cambodia, Deng and the newly
moderate Chinese Communist Party leadership came down on the side of
Pol Pot and his anti-Vietnamese supporters.
Ideologically from opposite ends of the revolutionary spectrum,
the pragmatic Deng and the ultra-radical Pol Pot recognized the mutual
benefit of their relationship44 . Once again the commonly recurring
theme of strange bed-fellows in search for security in the Cambodian
geopolitical context is borne out. The support of China gave Pol Pot the
horsepower necessary to clean house. In February 1977, the party center,
led by Pol Pot and supported by Ta Mok, a strongly anti-Vietnamese
party head from the Southwestern Zone, initiated a purge of the pro-
Vietnamese opposition within the KCP45 . The purges intensified following
an attempted coup in August, and were to continue to the last days of
the Khmer Rouge grip on power in Cambodia in January 1979.
44Wayne Bert, "Chinese Policies and U.S. Interests in Southeast
Asia," Asian Survey 33 (March 1993): 328.
4 5 Kenneth M. Quinn, "The Pattern and Scope of Violence," in
Cambodia 1975-1978: Rendezvous with Death . Karl D. Jackson, ed.,
(Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press, 1989), 197-200.
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The effect of the purges was to radicalize the Cambodian
leadership and sow the seeds for its own destruction. More moderate
Khmer communists were either liquidated in the successive rounds .of
purges that swept Cambodia, or were forced to flee the country given the
impending threat of falling victim to one of the purges. Many of the
cadre who escaped fled to Vietnam. It was these former cadre who
fronted the Vietnamese invasion and occupation of Cambodia.
The Vietnamese Interregnum
Territorial relations between Cambodia and Vietnam had never
historically been good. Disputes between the two go back centuries and
started anew shortly after the Khmer Rouge captured Phnom Penh in
1975 46 . It was just such a dispute over possession of border-area islands
in the Gulf of Thailand that provided the tinder for the Mayaguez
incident (see note above). With Pol Pot and his anti-Vietnamese clique
firmly entrenched at the head of the Phnom Penh regime in 1977, the
border situation between Vietnam and Cambodia deteriorated rapidly.
Socialist ideology lost out to Khmer nationalism as the Khmer Rouge
leadership entertained grandiose visions of regaining territory lost to
Vietnam in the distant past. Specifically, Pol Pot seemed to have his
sights set on the historic Mekong Delta region of Cochinchina or
46Russell, Cambodia: A Country Study . 262.
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Kampuchea Krom, the area around present-day Ho Chi Minh City. This
area had been lost to the Vietnamese in the seventeenth century, having
been part of the ancient Khmer empire of Angkor.
Incidents of border incursions and armed skirmishes escalated
along all of Cambodia's borders beginning in 1976, and especially
between Khmer Rouge and Vietnamese forces as 1977 wore on. There were
also incidents along the Thai and Laotian frontiers between Cambodian
and local armed forces. In October 1977, border fighting had reached the
point that Vietnam decided to launch a punitive campaign comprised
of a force of 20,000 personnel with the aim of teaching the Khmer Rouge
a lesson. In December, an additional 58,000 personnel were deployed as
reinforcements as the Vietnamese encountered tenacious Khmer Rouge
resistance. Following an orderly withdrawal from Cambodian territory47
,
the Vietnamese leadership decided to change tactics. The Vietnamese
began efforts to foment and support an internal resistance movement to
the Pol Pot Angkar faction given the continued anti-Vietnamese
belligerence in Phnom Penh48 .
47 Pol Pot claimed this an even greater triumph than the April 17
victory over the Lon Nol regime.
48 Quinn, "The Pattern and Scope of Violence," in Cambodia 1975
1978 . 205.
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This movement was centered on the Eastern Zone among KCP
members who had loyally served their party in Vietnam, for perhaps
most of their adult life in many cases. Given the purges underway at the
time (as noted above), it seems that the cadre in the Eastern Zone were
caught between the proverbial rock and hard place. They would be
damned if they did rebel against Pol Pot, and damned if they did not
rebel since they would be presumed to be guilty of harboring such
sympathies anyway. Given the ever-widening scope of the purges, it
seemed to many only a matter of time before they would be summoned
to Tuol Sleng prison or a regional facsimile. It was thus Pol Pot's fear of
the Vietnamese and the resulting purges that drove many senior KCP
officers to break with him and side with Vietnam 49 . It is ironic that Pol
Pot's Vietnamese paranoia would become a self-fulfilling prophesy of
insurrection originating among those cadres with an affinity for the
Vietnamese.
In May 1978, So Phim, a long-time rival to Pol Pot, first vice-
president of the presidium and member of the KCP Political Bureau, led
an uprising in the Eastern Zone. The revolt failed and resulted in
massive retaliation by Pol Pot and his Southwestern henchmen. As many
49Quinn, "The Pattern and Scope of Violence," in Cambodia 1975-
1978 . 207.
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as 100,000 people in the Eastern Zone, political cadres, "new people 50 ,"
and ethnic Vietnamese residents -- labeled people with "Khmer bodies
but Vietnamese minds" -- were liquidated or were deported to face
certain death in other parts of the country. In November, Vorn Vet,
second vice premier and head of the special Phnora Penh capital zone,
pro-Vietnamese leader, led another coup attempt that failed. With tens
of thousands Cambodian exiles seeking sanctuary on Vietnamese
territory, the Vietnamese announced the formation of the Kampuchean
National United Front for National Salvation (KNUFNS) on December 3,
1978. A heterogenous mix of dogs and cats, communist and non-
communist exiles, who shared an antipathy to the Pol Pot regime, this
group mirrored previous Cambodian resistance groups in being strange
bed-fellows brought together by common aversions rather than common
interests. It also maintained commonality in being wholly dependent on
an external power, Vietnam in this case, for support and survival.
Cambodian aggressiveness in the border areas finally surpassed the
Vietnamese threshold of tolerance for challenges to its territorial
50The terms "new people" or "April 17 people" were used to
identify those who had been living in cities and towns on April 17, 1975.
People so identified were marked for punishment for presumably
"betraying" the revolution unlike the "old people" or "base people" who
had lived in the countryside and supported the Red Khmers. Chandler,
The Land and People of Cambodia . 2-3.
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integrity 51 . The tenure of Pol Pot's grip on Cambodia ended with the
launching on December 25, 1978 of the Vietnamese invasion of
Cambodia. An overwhelming force of 120,000 Vietnamese troops
supported by a lesser Khmer force of three regiments swept through
Cambodia in two weeks to capture Phnom Penh on January 7, 1979. A
new administration, the People's Republic of Kampuchea (PRK), was set
up a few days later in Phnom Penh under Vietnamese supervision. This
government was headed by Heng Samrin, a former Khmer Rouge division
commander who had fled to Vietnam when his faction was overpowered
by that of Pol Pot52 . The rest of the new government consisted largely of
Cambodian's who had defected from the DK after 1976 or had spent
many years of their lives serving in Vietnam.
The invasion succeeded in its intent to overthrow Democratic
Kampuchea, but only insofar as pushing the Khmer Rouge out of the
cities and into the forests and jungles of the Thai border areas. From new
jungle hideouts and mountain lairs, Pol Pot and the Khmer Rouge
regrouped and re-established an insurgency against the regime in power
as they had done against Lon Nol and the republicans in the late 1960s.
51 Stephen J. Solarz, "Cambodia and the International
Community," Foreign Affairs 69 (Spring 1990), 102.
52Neher, Southeast Asia in the New International Era . 181.
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The end of Democratic Kampuchea's tenure in Phnom Penh failed to
spell the coming of peace; civil war continued to rage as a Khmer Rouge
dominated coalition of Cambodian forces fought to resist the Vietnamese-
installed Heng Samrin regime 53 . Stalemate, a permanent state of
insecurity as the government fought a low-intensity conflict, set in as the
insurgency was unable to topple the PRK regime, and the PRK regime was
unable to eradicate the insurgency.
53By 1986 Heng Samrin had become little more than a figurehead
as chief of state; Hun Sen. prime minister and foreign minister, has
emerged as the leading figure in the PRK (later the State of Cambodia
[SOC]). Neher, Southeast Asia in the New International Era . 184.
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IV. THE CONFLICTS TO BE RESOLVED (1979-1991)
A. ENTANGLING WEBS OF INTERNATIONAL ASSISTANCE
By the end of 1979, the Vietnamese and their Cambodian
surrogates in the PRK were firmly in control of the country54 . The
presence of Vietnam's 150,000-1 70,000-man army of occupation ensured
control of the major population centers and most of the countryside.
The population at large offered little resistance to the invaders having
been rendered weak and weary during three years of Khmer Rouge-
sponsored terror and totalitarian revolution 55 . Many Cambodians
welcomed the Vietnamese, as they had welcomed the Khmer Rouge in
1975, with stunned relief and hopes that peace and stability would
accompany the new regime.
54Nayan Chanda makes a rather compelling case for the hypothesis
that the complete seizure of Cambodia by Vietnam may have been the
result of strategic opportunism. Spectacular military successes and the
rapid crumbling of Phnom Penh's defenses outstripped the Vietnamese
ability to fully take up the reins of government due to
uncharacteristically poor or non-existent advanced planning. Thus, it
was not until late in the year that Vietnam had consolidated its hold on
Cambodia. Chanda, Brother Enemv . 345-347.
55 David Joel Steinberg, ed., In Search of Southeast Asia: A Modern
History (Honolulu: University of Hawaii Press, 1987), 382.
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As with the Khmer Rouge in 1975, however, the Vietnamese were to
disappoint hopes for an end to the political woes of Cambodia. Peace
and stability continued to elude Cambodia as the invasion and
occupation unleashed a new round of conflict. For anti-Vietnamese
critics of the new regime, the inauguration of the PRK opened a new
colonial era for Cambodia, a period of Vietnamese overlords and
governments-in-exile. For anti-Communist opponents, the new regime
represented a renewed commitment to a socialism that many Khmer
believed had been discredited or overtaken by events past56 . The change
of leadership in Phnom Penh meant a shuffling of the conflicting factions
into new alliances of convenience and expediency, but no real change for
Cambodia as a country embroiled in a civil war. In this civil war, the
particularly Cambodian themes of foreign influence and intervention,
and of politico-military alliances based upon common aversions rather
than common interests, continued to play themselves out in the
Cambodian context.
The Khmer Rouge was supported logistically by China and
Thailand as they took up a guerrilla resistance movement based in
remote areas of northwestern Cambodia. Other anti-Vietnamese non-
communist resistance groups (NCR's), one made up of former Lon Nol
56Chandler, Tragedy of Cambodian History . 313.
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republicans under Son Sann and another of royalists following Prince
Sihanouk, were supported by the United States. Featuring their own
military factions, these groups took up the fight (at least nominally)
against the Vietnamese and their PRK puppets. Tortuous negotiations
that began in 1979 finally bore fruit as these three groups joined together
in the anti-Vietnamese cause to form the tripartite Coalition
Government of Democratic Kampuchea (CGDK) in June 1982. Presenting
a resolute and determined opposition, Cambodia in time became
Vietnam's Vietnam, a quagmire of low-intensity conflict requiring
extensive military commitment in a time of waning Soviet support,
domestic unrest, and pressing needs for economic reconstruction at
home 57
.
The ability of Cambodian communists and anti-communists to
put aside ideological differences and mutual antagonisms in the face of
an external threat to the Cambodian national identity brings to mind a
similar example of disparate groups coming together in China. China
was in the midst of a fierce internecine war between the Nationalists
(KMT) and the Communists (CCP) when Japanese aggression erupted in
57Solarz, "Cambodia and the International Community," 103.
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1937 58 . In the face of an external threat to China's survival, the KMT and
CCP hastily concluded an uneasy alliance in common cause against the
Japanese invader. The parallels between the historical example and the
Cambodian case are striking in their continuity. Wary and suspicious of
each other in grudging cooperation, both coalitions fought among
themselves almost as often as they fought their common enemy. The
question remains whether the Cambodian factions will return to warring
on each other when the external player is eliminated (the Vietnam has
since been supplanted by the UN in the current scenario), as in the
Chinese case. This question will be returned to in a later section of this
study.
B. THE REFUGEE PROBLEM
The Vietnamese invasion of 1979 sparked the beginning of one of
Cambodia's most intractable problems, that of refugees and displaced
persons. Rather than welcoming the Vietnamese invaders, many
Cambodians chose to flee the upheaval brought about by the continuing
58 For a complete and authoritative discussion of the events cited
in this section, see John K. Fairbank, Edwin O. Reischauer, and Albert M.
Craig, eds.. East Asia: Tradition and Transformation , rev. ed. (Boston:
Houghton Mifflin company. 1989) 797-807, 932-940.
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and widening civil war. Upwards of 400,00059 Cambodians became
displaced persons, refugees in border camps and holding areas in
Thailand and other Southeast Asian countries. The more resourceful,
educated, and healthy sought refuge in France, Canada, the US and other
Western nations60 . One collateral effect of this exodus,taken together with
the previous efforts of the Khmer rouge to eradicate all Cambodians with
an education or Western experience, was a lack of talent available to run
the country. Since the Vietnamese occupation, Cambodia has been
largely dependent on foreign advisers and entrepreneurs to keep the
lights on and the businesses open.
William Shawcross, in his book The Quality of Mercv . examines in
detail the refugee problem and relief efforts that took place in Cambodia
after 1979. The refugee problem unfolded in two parts or phases. First,
the renewed conflict engendered by the invasion resulted in thousands of
Cambodians fleeing the violence, often swept along by remnants of the
Khmer Rouge making for Thailand, second, the end of the Khmer Rouge
59This number, like all demographic statistics relevant to
Cambodia's past 20 years, is merely an estimate. Various sources have
listed various numbers ranging from 300,000 to 800,000 persons. This
number is from UNHCR sources based on the number of Cambodians that
had be repatriated as part of the peace process. Nate Thayer, "Wretched
of the Earth," Far Eastern Economic Review . 15 April 1993, 21.
60 Steinberg, In Search of Southeast Asia . 382.
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regime meant the end of the draconian Khmer Rouge policy of forcibly
keeping the people on agrarian collectives. Hundreds of thousands of
Cambodians took to criss-crossing the country seeking to reunite families,
hoping to reclaim land, trying to put their lives back together. As the
population flowed across the countryside like a river overflowing its
banks, the 1978-79 rice harvest was largely abandoned in the fields61 .
This set the stage for massive food shortages, which in turn resulted in
famine as farmers were forced to consume the rice seed necessary for
later planting. Already weakened by years of overwork and malnutrition,
many Cambodians, particularly the young and very old faced
starvation. The international community responded with a massive
relief effort. More than $400 million was provided between 1979 and
1982, with the US contributing almost a quarter of this total62 .
Shawcross is highly critical of the emergency humanitarian aid
efforts administered largely through the United Nations and other
international non-governmental organizations (i.e. the International
Committee of the Red Cross) for their parochialism, mismanagement and
sanctimonious behavior. It is Shawcross' observation that ineptitude and
naivete in the application of the international assistance to people in
6 iChandler, The Land and People of Cambodia . 159.
62 Sutter, The Cambodian Crisis . 15.
54
distress can actually reinforce the underlying causes of their despair;
such was true in Cambodia as the effect of humanitarian aid was to
reinforce the political stalemate between the administration in Phnom
Penh and the CGDK resistance led by the Khmer Rouge63 . Diversion of
relief supplies to the warring parties allowed them to concentrate their
resources on acquiring the implements of struggle and war.
C. THE COMPETING INTERNATIONAL INTERESTS
The world reacted with astonishment as the Vietnamese celebrated
their success in Phnom Penh: both sides had for some time prior kept
secret their escalating border disputes and clashes. The rapid crumbling
of the Khmer Rouge forces resulted in a blitzkrieg-type victory caught
even the Vietnamese by surprise. In short order, Vietnam had upset the
geopolitical balance of power in Southeast Asia by displacing Democratic
Kampuchea and establishing itself as the dominant influence in
Indochina. Astonishment in the international community quickly
turned into either condemnation or exultation. The contradictory
reactions resulted from contending interpretations of the root causes of
the conflict, which varied directly with bloc orientation and geopolitical
interest. What Hanoi saw as the liberation of a socialist neighbor from a
63William Shawcross, The Quality of Mercv (New York: Simon and
Schuster, 1984), 414.
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noxious, repressive regime, and as a necessary step in securing the
integrity of its own borders, was seen in most Western nations and China
as unprovoked aggressions-*.
The removal of the Pol Pot regime in itself elicited very little
international sympathy: stories of the massively inhumane practices of
the Khmer Rouge had been trickling out of Cambodia with refugees who
escaped the killing fields. With the Vietnamese propaganda blitz that
followed the invasion, the trickle of stories became a flood of undeniable
facts as the reign of terror perpetrated by the Khmer Rouge came to light
in records written in the hand of the torturers and executioners
themselves. The Khmer Rouge definitely deserved to be ousted. What
served to focus world opinion against Vietnam, so crucial in its own
victory against the US, was the question of its ultimate intention in
installing a client regime. Vietnam elicited condemnation among its
neighbors not for what it did per se, but what it might do next. Behind
the boilerplate and rhetoric of respect and support for self-determination
and independence, there lay pragmatic and abiding international
security concerns, ambitions and interests.
Thailand. ASEAN, and the United States
64Chandler, Land and People of Cambodia . 160.
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Most vocal in its opposition to Vietnam's occupation of Cambodia
was Thailand, which felt directly threatened in losing its traditional
buffer against its historical enemy65 . Thailand's call for Vietnam's
immediate withdrawal from Cambodia was echoed by her allies in the
Association of Southeast Asian Nations (ASEAN)66 , Indonesia, Malaysia,
the Philippines, and Singapore67 . ASEAN was motivated to condemn the
Vietnamese presence due to the perceived implications the Cambodian
conflict had for the wider regional security environment. The Vietnamese
invasion ended ASEAN's hope for peace and stability after the US
disengagement in Indochina, seeing instead the door re-opened to
increased Great Power rivalry in the region. Vietnam's actions threatened
ASEAN's policy of not allowing one country to intervene in the internal
affairs of another country in the region; its goal was to prevent a
Vietnamese success in Cambodia by withholding recognition of the PRK
65 Thailand shares a very permeable 500 mile border with
Cambodia. Besides regarding Cambodia as a buffer against Vietnam,
Thailand views the richly forested regions of northern Cambodia and the
gem-filled areas of southwestern Cambodia as lucrative economic
resources not to be lost to rivals.
66
"Joint Statement by ASEAN Foreign Ministers, January 12, 1979,"
text given by Bangkok radio as reported by Foreign Broadcast
Information Service in Daily Report: Asian and Pacific . January 15, 1979,
A-l.
^Brunei joined ASEAN in 1984.
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(thus legitimating it) and applying diplomatic and economic pressure
on Hanoi to quit Cambodia.
The United States concurred with Thailand's insistence on the
need for an immediate Vietnamese withdrawal from Cambodia, yet
lacked the credibility and political will to do much about it. Suffering
from a tentativeness born of pessimism and self-doubt, what has since
been labelled "Vietnam-syndrome,"68 the US chose to follow ASEAN's
diplomatic lead on Cambodia, playing instead a supporting role. As the
diplomatic effort shifted to the world stage, the US backed the request by
Democratic Kampuchea (now a government-in-exile) for an emergency
meeting of the United Nations Security Council to take up the issue of
Vietnamese aggression. The US complied with the ASEAN strategy of in
keeping Vietnam isolated from the world market economy of Western
investment and economic aid. Although it had never recognized
Democratic Kampuchea when the Khmer Rouge was in power, and while
it certainly decried the Khmer Rouge's deplorable record of human rights
violations, the US eventually fell into a policy of indirectly supporting
the Khmer Rouge in providing what it termed non-lethal aid to the tune
of $5 million a year to the anti-Vietnamese resistance. As seen with
humanitarian assistance, non-lethal aid allowed the protagonists to shift
68
"Ending America's Vietnam Syndrome," Far Eastern Economic
Review
. 7 January 1993, 5.
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resources to lethal venues. Like the CGDK NCR members, the US was
drawn in not by ideology, but by its aversion to an old enemy, Vietnam.
China
Vietnam's taking of Cambodia eliminated China's only ally in
Southeast Asia. China had backed the Khmer Rouge, albeit somewhat
reluctantly, primarily as a counter-balance to the increasing Soviet
presence in Indochina. Throughout the early 1970s, Beijing's foreign
policy was predicated on resisting Soviet "encirclement," expansion of its
influence on China's southern periphery69. Given Vietnam's historical
enmity towards China, and its entry into the Soviet orbit, it took no
great leap of paranoia for China to construe Vietnam's invasion and
occupation of Cambodia as an attempt to establish an Indochinese
Federation 70 as a surrogate for Soviet "hegemonism."
69Robert S. Ross, "China and the Cambodian Peace Process: The
Value of Coercive Diplomacy." Asian Survey 31 (December 1991), 1171.
70 This charge grew out statements variously attributed to Ho Chi
Minh regarding an "age old dream" for an Indochinese federation [lower
case "f"]. It was publicly feared, largely for propaganda purposes of
depicting Vietnam as an imperialist, that it putting into play a grand
scheme. This allegation enjoyed wide play and acceptance in Southeast
Asia; the explanation that Vietnam was merely acting to end the
atrocities being carried out in Cambodia simply could not be taken at
face value. Most analysts have since dismissed the Federation factor as
an irredentist myth useful in mobilizing the nationalistic impulses in a
population against a common enemy. For a discussion focused
specifically on this nationalistic myth, see David C. Harrison,
"Indochina: The Federation Factor." M.A. thesis, Naval Postgraduate
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China's response to the Vietnamese invasion was a bit more
comprehensive and to the point than ASEAN's call for consultations in
the UN. Beijing pursued a multi-lateral and multi-faceted course of
action combining diplomatic, economic, and military policy instruments
to achieve the political end of ensuring a minimal adversarial power on
its periphery71 . China initially pursued a military demonstration and
began massing men and material along its southern border. In February
1979, 250,000 Chinese troops invaded northern Vietnam with the aim of
teaching Vietnam "necessary lessons.
"
7 2 After three weeks spent
destroying most of the Vietnamese villages within twenty miles of the
border, and suffering heavy losses in the process, the Chinese declared
their point made and withdrew their troops. Although a giant in size
and power, China was, however, unable to achieve militarily its objective
of forcing the Vietnamese out of Cambodia, and so realize its strategic
goal of establishing itself as the regional authority in Southeast Asia.
School, 1982.
71 Ross, "China and the Cambodian Peace Process," 1170-1172.
72Teng Hsiao-ping [Deng Xiopingl, from a statement given in
Washington D.C. as reported by Eileen Teltsch, "Vietnamese Seek
'Appropriate Measures' by U.N.," New York Times . 18 February 1979.
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Vietnam
On the face of it, Vietnam's supporters celebrated the liberation of
the Khmer people from a repressive regime described officially in the PRK
literature as the "genocidal regime of the Pol Pot/Ieng Sary clique."73 The
noxious nature of the Khmer Rouge was emphasized, their deviation
from human decency and standards of civilized behavior.The Khmer
patriots founding the PRK were celebrated for establishing a peaceful,
independent, democratic, and nonaligned Cambodia that could resume
the advance towards scientific socialism.
In a gratuitous bit of revisionism, the Vietnamese presented the
conflict in Cambodia as having originated in a domestic power struggle
between rival factions: the Khmer Rouge faction were a faction led by Pol
Pot that had been ousted by a Cambodian National Liberation Front that
came later to be known as the PRK. Hanoi rejected the contention that it
was a direct party to the Cambodian conflict, arguing instead that its
deployment of troops were in accordance with a security treaty signed in
1979 with the Front. While disavowing a direct role in the conflict,
Vietnam acknowledged the wider geopolitical dimensions of the
Cambodian situation. In this context Vietnam argued that its troops
? 3Chandler, Tragedy of Cambodian History . 312.
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served as a counter to the threat of Chinese expansionism, basically
taking the world view and turning it around.
Soviet Bloc
In reality the Vietnamese invasion laid bare the hollowness of
communist ideology and its anti-imperialism message in overrunning a
socialist comrade-in-arms. In provoking a red-on-red engagement,
Vietnam essentially dispelled the myth of Marxist-Leninist solidarity that
had formed the bedrock of its appeal as an alternative movement to
exploitative capitalism in less developed countries. The Vietnamese
occupation instead served to highlight the Sino-Soviet split, the
internecine hegemonic rivalry in the international communist
movement. The pattern of diplomatic recognitions of the new state of
the People's Republic of Kampuchea reflected this state of affairs of Great
Power rivalry. In rapid succession after Vietnam established a PRK foreign
ministry under a thirty year-old former Khmer Rouge cadre named Hun
Sen, the Soviet Union, various Marxist-Leninist states in the Soviet bloc,
India and other developing countries in the Soviet orbit formally
established relations with the PRK.
Impasse
By January 1980, a diplomatic stalemate had emerged as twenty-
nine countries recognized the regime in power in Phnom Penh, the PRK,
62
as the legitimate government of Cambodia, while nearly eighty
continued to recognize the regime in exile, Democratic Kampuchea, as
the legitimate state in principle 74 . With neither regime able to defeat the
other on the battlefield, attention was focused on the UN as a forum for
resolution of the dispute. Over Soviet objection, Prince Sihanouk was
allowed to address the Security Council in January 1979. Speaking from
the Khmer Rouge perspective, but also as Cambodia's former monarch
and symbol of unity, the prince charged the Vietnamese with naked
aggression against Cambodia. In an emotional appeal, Sihanouk called
upon the Security Council to condemn Hanoi's interference in
Cambodia's internal affairs and establishment of a puppet regime.
Despite stirring up much outrage in the international forum, Sihanouk's
efforts were for naught. Dispute over which delegation should occupy
Cambodia's seat in the UN General Assembly, that of the Khmer Rouge or
the one sent by the PRK, resulted in a diplomatic stalemate. The
stalemate created by this dispute effectively rendered the UN unable to
effect any diplomatic resolution to the conflict in Cambodia
While charge and counter-charge went back and forth in the UN,
the Chinese began what Stephen Solarz, then Chairman of the House
Subcommittee on Asian and Pacific Affairs, termed moral cynicism in
74 Russell, Cambodia: A Country Study . 191.
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supplying arms and supplies to the exiled leaders of the Khmer Rouge to
restore the balance of power7 ^. In this pragmatic effort to prop up the
Khmer Rouge resistance, the Chinese were actively assisted by the Thais
who provided logistical support in the form of transport, food and
shelter. The US, then undergoing a pro-Chinese/anti-Vietnamese phase of
its foreign policy, gave its tacit approval to the Thai and Chinese efforts
to support an insurgency; indeed the US furthered these efforts in the
form of imposing an effective aid and trade embargo against Vietnam. As
will be shown later in this paper, it was this economic facet of the
Chinese strategy that eventually brought around the Vietnamese to the
negotiating table in earnest. But this was not to happen for ten years.
The end result for Cambodia of the military and diplomatic impasses,
the failure of the quick solutions, was the completion of the setting of
the stage for another prolonged period of foreign occupation and civil
war.
7 5Solarz, "Cambodia and the International Community," 102.
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V. THE INTERNATIONAL SOLUTION
On 23 October 1991, an agreement was signed in Paris that
constituted a commitment by the signatories to a political settlement
process designed to achieve a resolution of the Cambodian conflict. A
collection of three Agreements and attendant Annexes, the document
signed in Paris was entitled "Agreements on a Comprehensive Political
Settlement of the Cambodia Conflict76 ," hereafter referred to simply as
the Agreements. The parties to the Agreements were the four warring
Cambodian factions (State of Cambodia, Khmer Rouge, Son Sann's KPNLF,
and Sihanouk's FUNCINPEC 77 ); the regional powers with vested interests
in the conflict (Vietnam, China, and Thailand); and other concerned or
interested countries including the United States, Soviet Union, France,
Japan, India, and eleven others. The accord's intent on one level was to
bring to an end the 14-year civil war that has plagued Cambodia since
the Vietnamese invasion and occupation in late 1978. On another, it was
76United Nations, A greements on a Comprehensive Political
Settlement of the Cambodian Conflict , document A/46/608, S/23177, 23
October 1991.
77These acronyms and groups will be defined and discussed below.
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to create a Cambodia at peace, with a pluralized political system and
prospects for a viable economy7 8
A. THE INTERNATIONAL VIEW OF THE CONFLICT
Great Power Involvement
The "Big Picture" interpretation of the 1978 Vietnamese invasion of
Cambodia has been that of a proxy war fought by surrogates of China
and junior partners of the Soviet Union. As mentioned above, China
began actively and exclusively supporting the Pol Pot regime in 1977
against fears of a Soviet-Vietnamese client state coming to pass in
Cambodia. The low-intensity intra-party struggle fought between Pol Pot
and the Eastern Zone cadres raised the specter in Beijing's mind that a
less-than-independent regime in Phnom Penh could constitute a
competitive or antagonistic Vietnamese-cum-Soviet presence in a region
China regarded as its own exclusive sphere of influence79 . China's
support of the Khmer Rouge represented a pragmatic compromise
78 Frederick Z. Brown. "Cambodia in 1992: Peace in Peril." Asian
Survey 32 (January 1992), 83.
79Robert G. Sutter, "China's Strategy Toward Vietnam and its
Implications for the United States," in The Third Indochina Conflict , ed.
David W.P. Elliot (Boulder, CO: Westview Press, 1981), 165.
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between ideology and geopolitical interest80 . The Chinese recognized Pol
Pot and the Khmer Rouge as sonofabitchs, but they were China's
sonofabitchs.
For its part, the Soviet Union had long viewed China as its primary
geopolitical rival. Continued support for the Vietnamese in its
Indochinese ventures meant an opportunity for the Soviets to gain a
foothold in Southeast Asia, a region in which they had not historically
enjoyed tremendous influence. An Indochina dominated by a strong
Soviet client, Vietnam, would challenge China on her southern border, in
and of itself a good thing in the zero-sum mentality of the time.
Furthermore, such a challenge would occupy China's attention and
energies, and so would tend to dissipate the threat that China
represented to Soviet interests in other parts of the world.
Vietnam was firmly entrenched in the Soviet sphere of influence at
the time, having formalized the bilateral relationship with a Treaty of
Friendship and Cooperation in November 1978. Vietnam also regarded
China as its principal enemy having been invaded, conquered, and
colonized by China for over 1000 years 81 . The cultural and national
80\Vayne Bert, "Chinese Policies and U.S. Interests in Southeast
Asia," Asian Survey 33 (March 1993), 328.
8 i Steinberg, In Search of Modern Asia . 69.
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identity of the Vietnamese people was forged largely in the process of
resisting Chinese domination82. Given such historic-emotional
predispositions, Vietnam interpreted China's actions in Indochina as the
resumption of a traditionally imperialistic foreign policy, fraternal
communist ideology notwithstanding. Proof of China's antagonistic
intent lay in its support for what Vietnam viewed as an aggressive and
malevolent Khmer Rouge. Vietnam therefore presented its invasion and
occupation of Cambodia as a precautionary defensive measure against
Chinese expansionism. As Michael Leifer points out, however, the true
heart of the matter between Hanoi and Beijing "has been whether the
balance of power in Indochina should be more favorable to Chinese or
Vietnamese interests." 83
The Conflicts Behind the Battles
The civil war in Cambodia that began with the Vietnamese
occupation resulted in a military stalemate between two basic sides: on
one was the Vietnamese backed government-in-power in Phnom Penh
known as the People's Republic of Kampuchea (PRK), political precursor
82Gareth Porter, "Vietnamese Policy and the Indochina Crisis," in
The Third Indochina Conflict , ed. David W.P.Elliot (Boulder, CO:
Westview Press, 1981), 71.
83 Michael Leifer, "Power-sharing and Peacemaking in Cambodia?"
SAIS Review 12 (Winter-Spring 1992), 141
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to the State of Cambodia84 ; on the other was a nominal coalition of three
groups formed in 1982 under the rubric Coalition Government of
Democratic Kampuchea (CGDK) 8 ^. The CGDK was a disparate group
which included royalists (FUNCINPEC), republican elites (KPNLF), and
radical socialists (Khmer Rouge). The CGDK members were often at odds
with one another, but managed to hold things together well enough to
earn wide international recognition and continued occupation of
Cambodia's seat at the United Nations86 . The CGDK had very little in
common besides their opposition to the SOC, their exile status, and their
support by outside actors. In Cambodia, however, "common enemies" is
a common virtue, and a firm enough basis for an alliance of mutual
benefit.
Behind these two sides were the international actors, external
players whose roles were forged in super-power and Cold War
competitions for security. Acting through internal players, relegating
themselves as much as possible to the indirect means of using
84The PRK became known as the State of Cambodia (SOC) in 1989
as the regime sought to distance itself from the socialist movement
connotations of the name "Kampuchea."
85
86Robert G. Sutter, The Cambodian Crisis and U.S. Policy Dilemmas
(Boulder, CO: Westview Press, 1991), 23.
69
Cambodian front men, the external powers have directed much of the
latest conflict in a manner bringing to mind the Japanese Bunraku
puppet genre. Garbed in black, yet in full view, the puppeteers direct the
action of the play bringing it off with the help of an audience trained
not to be distracted by their presence. Acceptance of the applicability of
this imagery to the Cambodian situation has powerful implications for
the construction and development of a premise for an appropriate
international solution. Ideology, despite rhetoric to the contrary, has
never truly been an issue in the motivation behind the involvement of
such puppeteers. The only consistent theme to the actions of the foreign
powers vis-a-vis Cambodia has been pragmatic self-interest in the search
for security, or at least to promote the insecurity of one's rivals 87 .
Conflict has been spilling over into the Cambodian sideshow from the
regional stage of Southeast Asia since the 1970s.
In this simplified conceptualization of the forces at work in the
Cambodian conflict, the two great communist powers, China and the
Soviet Union, promoted a confrontation in Cambodia for the purposes of
pursuing nationalistic self-interest and the hegemonic enhancement of
87 Nate Thayer, "Cambodia: Misperceptions and Peace." The
Washington Quarterly 14 (Spring 1991), 180.
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their influence in the region 88 . Cambodia and Vietnam, aspiring regional
hegemons themselves, are essentially seen as pawns in the game of
rivalry between the great powers. Historical precedent, the abiding
enmity between the Khmer and Vietnamese peoples, suggest that many
more factors were at work in the border wars than simply competition
between the major communist powers. While the pawns in this model
certainly had their own agendas to pursue, the element perceived to be
crucial in precipitating the Cambodian conflict was superpower
competition played out through the support of opposing sides in a local
dispute, escalating the affair into a full-blown civil war. It is this element
of the conflict's causal chain that the international solution addresses in
the Agreements on a Comprehensive Political Settlement of the
Cambodia Conflict.
B. THE DYNAMICS OF A DESIRE AND SEARCH FOR PEACE
The equation of conflict behind the international approach to
resolving the Cambodian conflict is one of Sino-Soviet competition for
power and influence being carried out by proxies on a regional stage.
Competing ideology is not an issue in the conflict, and never has been,
88 Robert S. Ross, "China and the Cambodian Peace Process: The
Value of Coercive Diplomacy," Asian Survey 31 (December 1991), 1170-
1171.
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unlike in the First or Second Indochina War. Security and influence are
the issues of contention in the Third Indochina War, a civil war in
Cambodia involving Cambodian puppets directed by Vietnam and the
Soviet Union on the one side, and a coalition of nationalist Khmer forces
supported by China, Thailand, the US and other regional neighbors on
the other.
Efforts on the International Periphery
The Foreign Ministers of France, interested as the former colonial
power in Indochina, and Indonesia, acting as the representative of
regional interests in ASEAN, co-sponsored a series of international
conferences on the problem of the Cambodian civil war beginning in
1981. These negotiations continued throughout the decade, but initially
made little progress beyond demonstrating an international concern for
the Cambodian conflict. The pressures of the Cold War and the impetus
for super-power competition were slowly easing off, however, and
gradually more conciliatory attitudes began to take hold in the minds of
the main players.
The long and drawn out negotiation process for peace began in
New York in 1981 under the U.N. and continued there through to 1985;
began again in 1987 at Paris and subsequent years; in 1988 and 1989 was
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pursued by Indonesia at the two Jakarta Informal Meetings (JIM I & II)89 .
The peace conference at Paris in 1989 was the break-through in light of
the attendance of the five permanent members of the Security Council,
their show of determination to bring the war to a close. With the
supporters and backers of the warring factions willing to compromise
and discuss peace, it seemed only a matter of time until the principals
could be brought to agreement as well.
End of the Impasse
A number of factors contributed to the beginnings of what was
hoped would be an end to the interminable civil war in Cambodia. The
continued stalemate on the battlefield convinced the parties directly
involved that their respective objectives could not be achieved through
military means. The last major Vietnamese offensive during the dry
season of 1984-1985 ended inconclusively as CGDK forces were pushed
deep into Thailand, but the insurgency continued unabated throughout
PRK territory9 *). The PRK military arm had remained largely ineffectual,
reliant on the Vietnamese military presence to defend itself. Despite its
89For a summary of the negotiation process, see Amitav Acharya,
Pierre Lizee, and Sorpong Peou, eds. Cambodia - The 1989 Paris Peace




technical and logistical superiority, however, ironically the Vietnamese
army could not gain an edge sufficient to ensure a final decisive victory
against an enemy who adopted tactics similar to those it used in its fight
against the US. The inadequacy of the military solution to achieve
resolution in the form of a victory renewed interest in negotiation as a
means of resolving the conflict.
The basis of the great power rivalry and Cold War competition
operational in Cambodia began breaking down with the decline of the
Kremlin's propensity for foreign intervention and adventurism marked
by Mikhail Gorbachev's entry into power?!. The economic burden of
maintaining an activist foreign policy caught up with the Soviet Union
in the mid-1980s. Gorbachev's policy of political moderation abroad
coincided with a fundamental break with past practices, a desire for
improved relations with the West and a rapproachment of the Sino-
Soviet relationship. With the reconciliatory reorientation of the Soviet
Union's foreign policy came a decrease in support for projects such as
Vietnam's occupation of Cambodia as a geopolitical thorn in rival
China's side.
The same economic pressures of keeping an economy on a war
footing that had contributed to the collapse of the Soviet Union led
9
1 Sutter, The Cambodian Crisis . 30.
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similarly to a crumbling of Vietnam's ambitious plans to become the
dominant political will in Indochina92
. Since the February 1979 Chinese
invasion, Vietnam had been forced to garrison in its northern border
areas upwards of 120,000-150,000 troops in recognition of the heightened
tensions with China. The Chinese build-up of a large military presence
across the border formed a threat Hanoi had to honor with troop
deployments of its own 93 . This counter-mobilization, intended by the
Chinese to "bleed the Vietnamese white,"94 began having its desired effect
on the Vietnamese economy and political will in the late 1980s.
Economic sanctions against Vietnam and Cambodia were imposed by the
United States and Japan, while diplomatic pressure was orchestrated by
ASEAN. The goal of this collective exercise was to impose on Hanoi an
increasing strain, a strategy of attrition, which would lead it to revise its
foreign policy9 ^.
92 Doubts lingered as Hanoi continued to be suspected by its
neighbors of harboring long-term ambitions for hegemony. William J.
Crowe, Jr., and Alan D. Romberg, "Rethinking Security in the Pacific,"
Foreign Affairs 70 (Spring 1991), 124.
93 Robert S. Ross, "China and the Cambodian Peace Process," 1175.
94 Amitav Acharya, Pierre Lizee, and Sorpong Peou, eds., Cambodia
The 1989 Paris Peace Conference . (Millwood, NY: Kraus International
Publications, 1991), xlvi.
95 Leifer, "Peacemaking in Cambodia?" 141.
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Vietnam began looking for conciliatory means by which it could
extricate itself from its isolated position vis-a-vis Western aid and
investment. New cooperation came forth on the sensitive POW/MIA issue
in order to improve relations with the US 96 , along with an increasingly
reasonable attitude towards negotiation and cooperation in Cambodia as
well 97
. The complete breakdown of the Soviet Union in the late 1980s
further eroded Vietnam's ability to maintain a position in Cambodia.
The loss of Soviet support, combined with its own continuing economic
woes, ultimately led Vietnam to publicly announce in 1988 the
withdrawal of their occupying forces from Cambodia98 . The Vietnamese
troop withdrawal in September 1989" marked the removal of a major
96Richard Sammon, "No Proof That Prisoners Remain inSoutheast
Asia, Panel Finds," Congressional Quarterly . 16 January 1993, 138-139.
97 Sutter, The Cambodian Crisis . 28-30.
98 Stephen J. Solarz, "Cambodia and the International
Community," Foreign Affairs 69 (Spring 1990), 103.
"In testimony before a House Subcommittee, Assistant Secretary of
State Richard H. Solomon stated that the Vietnamese left in place 5,000-
10,000 military advisors after their publicized withdrawal. Also, the
Vietnamese have sent across the border at various times military units to
participate in engagements in support of Phnom Penh [SOC] forces.
Solomon goes on to estimate "a significant Vietnamese presence in the
country." Congress, House, Subcommittee on East Asian and Pacific
Affairs, Effects on the Conti nued Diplomatic Stalemate in Cambodia .
102nd Cong., 1st sess., 11 April 1991, 23-24.
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hurdle in the on-going international effort to achieve an end to the civil
war that had been plaguing Cambodia since its invasion and
occupation.
Such reconciliatory initiatives on the part of Vietnam relieved the
competitive pressure put on China along her southern border. China
responded to the dissipation of the Soviet-Vietnamese threat to the
south by signalling a willingness to withdraw aid from the insurgent
Khmer Rouge in their battle against the Phnom Penh government 100 . The
Khmer Rouge had consistently proven to be a willful client, resistent to
restraint by Beijing, and the Chinese harbored no especial affinity for this
group of dyed-in-the-wool avowed Maoists. The retrenchment of Soviet
foreign policy and the later collapse of the Soviet Union eased Chinese
concerns about the threat of the Russian Bear to the north. Historic
Chinese fears of Russian encirclement abated, at least for the time being.
Like Vietnam, China also had in conjunction with these external
events an internal situation that motivated an interest in displaying a
newly reasonable attitude towards negotiation and cooperation in
Cambodia as well. Still smarting from the diplomatic isolation that
came as a result of the Tiananmen Square massacres in 1989, China
sought to adopt a more conciliatory and liberal attitude in her foreign
loowayne Bert, "Chinese Policies and U.S. Interests in Southeast
Asia," 328.
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policy as a counter-balance to a stricter, hard-line domestic policy 101 .
More importantly, however, the Chinese had shifted its goals in
Indochina, and were more interested in the of the approachment of. the
Sino-Soviet relationship than the continuance of the Sino-Khmer
entente. Withdrawal of support for the Khmer Rouge was part of China's
concessions in this direction 102 .
Finally, with the perception of a communist threat in Asia at last
ebbing, and with the healing that comes with time, the US moved ever
closer to a rapproachment with Vietnam, towards a re-engagement in
Southeast Asia and a closing of its most painful chapter in the Cold
War 10 3. The balances of power and competition in the world had
changed sufficiently that the time seemed right for all the external
players to begin seeking a way out of Cambodia.
Consensus Among the Perm Five
Several of the members of the Perm Five (the five permanent
members of the United Nations Security Council: the United States,
France, Britain, the Soviet Union, and China) had supported opposing
101 Elizabeth Becker, "Cambodia: Laboratory for U.N. Dreams and
Ambitions," International Herald Tribune . 21 October 1991.
102Wayne Bert, "Chinese Policies and U.S. Interests in Southeast
Asia," Asian Survey 33 (March 1993), 328-330.
103"Ending America's Vietnam Syndrome," FEER . 7 January 1993, 5.
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sides in the various wars that had afflicted Cambodia; working together
they had the power and influence to end the outside intervention that
was thought to have sparked and fueled the conflict. China and the
Soviet Union had provided direct aid to the belligerents, while the
United States had supported third-party non-communist opposition
groups and enforced severe economic and diplomatic sanctions against
one of the belligerents, its former foe Vietnam. If Cambodia had been a
sideshow in the 1970s, by the 1980s it had become a puppet show, a
regional stage upon which super-power competition for security was
played out through Cambodian surrogates.
As members of the Perm Five, the participation of the Soviet Union
and China in the creation of a peace process, or at least their tacit
approval of one in the form of an abeyance of a veto to council
deliberations, was necessary and crucial in the working out of a Security
Council draft agreement on a negotiated political settlement for
Cambodia. A series of high-level discussions among the five in
consultation with the UN Secretary-General were held in Paris and New
York beginning in January 1990 104 . The meetings were highly visible and
represented an unprecedented level of cooperation and recognition of
shared interests in the Cambodian situation among the former Cold War
104 Sutter, The Cambodian Crisis . 42.
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enemies. The Cambodian peace efforts seemed proof that the Cold War
had thawed, and raised hopes that such super-power cooperation to end
regional conflict could usher in a new era of world order.
After their sixth meeting of 27-28 August, the Perm Five announced
an agreement on a Framework for a Comprehensive Political Settlement
in Cambodia 105 . This draft agreement formed the basis of a plan
presented in September to the four Cambodian parties at an informal
meeting in Jakarta called by the co-coordinators of the Paris Conferences
and Jakarta Meetings. The Cambodian parties accepted the framework,
thereby setting the stage for the Paris Peace Conference in 1991 where the
details would be elaborated 106 .
The Agreement on a Comprehensive Political Settlement of the
Cambodia Conflict was signed in Paris in October 1991 by all the
interested and warring parties including the four Cambodian factions 107 .
Peace seemed to be at hand for Cambodia at last. The Agreement invited
105 United Nations Security Council, Framework for a
Comprehensive Political Settlement of the Cambodia Conflict . S/21689,
31 August 1990.
106Frederick Z. Brown, "Cambodia in 1991: An Uncertain Peace,"
Asian Survey 33 (January 1993), 90.
107 Library of Congress, Congressional Research Service, The
Cambodian Peacekeeping Operations: Background. Prospects and U.S.
Policy Concerns , by Robert G. Sutter, CRS Report for Congress (Washington
D.C.: US GPO, 1993) 2.
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the UN to establish the United Nations Transitional Authority in
Cambodia (UNTAC) and provide it with a Mandate as set forth in the
Agreement. The Security Council draft proposal was seen as crucial to
the evolution of the Cambodian equation, the moves towards a peace
process. The proposed framework that formed the basis of the Paris
Agreements carried great weight and influence due to its endorsement by
the main great power players. The draft framework, coming as it did
from on high elicited great optimism for a resolution of the conflict in
Cambodia. The puppeteers had ended their fight and agreed to an end
of the Cambodian conflict. Peace was expected to descend like a curtain
to end the Cambodian tragedy.
C. ENTER THE UNITED NATIONS
With the end of the Cold War, the winding down of hostilities
between the great powers, the world community seemed ready for an
international multi-lateral organization like the United Nations to step
in and provide assistance in the form of leadership and firepower in the
resolution of lingering regional conflicts 108 . The Cambodian Conflict
seemed the perfect vehicle for establishing UN credibility, the perfect
environment for the UN to flex the muscles of its new found
108Thomas R. Pickering, "The U.N. Contribution to Future
International Security," Naval War College Review . 46 (Winter 1993), 95.
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responsibility. Over four decades of Cold War antagonism between the
great power members of the Security Council had effectively hamstrung
the UN from playing any forceful role in managing international peace
and security. The 279 vetoes exercised by permanent members of the
Security Council speak of the deep disagreements that blocked any
effective action in conflict resolution 109 . Due to superpower
intransigence, the UN apparatus had been limited to providing
humanitarian relief or monitoring a cease-fire in previous disputes and
conflicts. In Cambodia, the cooperation of the great powers meant the
UN was afforded the opportunity to move on to the more dynamic
mission of peacemaking' i°.
By virtue of the multi-lateral push for an accord in Cambodia,
specifically the Perm Five initiatives and international deliberations on
working out the terms of a peace process, the situation in Cambodia can
be thought of as an Epilogue to the Cold War. As noted above, the
conflict in Cambodia was thought to have grown out of Cold War
confrontation, but the peace effort marked the beginnings of
109Boutros Boutros-Ghali,"UN Peace-keeping in a New Era: A New
Chance for Peace," The World Today 32 (April 1993), 66.
110Thomas G. Weiss, "New Challenges for UN Military Operations:
Implementing an Agenda for Peace." The Washington Quarterly 16
(Winter 1993), 54.
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collaboration between the former enemies. The formerly competing
puppeteers had come full circle to cooperate in a country which had
served as their proxy battlefield.
This new spirit of cooperation engendered a vision and hope for a
new world order based upon peace and stability 1 ! 1 . Economic and
political realities dictate that such a world order be carried out and
enforced on a multi-lateral basis 112 . To implement this vision, the
international community has naturally turned to its United Nations.
The Cambodian peace agreement calls for a truly comprehensive
UN mission comprised of military, civilian, and administrative elements
to assist Cambodia in its transition from a civil-war-torn country to an
independent unified state with an elected government. No small task for
even an established superpower, the high-profile role of the UN
envisioned in the peace agreement was of a scale and cost
unprecedented for the UN at the time. Cambodia marked the emergence
of the UN as a peace-builder, an organization expected to be pervasively
active in Cambodian life. The envisioned United Nations effort in
Cambodia aroused hopes that it might serve as a blue-print for ensuring
ni Boutros-Ghali,"UN Peace-keeping in a New Era," 66.
1 ^Richard N. Gardner, "Practical Internationalism: The United
States and Collective Security," SALS Review 12 (Summer-Fall 1992), 38-
39.
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peace, and for protecting human rights in an unstable post-Cold War
world.
D. THE PLAN FOR CONFLICT RESOLUTION
The ultimate goal of the three Agreements that make up the
Comprehensive Political Settlement of the Cambodian Conflict is
"enabling the Cambodian people to determine their own political future
through free and fair elections ... in a neutral political environment with
full respect for the national sovereignty of Cambodia."! 1 3 To accomplish
this worthy goal, the first of the three agreements outlines a very
detailed linear plan of interrelated actions, conditions and goals that
must be accomplished to prepare the ground for pluralistic democracy
to take root in Cambodia. The second and third instruments deal with
international commitments to protect and nurture the fledgling
Cambodian government that will hopefully come of a successful
completion of the political settlement process.
In their September 1990 joint communique announcing
acceptance of the Perm Five framework for a political settlement of their
113 United Nations, A greements on a Comprehensive Political
Settlement of the Cambodian Conflict , document A/46/608, S/23177, 23
October 1991, 4. The text of the first section, the Agreement on a
Comprehensive Political Settlement of the Cambodian Conflict, and its
Annexes that concern the UN operations in Cambodia is reproduced in
Appendix A.
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civil war 114 , the four Cambodian factions also stipulated their agreement
to form the Supreme National Council (SNC) as the "unique legitimate
body and source of authority in which, throughout the transitional
period, the sovereignty, independence, and unity of Cambodia are
enshrined." 115 The SNC consisted of twelve members, six representatives
from the SOC and two each from the three resistance groups. The SNC,
formally established in September 1990, was however unable for several
months to take up a full role in the peace process due to a near-show-
stopping dispute over the why and how of adding a chairman to the
council. The Perm Five had indicated that Prince Sihanouk would be
acceptable and desirable in this role 116 . Dispute arose when the SOC
representatives argued that Sihanouk's appointment would skew the
balance between the factions on the Council given Sihanouk's
relationship with FUNCINPEC. The SOC wanted another seat on the SNC
1 " Final Communique of the Meeting of the Supreme National
Council of Cambodia . Pattaya, June 26, 1991.
115 United Nations, A greements on a Comprehensive Political
Settlement of the Cambodian Conflict . S/23177, 23 October 1991, 10.
116United Nations Security Council, Framework for a
Comprehensive Political Settlement of the Cambodia Conflict . S/21689,
31 August 1990, Section I, Paragraph 5.
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or, barring that, have its leader, Hun Sen, installed in a significant
position as well, perhaps as SNC Vice Chairman 117 .
The leadership issue was resolved with Sihanouk renouncing his
party ties and declaring his political neutrality. Sihanouk maintained
that his status as the former monarch elevated him above the narrow
squabbles of the factions; he was concerned only with the welfare of all
Cambodia beyond factional politics. Further compromise was found in
Sihanouk's taking up the helm of the SNC as President instead of
Chairman, with voting rights only in event of deadlock. Such are the
vagaries of Cambodian politics.
Once the SNC became operational as the embodiment of
Cambodian sovereignty, it seemed that a major political breakthrough
had been achieved and that national reconciliation was a true
possibility. The Cambodian factions had actually agreed to a form of
power sharing and pluralism 118 . In agreeing to recognize the investiture
of political authority and legitimacy in the SNC, the factions seemed to
have a desire to ease the conflict between them. With the issue of SNC
117Congress, House, Subcommittee on East Asian and Pacific Affairs,
Recent Developments in Cambodia . 101st Cong., 2nd sess., 10 December
1990, 14.
118This issue of power-sharing was and is a concept quite foreign to
the Cambodian political mind-set. It was the unresolvability of this
question that doomed the earlier 1989 Paris Peace Conference effort.
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leadership issue behind them, the factions rode the crest of consensus to
agree to a cease-fire, to end outside military support, to demobilize
combatants, and to prepare and participate in elections as called for in
the Security Council frameworki 19 . This round of progress set the stage
for the terms of the Agreements signed in Paris in October 1991.
In a show of what appeared to be good faith in complying with the
Agreements, the SNC delegated "all powers necessary" during a
transitional period to the UN to ensure implementation of the
Agreement. The transitional period of UN control began with the
Agreements' entry into force and will terminate when a constituent
assembly elected in conformity with what the Agreements call a free and
fair election in a politically neutral environment has approved the new
Cambodian Constitution and transformed itself into a legislative
assembly. This assembly will form the basis of a democratically elected
Cambodian government which will be self-determining, independent,
and politically durable.
119
"Asia Yearbook 1991: Cambodia." Far Eastern Economic Review ,
January 1991, 91. See also Congress, House, Subcommittee on East Asian
and Pacific Affairs, United States Policy Toward Cambodia: Prospects for a
Negotiated Settlement . 101st Cong., 2nd sess., 12 September 1990, 43-56
(Appendix 1) for the text of the Perm Five Agreement.
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Terms of the Paris Agreement
The plan for resolving the Cambodian civil war as outlined in the
Paris Agreements is comprehensive insofar as it presents a daunting, list
of issues and problems to be taken up in the effort to implement a peace
process. In what Brown notes to be strength and weakness, the Agreement
is in some respects detailed and precise, in others vague and
ambiguous 120 . What is not said in terms of enforcement and other key
points is as significant as what is said in terms of programs and goals.
Without this nebulous quality, Brown notes, the Agreement would never
have been signed. Given wise interpretations by the UNTAC chief of
mission and firm action by the UN and international community over a
sustained period, peace can come about for Cambodia.
After inviting the UN to create a United Nations Transitional
Authority in Cambodia (UNTAC), the Agreement in its succeeding
sections calls for the withdrawal of foreign forces and verification of
same; an immediate cease-fire and cessation of outside military
assistance; the organization and conduct of free and fair elections in a
politically neutral environment; the fostering of an environment in
which human rights are respected; and the safe and dignified
repatriation of Cambodian refugees and displaced persons from camps
izofirown, "Cambodia in 1991," 91.
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along the Thai border* 2 1. The UNTAC Mandate foreseen in Annex 1 of the
Agreement reflected these calls for action. The Mandate covers programs
relating to human rights, the organization and conduct of free and fair
general elections, military arrangements, civil administration, the
maintenance of law and order, the repatriation and resettlement of
Cambodian refugees and displaced persons, and the rehabilitation of
essential infrastructures. UNTAC was essentially called upon to establish
order and prepare the country for elections while keeping the people fed.
Given the full factional cooperation anticipated, UNTAC 's mission
seemed fairly straight-forward, if difficult.
United Nations Transitional Authority in Cambodia
As a preliminary to the establishment and deployment of UNTAC,
the UN Advance Mission in Cambodia (UNAMIC) was established on 16
October 1991 by the Security Council, acting on the earlier
recommendation of the Secretary-General 122 , in its adoption of
Resolution 717 (1991). UNAMIC's mission was to assist in maintaining
121 This list is by no means complete as regards the provisions and
provisos of the Agreement; the items listed here pertain directly to
actions the UN was called upon to perform or ensure. For a complete
listing of the conditions and stipulations of the Agreement, please see
Appendix A.
i 22 United Nations Secretary-General, Report of the Secretary-
General on the Establishment of an Advance Mission in Cambodia.
S/23097, 30 September 1991.
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the cease-fire in Cambodia, facilitate communications between the
respective military headquarters of the four Cambodian factions, and
ensure liaison between the SNC and the Secretary-General.
On 8 January 1992, the Security Council adopted Resolution 745
(1992) which expanded UNAMIC's mandate to include training the
civilian population on how to avoid mines and booby traps and
initiated a mine-clearing program. UNAMIC became operational shortly
after the signing of the Paris agreements and existed until it was absorbed
into the UNTAC structure in March 1992 when UNTAC came on line.
On 19 February 1992, then Secretary-General Perez de Cuellar
submitted a report to the Security Council 123 which contained an outline
of the plan for operationalizing the Paris Agreements and organizing
UNTAC. UNTAC was to consist of seven distinct components: human
rights, electoral, military, civil administration, police, repatriation, and
rehabilitation !24. The Security Council approved the report and plan in
passing Resolution 745 of 28 February 1992. In the resolution, the
Security Council authorized UNTAC until the elections of May 1993. The
Secretary-General estimated the cost to be some $1.9 billion, with an
123 United Nations Secretary-General, Report of the Secretary-
General on Cambodia . S/23613, 19 February 1992.
i24ibid, para. 7.
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additional $600 million needed for the United Nations High
Commissioner for Refugees' (UNHCR) repatriation effort of over 350,000
Cambodians living in camps in Thailand 125 . The Cambodia peace
process easily represents "the biggest and most complex" operation in
U.N. history.
The obstacles to success that confronted UNTAC were truly
formidable. UNTAC had been called upon to: create, enforce, and
monitor a cease-fire in a country saturated with armaments; canton the
belligerents and demobilize 70% of the troops without funding or
supplies to house or feed them; monitor and in some cases to run a
corrupt SOC government; repair shattered infrastructure; prepare the
country intellectually and politically for free and fair elections in a
political culture which knows little of pluralism or democracy; repatriate
and resettle destitute Cambodians to mine-free lands and enough of a
grub-stake to make a go of it until they were to become self-sufficient.
UNTAC's strength consisted of approximately 16,000 military, 3,600
police, and 2,500 civilian staff at the time of the elections of May 1993.
UNTAC was headed by the Special Representative of the Secretary-
General, Under Secretary-General Yasushi Akashi of Japan.
1 ^United Nations, General Assembly, UNAMIC and UNTAC. Report
of the Secretary-General: Financing of the United Nations Advance
Mission in Cambodia: Financing of the United Nations Transitional
Authority in Cambodia . A/46/903, 7 May 1992.
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E. THE PLAYERS IN THE CURRENT DRAMA
Many of the internal and regional players in the Cambodian civil
war have ancient roles and grievance against each other. There is much
historical baggage in the form of almost genetic memories of past wrongs
to right and scores to settle that must either be put aside or
accommodated if a lasting peace is be to achieved in Cambodian and
Indochinese minds and hearts.
Pu ppeteers/External Powers
Vietnam
Vietnam's historical interest in Cambodia has been discussed
above; but, Vietnam's 1978 invasion of Cambodia rekindled fears abroad
of its aggressive intentions towards the rest of Southeast Asia. It was
feared that Vietnam was putting into play the alleged scheme of Ho Chi
Minh for an Indochinese federation. The explanation that Vietnam was
merely acting to end the atrocities being carried out by the Khmer Rouge
regime could not be accepted at face value 126 .
126Congress, House, Subcommittee on East Asian and Pacific Affairs,
Effects on the Continued Dip lomatic Stalemate in Cambodia . 102nd
Cong., 1st sess., 11 April 1991, 26.
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A more pragmatic explanation than "dreams of an Indochina
Federation" deals with Vietnam's concerns regarding her age-old nemesis
China. Historically the major threat for Vietnam has been from the.
north, from her old conqueror China. Chinese support for the Khmer
Rouge, and later the CGDK. resistance, seemed a deliberate move to create
in Cambodia a dagger poised at Vietnam's underbelly. Given the historic
Cambodian claim regarding the Mekong Delta region (that it was stolen
by Vietnam) 1 27, the fanatically nationalistic leadership in Phnom Penh
that Pol Pot and the Khmer Rouge represented, and the vast Chinese
resources supporting the regime; put together these factors seemed to the
Vietnamese too volatile a mixture to be left on its doorstep. The cross-
border attacks Cambodia unleashed on Vietnam in the third and final
phases of "Pol Pot Time" in 1977-1978 led directly to the Vietnamese
response of invasion and occupation, touching off the current crisis of a
14-year-old civil war. In this scenario the question of an Indochinese
Federations is superfluous.
The Soviet Union
China and the Soviet Union have both used Cambodia as a
battlefield for a proxy war to play out the larger rivalry between
127Abdulgaffar Peang-Meth, "Understanding the Khmer:
Sociological-Cultural Observations," Asian Survey 31 (May 1991), 443.
This article goes into great detail about the abiding enmities between the
Vietnamese and Cambodians.
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themselves. The Soviet Union, in providing direct material aid to the
Vietnamese and unleashing them to occupy Cambodia to establish a
dominant presence in Indochina, was attempting to threaten its own
traditional enemy, China, with a new threat from the south 128 .
China
China, in its involvement with the Khmer Rouge, was seeking to
insure the security of its southern border in response to the initiatives of
an activist Vietnam. That the Khmer Rouge subscribed to a neo-Maoist
thought made the adoption of this group politically convenient is clear.
However, it should be noted that in his last meeting with Pol Pot, Chou
Enlai advised the Cambodian leader to proceed cautiously with his
radical reform program of transforming Cambodia into a communist
paradise 129 . Proselytizing ideology was clearly not on the minds of the
Chinese leaders when they adopted the KR; the stability and security of
its southern border and the creation of an appropriate response to the
Soviet challenge was.
128 Sheldon W. Simon. "The Superpowers in Southeast Asia: A
Security Assessment," in Southeast Asia Divided: The A SEAN-Indochina
Crisis , ed. Donald E. Weatherbee (Boulder ,CO: Westview Press, 1985), 66-
67.
129Nayan Chanda, Brother Enemv: The War After the War (San
Diego: Harcourt Brace Jovanovich, 1986), 43.
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Southeast Asian Neighbors
ASEAN, the Association of Southeast Asian Nations, in its aggressive
initiatives for the peace process had no more of an altruistic motive
than any of the superpowers. What ASEAN was concerned primarily with
was a means of addressing what it perceived to be a Vietnamese
expansionist threat. Like the superpowers, ASEAN was simply seeking
stability and security for a region which the conflict in Cambodia
continues to threaten.
The United States
The policy of the United States towards Cambodia began in the
1970s as a sideshow of the Vietnam conflict and since then has remained
as such. The shift in U.S. policy advocating withdrawal of support for
the insurgent CGDK in favor of the peace process in 1990 was prompted
by U.S. domestic political concerns. Instead of reacting to regional
interests, the Bush Administration was concerned about its exposure on
the delicate issue of apparent support of the Khmer Rouge with an
election coming up. In a return to a classic linkage of policy, the shift in
favor of a process was also prompted by a desire to move forward on U.S.-
Vietnamese relations. U.S. -Vietnamese relations had been moving
forward on the basis of increased disclosure on the painful POW/MIA
issue in return for withdrawal of support from the opponents of the
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Phnora Penh regime. The shift in policy had nothing to with ensuring the
optimum internal organization of Cambodia.
Puppets/Internal Powers
State of Cambodia
The State of Cambodia (SOC) began life as the People's Republic of
Kampuchea (PRK) in January 1979 as the Vietnamese-installed puppet
government following the invasion and occupation of Cambodia. Many
of the leaders of the PRK were Khmer Rouge cadre who fled the
organization for Vietnam to avoid the widening murderous purges
conducted by Pol Pot. Pol Pot had focused the purges on members of
different factions or divisions within the Kampuchean Communist Party
(KCP), the parent organization of the Khmer Rouge. With the invasion
and occupation of Cambodia, these Cambodian communist exiles were
swept into office by the Vietnamese.
Founded as a creature of the Vietnamese, the PRK was initially
closely monitored and controlled by Vietnamese "advisers." After the
withdrawal of Vietnamese combat troops in September 1979, the SOC has
pursued a policy course increasingly independent from its mentor 130 .
This pursuit of independence culminated with the drastic change in
130Central Intelligence Agency, Guide to Kev Players in Cambodia.
7.
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image in 1991 wherein the regime's party (Kampuchean People's
Liberation Party) leadership decided to discard all of its communist
trappings and instead adopt an endorsement of pluralistic democracy
and calls for free and fair elections. This change also happened to
coincide with the advent of the UN-sponsored peace process. Re-born as
the Cambodian People's Party (CPP), this group of budding democrats
and free marketers has been led by Hun Sen, the first Foreign Minister of
the old PRK regime. One estranged son of Sihanouk, Norodom
Chakrapong, is number two in this organization.
Prince Norodom Sihanouk
Before, during, and no doubt after this current crisis has been
resolved, or more likely evolved into another form of conflict, the
dominant figure has been, as in all questions of Cambodian politics,
Prince Norodom Sihanouk. Installed on the throne by the French in 1941,
Sihanouk has emerged as the ultimate political survivor and the
ultimate symbol of Cambodian national unity. A descendant of the deva-
rajas, Sihanouk has enjoyed a vast and continued popularity with the
people of Cambodia as a living symbol of Cambodian nationalism and
unity. Attached to his persona is a great deal of legitimacy for
governance due to this popularity and the power of his appeal to
ordinary rural Cambodians.
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This attachment is all the more intriguing given Sihanouk's
playboy ways, and his repeated tendencies towards political
opportunism. It is just this importance as a symbol of unity for
Cambodia that makes Sihanouk so important to all sides, and accounts
for his physical survival. Indeed, it is this aura Sihanouk enjoys which
led to his selection as the Chairman of the Supreme National Council
(SNC), the sole legitimate body and source of authority in which the
sovereignty, independence, and unity of Cambodia is enshrined during
the transition period to national reconciliation. Sihanouk is the
embodiment of the SNC, and in such an elevated role has attempted to
portray a non-partisan father-figure for Cambodia.
Khmer Rouge
The Khmer Rouge, or perhaps more accurately the faction of the
Kampuchean Communist Party led by Pol Pot, attempted to radically
restructure Cambodian society to fit its vision of an agrarian Utopia
through mass killings and wholesale destruction from 1975-1979. Pushed
from power by the Vietnamese invasion, the Khmer Rouge nonetheless
retained much of its military power (24,000-30,000 troops 131 ) and gained
enough direct support from China and Thailand to carry on a guerilla
131 Central Intelligence Agency, Guide to Kev Players in Cambodia ,
13.
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insurgency and civil war against the Vietnamese-backed regime, the
People's Republic of Kampuchea/State of Cambodia.
The Khmer Rouge will continue to be a faction to reckon with for
the foreseeable future. From its strongholds in northern and western
Cambodia, it controls vast resources in the form of gems and lumber.
Corrupt Thai generals provide the Khmer Rouge with a market and
access to the outside world in order to purchase weapons and supplies.
The Khmer Rouge are said to have cached enough ammunition with
which to carry on a war for three years without re-supply. With high
morale and tight discipline, its forces are by far the most effective of the
nations armed forces. Furthermore, every indication points to the fact
that the Khmer Rouge have yet to give up its ambition of returning to
sole power in Cambodia.
Non-communist Resistance Groups
The National United Front for an Independent, Neutral, Peaceful
and Cooperative Cambodia (FUNCINPEC [French acronym]), was created
in 1981 to represent monarchists and some traditional nationalists
against the PRK. Sihanouk is considered by the U.S. and other Western
powers to be the primary Cambodian leader, the only figure of stature
capable of rising above Cambodia's endemic factional politics to fill the
role of statesman. As such he was placed in the Chairmanship of the
99
SNC. Prior to Sihanouk's appointment to the chairmanship of the SNC,
FUNCINPEC was accurately referred to as the "Sihanoukists." Since taking
this post, Sihanouk has distanced himself from the party, turning
control of it over to his son. Prince Norodom Ranariddh, in April 1990.
Sihanouk's intransigence to the interests of his old party has since led to
some conflicts with Ranariddh over political means and ends. Never a
prominent group militarily, FUNCINPEC has supported the UN election
process as a way to achieve political power.
The Khmer People's National Liberation Front (KPNLF) is the other
of the two non-communist tactions in the opposition. The KPNLF is a
hold-over group from the days of the U.S.-backed Lon Nol regime
representing right-wing political and business interests, the urban elite,
and those conservatives who are opposed to Sihanouk. Headed by former-
Prime Minister Son Sann and dominated by former Lon Nol military
officers, the KPNLF faction has been supported by the U.S., and more
recently by China. As former Lon Nol supporters, this group had grown
fat and soft during the years the U.S. pumped some $4 billion into the
country with no appreciable return. Splits in their top leadership
between Son Sann and the head of their military arm. General Sak
Sutsakhan, led to disillusionment and "spontaneous" demobilization of
their forces and an overall weakening of strength. Lately, internal
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conflicts and rampant corruption have severely weakened and
fragmented this group's effectiveness as a political party in the UN peace
process, reducing it to near obscurity.
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VI. IMPLEMENTATION OF THE UNTAC MANDATE
The United Nations Transitional Authority in Cambodia (UNTAC)
effort faced many obstacles, but optimism and hopes ran high, especially
among ordinary Cambodians. After two decades of war and upheaval,
the Cambodian people greeted the arrival of the first UN peacekeeping
troops in November 1991 with undisguised joy and relief. Exuberant
crowds gathered outside the gates of the peacekeepers' compound would
stare at them in expectation of something good happening. Hopes grew
that Cambodia was saved at last 132 .
These hopes faded almost as quickly as the curiosity of the crowds
as the UN deployed its troops and administrative apparatus to little
effect. The verbiage and lofty goals of international diplomacy gave way
to local reality as the timetable for peace ground to a halt. Frustration
followed after failure as UNTAC attempted to implement the terms of the
Paris Agreements. After months of making demands and threatening
sanctions, all to no avail, the UN increasingly came to be viewed as a
132 William Branigan, "Missteps on the Path to Peace," Washington
Post, 22 September 1992.
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paper tiger 133 . Disillusionment set in as the UN proved not to be the
panacea for which Cambodians hoped. Promised too much too quickly,
the Cambodian people assumed the UN was in Cambodia to cure all the
country's ills. When this did not happen, the Cambodian people reacted
with anger and began blaming the UN for all their problems including
rampant corruption, unsafe streets, and even traffic accidents 134 .
Agreements in principle gave way to disputes in fact as the
peacemaking process started and stumbled in an atmosphere of lingering
hostility and hidden agendas. Suspicion and ill-will accompanied claims
of malfeasance, improprieties and favoritism in UNTAC's treatment of
the various factions. The UN structure itself was criticized as being too
unwieldy an organization. The result has been resistance, hostility, and
outright refusal on the part of the various Cambodian parties to
cooperate with UNTAC. This chapter will examine those areas where the
133 Nate Thayer, "Moaners beware: Harassed UN reacts to negative
press assessments," Far Eastern Economic Review . 5 November 1992, 27.
134 Nayan Chanda, "Easy scapegoat: People blame the UN for all
their woes," FEER . 22 October 1992, 18. This tendency of the Cambodian
people to view the UN as an all-powerful entity coming in to cure all
their woes is a reflection of the Khmer political culture. In this tradition,
all political goods such as peace and stability are dispensed as favors
from the deva-raja, the god-king, to the people. Failure to provide such
goods are taken as a conscious act of omission, disfavor, by the authority
above. Anger and resentment result not as a recognition of failure of
duty per se, but from a failure of patronage, this topic will be taken up
further in the next chapter.
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peace process was structurally weak, and how the UN erred as the agency
of implementation.
A. THE PRINCIPLES OF PEACEMAKING
In Cambodia, UN peacekeepers have been called upon to arrange
the return of refugees; oversee the conduct of elections; maintain law and
order; promote political dialogue; and assist with economic
reconstruction and rehabilitation 135 .
As the planners in the UN have pressed ahead with an ever more
aggressive and ambitious approach to conflict management and conflict
resolution, peacekeeping has been transformed into a much more
comprehensive process that Boutros-Ghali terms peace-building 136 .
Mackinley and Chopra view this transformation as a fundamental
qualitative and quantitative change which they label "second generation
multinational operations." 137 Despite the expanding scope of
135 Boutros-Ghali, "UN Peace-keeping in a New Era," 67.
136 Ibid, 68. In this particular discussion, the term "peacemaking,"
which enjoys wider usage in the literature, will be used instead of
Boutros-Ghali's term "peace-building."
137Mackinley and Chopra, "Second Generation Multinational
Operations," 113-134.
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responsibilities, however, the search for a just and lasting peace, a true
political solution, the principles which traditionally underlay
peacekeeping have not fundamentally changed. UN Secretary-General
Dag Hammerskjold originally articulated peacekeeping as a provisional
measure of the UN Charter 138 with three limitations which have since
been consistently honored: (1) peacekeeping must be undertaken
without prejudice to the rights, claims, or positions of the parties
involved; (2) peacekeeping operations must have the consent of all the
parties concerned; and (3) peacekeeping forces may only use arms in self-
defense 139 . In other words, the UN presence was required to be to neutral,
consensual, and passive.
In announcing the UN's acceptance of the Agreement's invitation
to participate, then Secretary-General Perez de Cuellar stated that the
effectiveness and ultimate success of the UN intervention were closely
138The lack of reference to peacekeeping in the UN Charter led
Hammerskjold to coin the expression "chapter six-and-a-half," an
allusion to an invented bridge between Chapter VI and Chapter VII
which dealt with peaceful settlement of disputes and enforcement
measures respectively. Weiss, "New Challenges for UN Military
Operations," 52.
139Bruce Russett and James S.Sutterlin, "The UN in a New World
Order," Foreign Affairs 70 (Spring 1991), 70; see also John Mackinlay and
Jarat Chopra, "Second Generation Multinational Operations," The
Washington Quarterly 15 (Summer 1992), 114. For a discussion of
peacekeeping during the Cold war, see Brian Urquhart, "Beyond the
Sheriffs Posse," Survival 32 (May/June 1990): 187-223.
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dependent on the complete cooperation of all the parties concerned 140 .
Cooperation of the parties involved has always been a hallmark of
actions undertaken by the United Nations; the organization has lacked
the muscle to undertake any real missions of compulsion.
The Cambodian Peace Process has been characterized as an effort
in peacemaking and nation-building, something different from what had
come before. While the application areas or duties of UN involvement
have expanded, the basic underlying principles of neutrality and
cooperation governing UN actions have not changed, at least as far as the
Cambodian case is concerned. In the concluding remarks of the report
which served as the blue-print for UNTAC, Boutros-Ghali stated the four
essential conditions that must be met and maintained if UNTAC is to be
able to discharge its mandate effectively and with complete impartiality:
a) First, UNTAC must at all times have the full support
of the Security Council;
b) Second, it must operate with the full cooperation, at
all times, of the Cambodian parties and all other parties
concerned;
c) Third, it must enjoy full freedom of movement and
communications. This should be embodied in separate status-
of-mission agreements, to be concluded with the Supreme
National Council and with the neighbouring States in which
UNTAC may be located;
uo"peace Treaty to end Cambodian conflict signed in Paris; Cease-
fire agreement in effect," UN Chronicle . March 1992, 54.
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d) Fourth, the necessary financial resources must be
provided by Member States in full and in a timely manner. 141
The Secretary-General's four points reiterate the need for support
and especially cooperation in order to achieve successful peacemaking in
Cambodia. This aspect of UN involvement has not changed. What has
changed, however, is the level of initiative called for in the jump from
peacekeeping to peacemaking. In the case of internal conflicts, the
consistent consent of all the parties cannot be assumed and levels of
military effectiveness beyond that of the traditional ad hoc UN force
may be required 142 . Coercion may be a verboten term in UN circles, but a
certain amount of forceful persuasion has been found necessary in
dealing with recalcitrant parties. UN thinkers are struggling with ways to
empower the UN, proposing stronger mandates and the use of force. This
willingness to impose a settlement is a reflection of the enhanced level of
activism engendered by the end of the Cold War, the new collegiality of
the Security Council, and the hopes for a new world order 143 .
141 United Nations Security Council, UNTAC, Report of the Secretary-
General on Cambodia . S/23613, 19 February 1992, para. 172, 28-29.
142Thomas G. Weiss, "New Challenges for UN Military Operations:
Implementing an Agenda for Peace," The Washington Quarterly 16
(Winter 1993), 54.
143 Stedman, "The New Interventionists," 2-3.
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B. UNTAC -- SUCCESS AND OTHER RESULTS
Political Neutrality
Impartiality has been the abiding appeal of the UN's participation
in peacekeeping, its stock in trade so to speak in the business of
mediation in international relations. Adherence to the principle of
neutrality sets the UN above the conflict at hand, allowing it to play the
role of umpire or referee 144 . It is this disinterested third-party
characteristic that has previously made UN peacekeeping forces
acceptable to all the parties engaged in conflict. Violation of the
impartial role has almost invariably led in the past to peacekeepers
becoming just another faction and target in the conflict at hand 145 .
As the UN enters into the deeper waters of intervention in internal
conflicts in the post-Cold War era, there occurs a departure from the
strict impartiality of traditional peacekeeping. The UN has become
involved in the resolution of "domestic" conflicts as a political midwife
overseeing and facilitating the transition to democratic and pluralistic
144Mackinley and Chopra, "Future Multinational Military
Operations," 114.
145Examples of this would be what happened to the UN Operation
in the Congo (ONUC) in the 1960s, and the UN Interim Force in Lebanon
(UNIFIL). F. T. Liu, United Nations Peacekeeping and the Non-Use of Force .
Boulder CO: Lynn Rienner Publishers, 1992, 36.
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regimes 146 . This inherently entails adoption of an interest in the
outcome, an agenda to pursue. "Success" in bringing off the political
transformation becomes an end unto itself, and so the UN develops a
vested interest of its own
Stedman takes up this issue in his article "The New
Interventionists," arguing that boundaries of sovereignty and self-
determination in international and internal relations have become
blurred in the eyes of those seeking a new humanitarian world orderi 47 .
As moral and humanitarian questions of responsibility and culpability
direct the agenda of the world community, the UN is removed from its
role of umpire or referee officiating a contest to be placed into that of a
coach directing all the players of all the teams. While trying to officiate,
the UN is also attempting to lead all the players towards a goal. This
goal, agreed upon in principle perhaps, may not always be agreed upon
in fact. Cooperation begins to break down as the players realize that the
referee brought in for their pick-up game wants to play too. Crisis and
impasse occurs when the coach tries to direct the players, is met with
resistance and disrespect, but is unable to enforce compliance with the
146Durch and Blechman, Keeping the Peace . 15.
147 Stedman, "The New Interventionists," 3.
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game-plan 148 . At this point the coach has simply become another
member of a leaderless, bickering and likely to fail team. This is the
current situation of UN involvement in Cambodia. The problem is lack
of power and authority, a confusion of wanting the peacekeepers to
perform like a coach, but behave like a referee.
This shifting of roles for the UN is highlighted in the faltering
Cambodian peace process. While it is difficult to get beyond the
boilerplate of UN affirmations of neutrality and impartiality. The above
discussion lays out the implicit agenda of moral humanitarianism in the
UNTAC Mandate. To the outside observer, this agenda seems to indicate
and call for an anti-Khmer Rouge bias in the Cambodian peace
process 149 . The international community, especially the US 150 , has
maintained a consistent rejection of any development which would
promote a return to power of the Khmer Rouge in any way, shape or
148 See the following section on cooperation for a discussion
regarding the UN as an institution requiring enforcement powers to fulfil
the new roles called for in second-generation peace efforts.
149For an excellent discussion of anti-Khmer Rouge feelings and
perceptions in the international community, see Nate Thayer,
"Cambodia: Misperceptions and Peace," The Washington Quarterly 14
(Spring 1991), 179-191.
1S0Library of Congress, Congressional Research Service, The
Cambodian Peacekeeping Operations: Background. Prospects and U.S.
Policy Concerns , by Robert G. Sutter, CRS Report for Congress (Washington
D.C.: US GPO, 1993), 9.
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form 151 . The Khmer Rouge themselves have done little to mitigate
international revulsion for their past misdeeds or alleviate suspicion of
their current ambitions. Khmer Rouge intransigence has heightened fears
of their designs for a return to singular power. Doing little to rehabilitate
their image or endear themselves to UNTAC, the KR have instead lashed
back at the UN and others that "they" are out to exclude and
exterminate the KR to achieve the domination of the Khmer people 152 .
The KR are the personification of the old psychotherapy joke: "Just
because I'm paranoid doesn't mean someone isn't out to get me."
As in any stereotype or big lie, there seems to be some element or
grain of truth to the Khmer Rouge's perception that someone, perhaps
everyone, is out to get them. The UN has not maintained an impartial
stance in the Cambodian peace process 153 ; blocking the KR has been a
stated policy position of many of the major endorsers of the peace plan.
It seems little wonder that easy cooperation by all the parties was not
quite so forthcoming.
151 Thayer, "Cambodia: Misperceptions and Peace," 179.
152A later example from what is a continual stream of accusations
is Henry Kamm, "In Slap at the U.N., Khmer Rouge Charges West is
Backing Vietnam," New York Times . 1 March 1993.
153 For background on this situation, see David Roberts,
"Cambodia's Uncertain Future," The Pacific Review 6 (January 1993), 71-
76.
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Cooperation of the Parties
The conflict in Cambodia had all three great powers and their
regional allies involved in using Cambodia as a battlefield to play out
their own rivalries and conflicts. The end of the Cold War removed many
of the political obstacles and tensions that had contributed to or
exacerbated the civil war which had broken out between factions backed
and directed by foreign powers. As the East-West confrontation subsided,
and the Zero-sum rivalry of China and the Soviet Union eased, and the
Vietnamese backed away from regional ambitions and/or perceptions of
outside threat, a spirit of compromise and consensus regarding a desire
to resolve the Cambodian impasse began filtering from the top down.
The Cambodian players, who had felt no similar yearnings for
political reconciliation, and had for years balked at attempts bring
about negotiated settlements, succumbed to foreign pressures for peace
as their mentors wielded the levers of aid and assistance to prod clients
to a peaceful way of looking at the world. The agreement of the four
factions on the SNC seemed to portend peace and stability for Cambodia
as the UNTAC peace process was accepted and endorsed all around. With
all the players agreeing to get on board, the peace plan's goals seemed
attainable.
1 12
Since the Agreements were entered into force and the transition
period begun in October 1991 154
,
developments in Cambodia have
unfolded negatively despite the auspicious start. The behavior of the
factions, especially the Khmer Rouge, seems to indicate that they entered
into the Agreements in bad faith with no real desire for national
reconciliation. This interpretation of intentions recalls the history of the
factions' entry into the Agreement, of being subjected to pressure to
accept by their respective backers. The KR were perhaps more noticeable
in their opposition to reconciliation given their comparatively stronger
ideological base than the other groups who have been characterized as
fragmented, corrupt, short-term oriented, and "doctrine-less." 155 Despite
their tentative agreements, all sides seemed to have entered the
Agreement grudgingly as relations between the opposing sides remained
acrimonious 156 . While the focus has been on the Khmer Rouge in terms of
intransigence and being the all-around bad guys, the other factions,
particularly the Cambodian People's Party (CPP) of the SOC, have been
154UNAMIC, the advance mission for UNTAC, deployed to
Cambodia in November 1991.
155 See earlier discussion in this paper on NCRs.
156Far Eastern Economic Review, Asia Yearbook 1992 . 94.
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less than sterling in living up to the spirit, if not the letter, of the terms
of the Paris Peace Agreement.
The Peace Plan Stumbles
The Khmer Rouge intransigence has been repeatedly singled out in
the Secretary-General's UNTAC progress reports as a major factor in the
derailing of the peace plan timetable. UNTAC had announced that Phase
II of the cease-fire, the cantonment and demobilization phase, would
begin on 13 June 1992. Under the plan some 200,000 soldiers and
250,000 militiamen form the four warring factions were scheduled to
begin gathering in some 95 regroupment areas. According to the Paris
Agreement 157
, 70% of the four forces would be demobilized and the
remainder would stay in the cantonments with their weapons in U.N.
custody until a new government was formed after the elections.
Phase II stalled in the face of KR refusal to grant UNTAC personnel
access to the areas it controlled or to commit its forces to cantonment as
stipulated in the Agreement. The Khmer Rouge stalemate arose out of a
dispute with the UN over verification of the withdrawal of Vietnamese
troops from Cambodia. The Khmer Rouge claimed that thousands of
157 A greement on a Comprehensive Political Settlement of the
Cambodia Conflict : Annex 1, Section C; Annex 2.
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youn i5 % troops had been left behind disguised as SOC soldiers or
"settlers" 159 in violation of the Paris accord requiring the withdrawal of
all foreign troops 160 . Extensive efforts by U.N. forces to confirm this fact
has not yielded any indications of the presence of such forces 161 . While
not providing any positive proof of its own of this charge, the KR has
remained hostile demanding that UNTAC in effect prove the null
hypothesis in proving that there are not any Vietnamese forces left in
Cambodia.
A second unreconciled grievance blocking KR cooperation with the
U.N. plan as it stood was over the interpretation of the role and powers
of the SNC during the transition period. The KR maintained that
UNTAC's continued use of the current SOC government-in-place to
158A derogatory Khmer name for the Vietnamese, meaning literally
"savage." Serge Thion, "What's In a Name? It's All in How You Say It,"
Phnom Penh Post . 1-14 January 1993.
!59"Asia 1993 Yearbook," FEER . 97.
16°United Nations, Security Council, UNTAC, Second Progress Report
of the Secretary-General on the United Nations Transitional Authority in
Cambodia . S/24578, 21 September 1992, para 2.
161 Henry Kamm, "U.N. Authority Says It Has Found Only 3 Hanoi
Troops in Cambodia," New York Times . 3 March 1993.
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administer the country violated the Agreement 162 . One of the consistent
demands of the KR through the peace negotiation process has been the
call for the dismantling of the Phnom Penh regime as a precondition to
cooperation; use of the Phnom Penh regime lent legitimacy to the SOC
and prevented the creation of a neutral political environment 163 .
As implementation of the peace plan continued to be delayed and
various deadlines passed by, several sets of urgent talks and negotiations
took place in Tokyo and Beijing as well as in Phnom Penh to try and
resolve the KR imposed impasse. The Khmer Rouge claimed that both
"violations" of the Agreements created conditions which threatened its
safety and survival; until UNTAC could provide proof of the Vietnamese
departure (the null hypothesis) and ensure a neutral political
environment (according to the Khmer Rouge definition), the Khmer
Rouge refused to lay down its arms and cooperate with any significant
areas of the peace plan 164 . The KR refusal to cooperate effectively ended
the cantonment, disarmament, and demobilization process as the other
162United Nations, Security Council, UNTAC, Second Progress Report
of the Secretary-General on the United Nations Transitional Authority in
Cambodia . S/24578, 21 September 1992, para 2.
163Brown, "Cambodia in 1992 ." 86.
164United Nations, Security Council, UNTAC, Report of the Secretary-
General on the Implementation of Security Council Resolution 783
(1992) . S/24800, 15 November 1992.
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factions balked at standing down their forces while leaving the KR out
there militarily intact.
A Khmer Rouge Strategy?
The clandestine nature of the Khmer Rouge and a dearth of
availability of its writings makes analysis of its position and agenda a
job of deduction based upon its propaganda and actions. Some analysts
argue the Khmer Rouge charges may have had some element of validity
to them: Assistant Secretary of State Richard H. Solomon stated in
testimony before Congress in 1991 that some 5,000-10,000 Vietnamese
troops were still believed to be in Cambodia 165 ; Raoul Jennar, a Brussels-
based consultant who monitors Cambodian affairs for the NGO Forum on
Cambodia, describes an intelligence network of decommissioned
Vietnamese soldiers active in Cambodia 166 . Nevertheless, Khmer Rouge
protestations that it remained committed to the peace process and was
simply demanding that the UN carry out its mandate aside, most
observers believed that the Khmer Rouge were merely executing a tactic
165U.S. Congress, House, 1991, 24.
166Doug Niven, "UNTAC Approach Flawed, Analyst Says," Phnom
Penh Post . 29 January- 11 February 1993.
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of negotiation and delay while maintaining their strategic goal of
returning to sole power 1 67.
Nothing to Lose. Everything to Gain
The effectiveness of any peacekeeping mission requires the
continuing perception by all parties that the absence of violence is in
each of their respective interests 168 . In a situation such as that of a civil
war, this requires some form of sanction capability or enforcement
mandate. In the Cambodian case, there is little that the UN can do to
the Khmer Rouge to compel compliance short of launching a punitive
military operation 1 69. The loss of external aid means little to a party
J67Brown, "Cambodia in 1992," 89. A more moderate view of the
Khmer Rouge is also presented in Nate Thayer, "What Role for KR in a
New Government?" Phnom Penh Post, 29 January - 1 1 February 1993. In
this article, Thayer interprets KR internal documents to indicate a
willingness to participate in a national reconciliation government. My
own personal opinion is that the KR is probably somewhere in between
these two views in terms of willing to work within a government for
advantage while never surrendering its own autonomy.
i68\Villiam J. Durch and Barry M. Blechman, Keeping the Peace:
The United Nations in the Emerg in g World Order (Washington D.C.: The
Henry L.Stimson Center, 1992), 10.
i69\vhich would likely fail anyway given the example of the
unsuccessful 13 year Vietnamese effort to eradicate the KR.
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controlling vast resources in lumber and gems 170 . Even sanctions calling
for a ban on the Khmer Rouge's trade would be of little value since it
could not be enforced. Even if it could, it would likely have little effect
anyway, so large are the stockpiles of the Khmer Rouge 171 .
In terms of gaining factional cooperation in Cambodia, the foreign
powers are frustrated to find they have contributed to the creation of a
self-sustaining war that has taken on a life of its own. The puppeteers,
having removed their black garb, find that the puppets are still acting
out a drama, a conflict, of their own. The warfare pursued by the
internal players in Cambodia, the hostilities released, will not disappear
with the reductions of hostilities between the larger powers. In the
gaining and maintaining of a constant support of all the factions, the
Cambodian peace process has failed.
New World Order Goals and Aspirations. Cold War Tools and Limitations
In marking the expansion of the scope of peacekeeping beyond the
parameters of the traditional Cold War-style mission, the UN effort in
170 It is estimated that the KR earns about Baht 200 million [US $8
million] monthly from its log trade with Thailand alone. Ken Stier, "Log
rolling: Thai forestry contracts help to fund Khmer Rouge," FEER . 21
January 1993, 15.
'
171 Ted Morello and Nate Thayer, "The Pol Pot trail: UN efforts to
end Khmer Rouge trade likely to fail," FEER . 26 November 1992, 12; and
Nayan Chanda, "Strained ties: Poor UN relations with Bangkok mar peace
process," FEER . 17 December 1992, 26.
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Cambodia has emerged as prototype to a second generation of UN
military operations. In these second generation operations, the
importance of military effectiveness grows in relation to the complexity
and intensity of the operation 17 2. Coming to an agreement in the first
place was difficult during the Cold War era of Security Council
stalemate. Now that is the easy part. The difficulty now lays in getting
all the players in an expanded comprehensive effort to play by the rules,
and perhaps more importantly, finding some way to discipline these
players when cheating yields advantage 173 .
The intransigence of the Khmer Rouge, and the UN impotence to
dealing with this intransigence and hostility, points to the need for some
enforcement mechanism. The ambiguity and vagaries of the Agreement
that Brown alluded to as a potential strength or weakness depending on
how UNTAC interpreted its Mandate 174 has come back to haunt Special
Representative Yasushi Akashi and his peacemaking forces. The UN
contingents remain constrained by their own cold war peacekeeping
(militarily passive) rules in the field. An expansion of their role would
172 Mackinley and Chopra, "Future Multinational Military
Operations," 117-118.
173Congressional Research Service, The Cambodian Peacekeeping
Operations . 9.
174Brown, "Cambodia in 1991," 91.
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require a new mandate to pursue new tactical missions 175 . This move
has been blocked by middle nations who do not wish to be mired in a
morass of military tasks, by peacekeeping nay-sayers who continue to
hold to cold war perceptions of limitations, and by the great powers who
are loath to give up authority and the option for unilateral action' 76 .
Lessons Learned
KR refusal to cooperate with the peace plan, and its refusal to
allow UNTAC access to the approximately 15% of Cambodian territory it
controlled, spelled the de facto doom of the Agreement from the very
start. Lack of cooperation by one of the parties violated the principles by
which peacekeeping had operated, and which continued to govern the
UNTAC mandate as noted in the Secretary-General's report and remarks
above. Besides being comprehensive and complex, Cambodia marked the
charting of new waters for the UN as it entered into an internal conflict
with international overtones. As the first of the "second-generation
multinational military operations," UNTAC had yet to be equipped with
a mandate containing a modus operandi for enforcement of its plans
175 Mackinley and Chopra, "Future Multinational Military
Operations," 118.
176John Mackinley, "Toward a New Look for the UN," Providence
Journal 31 (March 1992); and Carroll J. Doherty, "United Nations'
Newfound Muscle Relieves, Worries Washington," Congressional Quarterly .
6 March 1993, 525.
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and policies. As Brown pointed out, inclusion of such a modus vivendi
would have prevented the Agreement from being approved in the first
place. Ambiguity and vagueness on this point left the door open for an
assertive interpretation by a strong Special Representative such as
Hammarskjold's "Chapter Six-and-One-Half" invention pertaining to the
UN Charter. No such "Akashi Doctrine" emerged from the headquarters of
UNTAC, only threats, pleas, demands, and polite requests 177 .
Numerous proposals and plans have come forth to deal with this
issue. These fit more-or-less along a continuum of options ranging from
creating a standing UN peacekeeping force to ignoring the problem
completely. Ignoring the problem is simply not feasible given the current
clamor for action in a world of New Interventionists. Neither is throwing
more money at the issue: UNTAC spent $3,000 per capita in an attempt
to purchase a peace for Cambodia -- to little avail. Until the
international community empowers its UN with the real-world ability to
see its mandates carried out as intended, the UN will remain a paper
tiger subject to seeing its moral imperative and authority to make the
177 In response to the launching of a military assault on Khmer
Rouge held provinces in February 1993 by government (SOC) forces, the
Secretary-General's Special Representative "called on SOC to desist from
violating the cease-fire and to exercise self-restraint." United Nations,
Security Council, UNTAC, Report of the Secretary-General on the
Implementation of Security Council Resolution 792 (1992) . S/25289, 13
February 1993, para. 7.
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world right flouted by those who seek to make it wrong. Such is the basic
$2.7 billion policy lesson to be learned from UNTAC's experience in
Cambodia.
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VII. THE POLITICAL-CULTURAL MILIEU
The discussion of the previous chapter would seem to indicate
that the breakdowns that occurred in the implementation of the
Cambodian peace plan were essentially mechanical or procedural in
nature. Many political scientists, observers and policy-makers point to a
process purposefully left vague and ambiguous on key points of
enforcement as the main culprit. They are also concerned with the UN as
an institution unprepared to take the bold and decisive action necessary
to turn a vague and ambiguous situation into a fait accompli of peace.
Caught between the ambitions for a new world order and the limitations
of old Cold War fears, UNTAC suffered from two congenital defects,
inherent weakness and lofty expectations, which taken together set the
peace process up for failure.
If UNTAC had been properly endowed with the mandate to enforce
its policies and compel the cooperation agreed to by all the parties as
specified in the terms of the peace plan, so the argument goes, Cambodia
would now be enjoying the fruits of peace, stability, truth, justice, and
the American Way. The prescriptions for strengthening the peacekeeping
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process to turn it into a viable peacemaking process run along a
continuum of organizational improvements and institutional reforms.
These scholars, politicians, and new interventionists who argue this
line are idealistic in their emphasis on empowering their UN in a way
that ignores or disregards the reality of the enduring internal dimensions
of conflict extant in the Cambodian case. They are off the mark,
however, in arguing for structural or procedural improvements of the
external institution as the sole improvement needed for peacemaking to
work. Granted, there are very real and debilitating flaws in the system
that must be addressed before peacemaking can become a Standard
Operating Procedure of the UN. But, focusing on quantitative and
incremental changes in peacekeeping enforcement without taking into
account the local or internal dynamic of conflict is of limited utility.
The classic Area Specialist argument is applicable in this discussion on
the need for a truly comprehensive understanding of the perspective and
goals of a people, and the importance of an in-depth knowledge of the
local political cultural milieu, in successful policy origination and
implementation in the search for a resolution to the conflict in
Cambodia.
The Agreements on a Comprehensive Political Settlement of the
Cambodia Conflict evolved out of the initiatives of the "external factors,"
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the international actors who have influenced Cambodia's descent into
conflict. The thrust of the plan is narrowly focused on resolving or
eliminating the international and regional pressures that have colored so
much of Cambodia's contemporary history, and then providing the
framework of electoral democratic pluralism within which the
Cambodian nation could come together to work out their future as one
people. The premise behind this approach was the idea that the external
players had pressured the Cambodian puppets into conflict, and that
removal of the critical factor of external pressure would result in the
Cambodians getting together to launch themselves on the road to
democracy. Power-sharing is a central assumption in the viability of an
ultimate accord.
The pivotal theme in this chapter is that the Cambodians
themselves must desire and wish for a democratic government. Political
culture encompasses the history and deep-rooted attitudes,
preconceptions, and values of a people that are important determinants
of social and political behavior. To be successful, any negotiated peace
plan must meet the criterion set by, and have the cooperation of, all the
players. In Cambodia's case this means the U.N., the great powers, the
neighbors, and finally the factions within must cooperate for peace.
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UNTAC has failed because the Cambodians themselves failed to do their
part. Look at the facts.
A. HISTORICAL ROOTS OF CONFLICT IN SOUTHEAST ASIA
Cambodia came to the attention of American policy-makers in the
early 1970s when, as an off-shoot to the efforts in Vietnam, the United
States actively supported the non-communist government of Lon Nol as
a prop against the left-leaning Prince Sihanouk and the communist
Khmer Rouge insurgents. The conflicts and disputes for territory and
power in Cambodia have a much longer history than the American
participation in these conflicts reflect. The warring parties struggling for
dominance and survival have been grappling with each other for
centuries. This background to the developments of the 1970s and 1980s
leading up to the current Cambodian crisis of interminable civil war
must be recognized and taken into account if a true cure to the
problems of Cambodia is to be found. The historical context of the
rivalries and wars of the regional players sets the tone for any dialogue
necessary for a lasting and durable political solution.
The history of the peoples of Southeast Asia is one of never-ending
conflict. The Chams of Vietnam, Khmers of Cambodia, the Pyus and
Mons of Burma and western Thailand have been in constant struggle
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with one another 178 . The important point to note is that the history of
the peoples living in Southeast Asia is one of moving into new lands,
working to displace the indigenous people or themselves feeling the
pressure of encroaching neighbors. Competition and conflict are part
and parcel of the heritage of Southeast Asia.
Cambodia
The major high points in Cambodian history are to be found in
the ancient past, the Angkor period of the first millennium. It was in the
ninth century that the Khmer empire of Cambodia was established by
Jayavarman II. A tenth century inscription refers to the Kings of
"Kambuja," the source of the name of the country. This empire rose to
greatness, expanding its power and authority practicing the Indian
Brahmanic cult of the deva-raja, or God-King 179 . It was during the reign
of Suryavarman II (c.l 1 13-c.l 150) that the building of Angkor Wat
began, one of the greatest buildings in the world and the enduring
symbol of Cambodia to this day. Cambodians still speak with pride of
the achievements and splendor of their early civilization in which art
178John A. Garraty and Peter Gay, eds., The Columbia History of
the World (New York: Harper and Row, 1972), 355-360.
179Abdulgaffar Peang-Meth, "Understanding the Khmer:
Sociological-Cultural Observations," Asian Survey 31 (May 1991), 442.
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and architecture flourished, irrigation networks for agriculture were built,
and the people prospered.
It was during this period also that the Khmer Empire expanded
through successful though costly wars against the Kingdom of Champa
(the coastal Mekong Delta region south of Hue), the Annamese (present
day northern Vietnam centered on Hanoi), and the Burmese. The Khmer
empire ranged at its zenith from the east coast of Indochina to Burma's
border in the west, and from Vientiane in Laos in the north to the Malay
Peninsula in the southwest 180 . This expansion sowed the seeds for later
Cambodian-Vietnamese enmity, an enmity that has continued to affect
relations and color opinions to this day.
A later ruler, Jayavarman VII (1181-1219), built Angkor Thom
nearby to Angkor Wat as an equally impressive testimonial to the
greatness of the Khmer people and their deva-raja. While artistically a
supreme achievement and a bold political statement, these temples and
the long and costly wars of expansion placed an overly-heavy economic
strain on the Khmer empire. This burden of pride began an era of
decline from which the Khmer could not recover. Standards of living
dropped, frustrations rose, and the deva-rajas grip on their empire began
isoPeang-Meth, "Understanding the Khmer," 443.
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to slip. A Mongol embassy in 1296 found Chen-la (the Khmer kingdom)
much weakened by the attacks of neighboring Sukhotai.
In the end the Khmers rebelled against their God-Kings, turning
instead to the imported Theravada Buddhism which made a virtue of
poverty and austerity in preference to ornate and expensive temples and
ceremonies. By the early fifteenth century, Angkor had been abandoned
and the Cambodian kingdom barely survived. It was much reduced in
size and power, and under constant threat from the Tai state of Ayuthia
in the west. As a small country with weak economic, military and,
political institutions surrounded by often hostile, predatory, and more
powerful neighbors, Cambodia suffered for centuries from poor
leadership and intense outside pressures. Despite brief periods of
resurgence, Cambodia continued to decline due to encroachment from
the Tai, Viet, and Lao. By the eighteenth century, Cambodia had been
reduced piece-meal to approximately its present borders under a virtual
joint Siamese-Vietnamese occupation. After battling their neighbors for
centuries, the Cambodians succumbed to the advance of the French. The
twentieth century for Cambodia can be capsulated as a constant struggle
for independence against their imperial masters.
In the region of Southeast Asia, there has been an enduring
atmosphere of genetic distrust and rivalry between the peoples who
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inhabit the area. It is these same peoples and cultures who make up the
regional actors, or puppets, in the current version of the Cambodian
conflict. To resolve the Cambodian conflict requires removal of causes of
conflict that have darkened the destiny of Chams, Annamese, and Thais
as well as the Khmers of Cambodia. This historical view of the conflicts
must be understood in seeing that the Cambodian crisis is but the latest
in a series of conflicts. The sympathetic appeal Cambodia enjoys in
being cast as the victim of a bullying Thailand and Vietnam is perhaps
easier to reconcile and lay aside when one realizes that both Thailand
and Vietnam are themselves the survivors of adversity, a harsh process of
natural selection that leaves them both perhaps a bit more contentious
and paranoid, certainly less inclined to peaceful and gentle ways.
B. POLITICAL CULTURAL IMPEDIMENTS TO A NEGOTIATED
PEACE
In the post-World War II experience of Indochina, conflict
resolution of internationally-fuelled civil wars has been achieved in only
one of two circumstances: 1) where one party achieves a decisive
military victory and so dictates the terms of a political settlement to its
adversary; 2) or where neither party "wins" outright, but one side lacks
the will to continue bearing the human and material costs of continuing
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the conflict and so sues for peace in an effective defeat 181 . However, the
durability of even such coerced "negotiated" resolutions to conflicts has
not been a part of the political tradition and experience in Indochina; in
the examples of the two circumstances of political settlement as conflict
resolver described above, the final arbiter was force majeure as the
agreements broke down and conflict re-flared. Cambodia marks an
attempt at conflict resolution of a new kind, that of a genuine
compromise in the form of power-sharing arrangements 182 .
Attempts to reach a negotiated end to the conflict in Cambodia
had previously faltered on the question of power-sharing 183 . The plan of
Congressman Stephen Solarz that became the Perm Five plan, which in
turn became the basis for the Agreements signed in Paris, proposed that
the UN take up responsibility for the administration of Cambodia in a
transition period between the signing of a political settlement and the
181 An example of the first type would be the decisive victory of the
Viet Minh over the French at Dien Bien Phu in May 1954 which in turn
shaped the political settlement reached at the Geneva Conference the
following July. An example of the second would be the American public's
unwillingness to sustain the human costs of the military stalemate in
the Vietnam War.
lg2Michael Leifer, "Power-sharing and Peacemaking in Cambodia?"
SAIS Review 12 (Winter-Spring 1992), 140.
183Amitav Acharya, Pierre Lizee, and Sorpong Peou, eds., Cambodia -
The 1989 Paris Peace Conference . (Millwood, NY: Kraus International
Publications, 1991), xlvii.
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outcome of free and fair elections. The Agreement called for all the
factions to recognize a Supreme National Council which would embody
Cambodian political authority and legitimacy. The SNC would in turn
delegate executive powers to UNTAC. The power-sharing dispute was
thought to have been essentially circumvented in this arrangement, and
would be resolved in the elections concluded in May 1993.
The Cambodians would not let themselves — UNTAC's election
would certainly not bring peace for Cambodia. The losing factions,
especially the Khmer Rouge, would not resign themselves quietly or
peacefully to defeat, and threatened to lapse back into a civil
insurgency. The losing SOC threatened partition, de facto secession. In a
country that has not had an election in 20 years, and in which 90% of
the eligible electorate has never voted nor known democracy before,
elections results would certainly not be accepted. All contestants,
FUNCINPEC, SOC and the Khmer Rouge only gird themselves for future
battles.
Deva-raias
The Hindu Brahmanie cult, describing life in terms of a pyramid-
like system at the top of which was the god-king or deva-raja, is another
complicating cultural factor in the Cambodian situation. The deva-raja
acted as an intermediary between the gods and the people at the nexus
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of a social order of established and well-defined class-status-rank-role
relationships 184 . In this cosmology of absolute power, the god-king is the
master of all existence and all must bow to his will; the individual is an
instrument serving the social order, the aims and goals of the deva-raja.
This philosophical-religious influence produced active, combative, and
resolute Khmer (the god-kings and his warriors) who led a populace of
patient, obedient, accepting, and resolute Khmer. The effect was to
impress upon Cambodian society a value and respect for authority,
power and command, and a political system in which the
superior/subordinate relationships are authoritarian and
paternalistic 185
. The Khmer carry within them an ingrained memory of
their early leadership in Southeast Asia, the capability and even
invincibility of the deva-rajas who took their people to such heights.
In the social order of the deva-raja's universe, and in the predatory
geopolitical environment that characterized Southeast Asia (and still
does), there was no place for complacency, accommodation, or
conciliation 186
. The god-king by nature does not negotiate nor placate,
but instead seeks gain through domination and recognition of his




absolute authority. Questions of honor and personal, as in just about all
Asian societies, are of extraordinary importance. Political positions and
stands become matters of honor and face. In the world of the deva-raja
wherein compromise is a form of surrender and yielding diminishes
honor' 87 .
Loyalty and allegiance come from the bottom up based not on
ideals or concepts, but upon simple power relationships attached to the
persona of the deva-raja and other leaders. Patronage and the dispensing
of the favors from above have created a system in which the Khmer
attach authority and legitimacy to individuals whom they owe loyalty
and allegiance. As seen in the case of the Khmer empire, the bond of
loyalty lasts so long as the needs of the followers are perceived to be
properly fulfilled. In times of need, of danger and insecurity, the
obligation of loyalty is established between the leader and followers who
find their safety emanating from the power of the leader. When the
leaders lose the ability to meet the needs of their people, the bonds of
loyalty are broken; disappointment deteriorates into enmity and even
betrayal.
Here is the source of the charisma of the ex-god-king, Norodom
Sihanouk. He is still the best hop for peace and the security of the
i87lbid, 449.
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Cambodian people. He might even re-install himself as king and reign as
an absolute despot. Certainly this seems to be his remaining goal in
life 188 . But this is unlikely to occur as the monarchy has been discredited
by past failures; new secular deva-rajas have appeared to rival the
former monarch in competition for the leadership of Cambodia.
Cambodia is a land of cliques and factions whose members are
bound by family ties, work relationships, and personal bonds of
patronage and favors. It should not be surprising then that the
combative and resolute characteristics of the four Cambodian factions
have prevented them from truly agreeing to compromise in the peace
process. The winner-take-all mentality and political culture of the
Khmer deva-rajas will be difficult to supplant with a western sense of
democratic pluralism. Loyalty and authority in Cambodia that have
traditionally been vested in individuals will be have to be transferred to
the institutions of the state if the Paris Peace Plan for a new and peaceful
Cambodia is to produce a viable and functional result. A national
unification of loyalties seems unlikely. Factional in-fighting and
intransigence to national reconciliation based on this trait dooms the
peace process in Cambodia.
i88Nayan Chanda and Nate Thayer,"'I want to retake power,'" FEER .
4 February 1993, 20; and Nate Thayer, "Sihanouk Poised to Take
Control," Phnom Penh Post . 29 January - 11 February 1993.
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C. CAMBODIAN NATIONALISM
One of the stated goals of the Agreement to end the conflict in
Cambodia was to provide the framework for the fostering of a respect for
human rights' 89 . As a first step towards promoting and protecting
human rights and fundamental freedoms in Cambodia, all the members
of the SNC signed the International Covenant on Civil and Political
Rights on 20 April 1992. Later came signatures of the factions on the
Convention against Torture and other Cruel, Inhuman or Degrading
Treatment or Punishment, the International Convention on the
Elimination of All Forms of Discrimination Against Women, the
Convention on the Rights of the Child, and the Convention and Protocol
relating to the Status of Refugees, all on 10 September 1992 at a
ceremony officiated by head of UNTAC Yasushi AkashU 90 . Akashi's
remarks at the ceremony were remarkably frank in stating that the UN
could not instill human rights guarantees and safeguards, but only
promote awareness in the hope that such knowledge would be seeds that
i 89A greement on a Comprehensive Political Settlement of the
Cambodia Conflict . Part III, Articles 15 and 16.
i 90Library of Congress, Congressional Research Service, United
Nations Operations in Cambodia , by Lois B. McHugh, CRS Report for
Congress (Washington D.C.: US GPO, 1993), 5.
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might later take root and flourish in Cambodian society after the UNTAC
mandate expires 191 .
The Human Rights component of the UNTAC plan was primarily
an effort aimed ensuring no return to the policies and practices of the
past 192 , which previously meant ensuring no return to the reign of terror
sponsored by the Khmer Rouge during their radical experiment 193 . To
that end the UN undertook, besides getting the SNC to agree to all the
Conventions and Protocols listed above, to begin an extensive human
rights information and education campaign and the rigorous
investigation of human rights-related complaints 194 . As with all the
other aspects of the UNTAC program, this one too was idealistic and has
no real roots in Cambodian history.
191 Library of Congress, Congressional Research Service, United
Nations Operations in Cambodia , by Lois B. McHugh, CRS Report for
Congress (Washington D.C.: US GPO, 1993), 5.
192United Nations, Security Council, UNTAC, Report of the Secretary-
General on Cambodia . S/23613, 19 February 1992, para. 8.
193 Library of Congress, Congressional Research Service, The
Cambodian Peacekeeping Operations: Background. Prospects and U.S.
Policy Concerns , by Robert G. Sutter, CRS Report for Congress,
(Washington D.C.: US GPO. 1993), 4.
194United Nations, Security Council, UNTAC, Second Progress Report
Qf the Secretary-General on the United Nations Transitional Authority in
Cambodia
. S/24578, 21 September 1992, para. 6.
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Cambodia is a country of remarkable ethnic homogeneity. In 1962
about 80% of the population was ethnic Khmer; the remaining 20%
included Chinese, Vietnamese, Cham, Khmer Loeu, and Europeans 195 . A
paroxysm of anti-Vietnamese violence and murder that occurred in April
1970 led to an exodus, as did the coming to power of Pol Pot. Most of
those Vietnamese who did not flee were butchered. It is now estimated
that ethnic Khmers make up 90+% of the population in Cambodia. This
is a solid basis for modern nationalism, but even this is no guarantee
that nationalism will pave the way for a regime dedicated to the
recognition of human rights. Violence is the common experience of all
Cambodian factions 196 .
Cambodian nationalism rests on two pillars: the memory of the
Angkor times when Cambodia was the strongest power between India and
195 Russell R. Ross, ed., Cambodia: A Country Study . 3d ed., Area
Handbook Series (Washington D.C.: Library of Congress, 1990), 83.
196 See Nayan Chanda, "Wounds of History: Surging resentment of
Vietnamese could spark new pogroms." FEER . 30 July 1992, 14-16; Nayan
Chanda, "Theatre of cruelty: UN tries to protect human rights as abuses
grow," FEER . 24 December 1992, 11; Tim McCarthy, "Slaughter of
Vietnamese in Phum Taches was Cold and Calculated," Phnom Penh Post .
15 January 1993; Henry Kamm,"33 Vietnamese are Slain in Cambodia,"
New York Times . 12 March 1993 for a sampling of the persistent waves of
anti-Vietnamese violence that has swept over Cambodia.
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China, and the obsessive fear of its neighbors, especially Vietnam 197 .
There is in the Cambodian political culture a lingering and smoldering
resentment of the Vietnamese that is compelling to the Khmer beyond
reason. The Khmer Rouge, despite their history of turning the gun and
club against their own people, have maintained a modicum of appeal
based upon their virulent anti-Vietnamese stance. Reports of violence
against ethnic Vietnamese who had been living in Cambodia for
generations are often met with silent nods of approval by ordinary
Cambodians, most of whom harbor a deep resentment of the yuon
(Vietnamese).
Ethnic rivalry is an issue that spawns violence and stands in the
way of achieving peace. The conflict in Cambodia has very real and
palpable ethno-national overtones that the U.N. peace process does not
address, and hopes for a peace-loving Cambodian nations-state are dim
at best. Walker Conner, Donald Horowitz, and Milton Esmani 98
197 Elizabeth Becker, When the War Was Over: The Voices of
Cambodia's Revolution and Its People (New York: Simon and Schuster,
1986), 82-120.
198 Walker Conner, "The Politics of Ethnonationalism," Journal of
International Affairs 27 (January 1973); Milton Esman, "Political and
Psychological Factors in Ethnic Conflict," in Conflict and Peacemaking in
Multiethnic Societies , ed. Joseph V. Montville (Lexington, MA: Lexington
Books, 1984); Donald L. Horowitz, Ethnic Groups in Conflict . (Berkeley:
University of California Press, 1988). Each of these scholars have
produced a prodigious amount of writings on this topic. The citations
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separately but collectively identify ethno-national conflict as
fundamentally emotive, passionate and irrational, simply not amenable
to compromise. Working within the peacemaking process as it currently
stands will not brighten the prospects a successful conclusion to the
UNTAC mandate. As such, the situation in Cambodia, as in many ethnic
and nationalistic and irredentist conflicts, is beyond the ken of rational
choice explanations and economic cost-benefit decision-making models.
Processes mean little to people who are cast in the concrete of history.
Any acceptable role model for peacemaking in a new world order
must find a way of addressing problems of ethnic strife, nationalism, and
political legitimacy. If Cambodia is to arrive at a political settlement, a
true end to the civil war, then it must find a way internally to resolve
these conflicts and the questions of its own nationalism. The Agreements
on a Comprehensive Political Settlement of the Cambodia Conflict does
not fill this bill nor the void in the Cambodian political culture that has
created such fragmentation. Nations working through their UN can
provide relief from the ills of civil war for their neighbors, but only by
way of intervening in such a way as to become another faction in the
civil war. Providing an army of administration or occupation without
the a priori consent and desire of the parties to the conflict for
listed here are the primary works I utilized in my research.
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reconciliation is at best a band-aid and not a cure. For reason of political
culture, this consent and desire simply was not there. The nagging
question remains, can a civil war be resolved by outsiders?
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VIII. TOWARDS A CONCLUSION
The analysis of this thesis has identified the fundamental flaws of
the U.N. peace plan for Cambodia as a focus on an internationally
imposed solution to a national problem entrusted to an institution
without the authority necessary to enforce peace and order. The modus
vivendi of the mandate creating UNTAC simply could not or did not
invest it with the ability to deal with the situation of violation of the
terms of the Agreement. The great powers and regional actors misjudged
their role and influence in Cambodia. While it is true that the internal
players in the Cambodian conflict had their superpower backers who
fostered the civil war in the country, the Cambodian surrogates have
proven not to be mere puppets responding to the directions of those who
provided aid with strings attached. While accepting the advice and
direction of the superpowers and their allies, the internal player have
pursued, and continue to pursue, their own agenda of grievances and
interests based upon ideology, ethnic strife, nationalism, naked
competition for power, and of course historical hatreds and fears. A
relaxing of tensions in the cold war superpower competition simply does
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not automatically translate into a relaxing of tensions in the domestic
competition in Cambodia. Draft agreements for peace from the
Permanent Five on the U.N. Security Council signed by the Cambodian
factions are of little value.
International efforts to coax Cambodia out to that small
precarious ledge before they were ready for the leap was a set up for
disaster in the face of the international community's unpreparedness to
commit extensive and expensive safety nets to the venture. In trying to
build a democratic state were there was no tradition of democracy, the
United Nations set for themselves an impossible task.
It becomes clear, then, that restoring peace and stability and
establishing democracy in Cambodia will require more than an eighteen-
month lull in the fighting, a single election, and a new constitution that
the United Nations can bring to the situation.
Even the delivery of these gifts is problematic as shown by recent
events. The elections of May 1993 are not be a solution to Cambodia's
political difficulties, although they may serve as a milestone on a longer
road of development and reconciliation. Leading Cambodia down the
path of democracy and self-determination has the requirement of a long-
term engagement of resolve and resources. UNTAC's mission was to
introduce peace and stability and a shadow of democracy to a land and
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people torn by conflict, revolution, and eivil war. The trust and security
of the international community and the hopes and needs of the
Cambodian people and others like them will demand more than illusory
shadows. Whatever the future may hold, the Cambodian people will
have to work out their own fate. They may choose to seek help from the
outside, but they must reconcile their differences at least to the extent













1 he States participating in the Paris Conference on Cambodia,
namely Australia, Brunei Darussalam, Cambodia, Canada, the People's Republic of
China, the French Republic, the Republic of India, the Republic of Indonesia, Japan,
the Lao People's Democratic Republic, Malaysia, the Republic of the Philippines,
the Republic of Singapore, the Kingdom of Thailand, the Union of Soviet Socialist
Republics, the United Kingdom of Great Britain and Northern Ireland, the United
States of America, the Socialist Republic of Viet Nam and the Socialist Federal Republic
of Yugoslavia,
In the presence of the Secretary-General of the United Nations,
In order to maintain, preserve and defend the sovereignty, in-
dependence, territorial integrity and inviolability, neutrality and national unity of
Cambodia,
Desiring to restore and maintain peace in Cambodia, to pro-
mote national reconciliation and to ensure the exercise of the right to self-
determination of the Cambodian people through free and fair elections,
Convinced that only a comprehensive political settlement to the
Cambodia conflict will be just and durable and will contribute to regional and inter-
national peace and security,
Welcoming the Framework document of 28 August 1990, which
was accepted by the Cambodian Parties in its entirety as the basis for settling the
Cambodia conflict, and which was subsequently unanimously endorsed by Security
Council resolution 668 '1990) of 20 September 1990 and General Assembly resolu-
tion 45/3 of 15 October 1990,
Noting the formation in Jakarta on 10 September 1990 oi the
Supreme National Council of Cambodia as the unique legitimate body and source
of authority in Cambodia in which, throughout the transitional period, national
sovereignty and unity are enshrined, and which represents Cambodia externally,
Welcoming the unanimous election, in Beijing on 17 July 1991,
of H.R.H. Prince Norodom Sihanouk as the President of the Supreme National
Council,
Recognizing that an enhanced United Nations role requires the
establishment of a United Nations Transitional Authority in Cambodia 'UNTAQ with
civilian and military components, which will act with full respect for the national
sovereignty of Cambodia,
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Noting the statements made at the conclusion of the meetings
held in Jakarta on 9-10 September 1990, in Paris on 21-23 December 1990, in Pattaya
on 24-26 June 1991, in Beijing on 16-17 July 1991, in Pattaya on 26-29 August 1991,
and also the meetings held in Jakarta on 4-6 June 1991 and in New York on 19 Sep-
tember 1991,
Welcoming United Nations Security Council resolution 717
(1991) of 16 October 1991 on Cambodia,
Recognizing that Cambodia's tragic recent history requires spe-
cial measures to assure protection of human rights, and the non-return to the poli-
cies and practices of the past,
Have agreed as follows:
PART I ARRANGEMENTS DURING
THE TRANSITIONAL PERIOD
SECTION I TRANSITIONAL PERIOD
Article 1 For the purposes of this Agreement, the transition-
al period shall commence with the entry into force of this Agreement and terminate
when the constituent assembly elected through free and fair elections, organized
and certified by the United Nations, has approved the constitution and transformed
itself into a legislative assembly, and thereafter a new government has been created.
SECTION II UNITED NATIONS TRANSITIONAL AUTHORITY IN CAMBODIA
Article 2*1) The Signatories invite the United Nations Secu-
rity Council to establish a United Nations Transitional Authority in Cambodia (here-
inafter referred to as "UNTAC") with civilian and military components under the
direct responsibility of the Secretary-General of the United Nations. For this purpose
the Secretary-General will designate a Special Representative to act on his behalf.
2) The Signatories further invite the United Nations Security
Council to provide UNTAC with the mandate set forth in this Agreement and to keep
its implementation under continuing review through periodic reports submitted by
the Secretary-General.
148
SECTION III SUPREME NATIONAL COUNCIL
Article 3 The Supreme National Council (hereinafter referred
to as "the SNC") is the unique legitimate body and source of authority in which,
throughout the transitional period, the sovereignty, independence and unity of Cam-
bodia are enshrined.
Article 4 The members of the SNC shall be committed to the
holding of free and fair elections organized and conducted by the United Nations
as the basis for forming a new and legitimate Government.
Article 5 The SNC shall, throughout the transitional period,
represent Cambodia externally and occupy the seat of Cambodia at the United Na-
tions, in the United Nations specialized agencies, and in other international institu-
tions and international conferences.
Article 6 The SNC hereby delegates to the United Nations
all powers necessary to ensure the implementation of this Agreement, as described
in annex 1.
In order to ensure a neutral political environment conducive to
free and fair general elections, administrative agencies, bodies and offices which could
directly influence the outcome of elections will be placed under direct United Na-
tions supervision or control. In that context, special attention will be given to for-
eign affairs, national defence, finance, public security and information. To reflect the
importance of these subjects, UNTAC needs to exercise such control as is necessary
to ensure the stria neutrality of the bodies responsible for them. The United Na-
tions, in consultation with the SNC, will identify which agencies, bodies and offices
could continue to operate in order to ensure normal day-to-day life in the country.
Article 7 The relationship between the SNC, UNTAC and ex-
isting administrative structures is set forth in annex 1.
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SECTION IV » WITHDRAWAL OF FOREIGN FORCES AND ITS VERIFICATION
Article 8 Immediately upon entry into force of this Agree-
ment, any foreign forces, advisers, and military personnel remaining in Cambodia,
together with their weapons, ammunition, and equipment, shall be withdrawn from
Cambodia and not be returned. Such withdrawal and non-return will be subject to
UNTAC verification in accordance with annex 2.
SECTION V CEASE-FIRE AND CESSATION OF OUTSIDE MILITARY
ASSISTANCE
Article 9 The cease-fire shall take effect at the time this
Agreement enters into force. All forces shall immediately disengage and refrain from
all hostilities and from any deployment, movement or action which would extend
the territory they control or which might lead to renewed fighting.
The Signatories hereby invite the Security Council of the Unit-
ed Nations to request the Secretary-General to provide good offices to assist in this
process until such time as the military component of UNTAC is in position to super-
vise, monitor and verify it.
Article 10 Upon entry into force of this Agreement, there
shall be an immediate cessation of all outside military assistance to all Cambodian
Parties.
Article 11 The objectives of military arrangements during the
transitional period shall be to stabilize the security situation and build confidence
among the parties to the conflict, so as to reinforce the purposes of this Agreement
and to prevent the risks of a return to warfare.
Detailed provisions regarding UNTAC's supervision, monitor-
ing, and verification of the cease-fire and related measures, including verification
of the withdrawal of foreign forces and the regrouping, cantonment and ultimate
disposition of all Cambodian forces and their weapons during the transitional
period are set forth in annex 1, section C, and annex 2.
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PART II ELECTIONS
Article 12 The Cambodian people shall have the right to de-
termine their own political future through the free and fair election of a constituent
assembly, which will draft and approve a new Cambodian Constitution in accordance
with Article 23 and transform itself into a legislative assembly, which will create the
new Cambodian Government. This election will be held under United Nations
auspices in a neutral political environment with full respect for the national sovereignty
of Cambodia.
Article 13 UNTAC shall be responsible for the organization
and conduct of these elections based on the provisions of annex 1, section D, and
annex 3.
Article 14 All Signatories commit themselves to respect the
results of these elections once certified as free and fair by the United Nations.
PART III HUMAN RIGHTS
Article 15 1) All persons in Cambodia and all Cambodian
refugees and displaced persons shall enjoy the rights and freedoms embodied in the
Universal Declaration of Human Rights and other relevant international human rights
instruments.
2) To this end, a) Cambodia undertakes:
to ensure respect for and observance of human rights and fundamental freedoms
in Cambodia;
to support the right of all Cambodian citizens to undertake activities which
would promote and protect human rights and fundamental freedoms;
to take effective measures to ensure that the policies and practices of the past
shall never be allowed to return;
to adhere to relevant international human rights instruments;
b) the other Signatories to this Agreement undertake to pro-
mote and encourage respect for and observance of human rights and fundamental
freedoms in Cambodia as embodied in the relevant international instruments and
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the relevant resolutions of the United Nations General Assembly, in order, in partic-
ular, to prevent the recurrence of human rights abuses.
Article 76 UNTAC shall be responsible during the transition-
al period for fostering an environment in which respect for human rights shall be
ensured, based on the provisions of annex 1, section E.
Article 17 After the end of the transitional period, the Unit-
ed Nations Commission on Human Rights should continue to monitor closely the
human rights situation in Cambodia, including, if necessary, by the appointment of
a Special Rapporteur who would report his findings annually to the Commission
and to the General Assembly.
PART IV INTERNATIONAL GUARANTEES
Article 18 Cambodia undertakes to maintain, preserve and
defend, and the other Signatories undertake to recognize and respect, the sovereignty,
independence, territorial integrity and inviolability, neutrality and national unity of
Cambodia, as set forth in a separate Agreement.
PART V REFUGEES AND DISPLACED PERSONS
Article 19 Upon entry into force of this Agreement, every ef-
fort will be made to create in Cambodia political, economic and social conditions
conducive to the voluntary return and harmonious integration of Cambodian refu-
gees and displaced persons.
Article 20 1) Cambodian refugees and displaced persons,
located outside Cambodia, shall have the right to return to Cambodia and to live
in safety, security and dignity, free from intimidation or coercion of any kind.
2) The Signatories request the Secretary-General of the Unit-
ed Nations to facilitate the repatriation in safety and dignity of Cambodian refugees
and displaced persons, as an integral part of the comprehensive political settlement
and under the overall authority of the Special Representative of the Secretary-General,
in accordance with the guidelines and principles on the repatriation of refugees and
displaced persons as set forth in annex 4.
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PART VI RELEASE OF PRISONERS OF WAR
AND CIVILIAN INTERNEES
Article 21 The release of all prisoners of war and civilian in-
ternees shall be accomplished at the earliest possible date under the direction of
the International Committee of the Red Cross (ICRC) in coordination with the Spe-
cial Representative of the Secretary-General, with the assistance, as necessary, of other
appropriate international humanitarian organizations and the Signatories.
Article 22 The expression "civilian internees" refers to all
persons who are not prisoners of war and who, having contributed in any way what-
soever to the armed or political struggle, have been arrested or detained by any of
the parties by virtue of their contribution thereto.
PART VII PRINCIPLES FOR A
NEW CONSTITUTION FOR CAMBODIA
Article 23 Basic principles, including those regarding human
rights and fundamental freedoms as well as regarding Cambodia's status of neutrali-
ty, which the new Cambodian Constitution will incorporate, are set forth in annex 5.
PART VIII REHABILITATION
AND RECONSTRUCTION
Article 24 The Signatories urge the international communi-
ty to provide economic and financial support for the rehabilitation and reconstruc-
tion of Cambodia, as provided in a separate declaration.
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PART IX FINAL PROVISIONS
Article 25 The Signatories shall, in good faith and in a spirit
of cooperation, resolve through peaceful means any disputes with respect to the im-
plementation of this Agreement.
Article 26 The Signatories request other States, internation-
al organizations and other bodies to cooperate and assist in the implementation of
this Agreement and in the fulfilment by UNTAC of its mandate.
Article 27 The Signatories shall provide their full coopera-
tion to the United Nations to ensure the implementation of its mandate, including
by the provision of privileges and immunities, and by facilitating freedom of move-
ment and communication within and through their respective territories.
In carrying out its mandate, UNTAC shall exercise due respect
for the sovereignty of all States neighbouring Cambodia.
Article 28 1) The Signatories shall comply in good faith
with all obligations undertaken in this Agreement and shall extend full cooperation
to the United Nations, including the provision of the information which UNTAC re-
quires in the fulfilment of its mandate.
2) The signature on behalf of Cambodia by the members of
the SNC shall commit all Cambodian parties and armed forces to the provisions of
this Agreement.
Article 29 * Without prejudice to the prerogatives of the Secu-
rity Council of the United Nations, and upon the request of the Secretary-General,
the two co-Chairmen of the Paris Conference on Cambodia, in the event of a viola-
tion or threat of violation of this Agreement, will immediately undertake appropri-
ate consultations, including with members of the Paris Conference on Cambodia,
with a view to taking appropriate steps to ensure respect for these commitments.
Article 30 This Agreement shall enter into force upon
signature.
Article 31 This Agreement shall remain open for accession
by all States. The instruments of accession shall be deposited with the Governments
of the French Republic and the Republic of Indonesia. For each State acceding to
the Agreement it shall enter into force on the date of deposit of its instruments of
accession. Acceding States shall be bound by the same obligations as the Signatories.
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Article 32 The originals of this Agreement, of which the
Chinese, English, French, Khmer and Russian texts are equally authentic, shall be
deposited with the Governments of the French Republic and the Republic of Indonesia,
which shall transmit certified true copies to the Governments of the other States par-
ticipating in the Pans Conference on Cambodia, as well as the Secretary-General
of the United Nations.
In witness whereof the undersigned Plenipotentiaries, being duly authorized there-
to, have signed this Agreement.





SECTION A GENERAL PROCEDURES
1 In accordance with Article 6 of the Agreement, UNTAC
will exercise the powers necessary to ensure the implementation of this Agreement,
including those relating to the organization and conduct of free and fair elections
and the relevant aspects of the administration of Cambodia.
2 The following mechanism will be used to resolve all issues
relating to the implementation of this Agreement which may arise between the
Secretary-General's Special Representative and the Supreme National Council (SNC):
a) The SNC offers advice to UNTAC, which will comply with
this advice provided there is a consensus among the members of the SNC and provid-
ed this advice is consistent with the objectives of the present Agreement;
b) If there is no consensus among the members of the SNC
despite every endeavour of its President, H.R.H. Samdech Norodom Sihanouk, the
President will be entitled to make the decision on what advice to offer to UNTAC,
taking fully into account the views expressed in the SNC. UNTAC will comply with
the advice provided it is consistent with the objectives of the present Agreement;
c) If H.R.H. Samdech Norodom Sihanouk, President of the
SNC, the legitimate representative of Cambodian sovereignty, is not, for whatever
reason, in a position to make such a decision, his power of decision will transfer
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to the Secretary-General's Special Representative. The Special Representative will
make the final decision, taking fully into account the views expressed in the SNC;
d) Any power to act regarding the implementation of this
Agreement conferred upon the SNC by the Agreement will be exercised by consen-
sus or, failing such consensus, by its President in accordance with the procedure set
out above. In the event that H.R.H. Samdech Norodom Sihanouk, President of the
SNC, the legitimate representative of Cambodian sovereignty, is not, for whatever
reason, in a position to act, his power to act will transfer to the Secretary-General's
Special Representative, who may take the necessary action;
e) In all cases, the Secretary-General's Special Representative
will determine whether advice or action of the SNC is consistent with the present
Agreement.
3 The Secretary-General's Special Representative or his
delegate will attend the meetings of the SNC and of any subsidiary body which might
be established by it and give its members ail necessary information on the decisions
taken by UNTAC.
SECTION B CIVIL ADMINISTRATION
7 In accordance with Article 6 of the Agreement, all ad-
ministrative agencies, bodies and offices acting in the field of foreign affairs, nation-
al defence, finance, public security and information will be placed under the direct
control of UNTAC, which will exercise it as necessary to ensure strict neutrality. In
this respect, the Secretary-General's Special Representative will determine what is
necessary and may issue directives to the above-mentioned administrative agencies,
bodies and offices. Such directives may be issued to and will bind all Cambodian
Parties.
2 In accordance with Article 6 of the Agreement, the
Secretary-General's Special Representative, in consultation with the SNC, will de-
termine which other administrative agencies, bodies and offices could directly in-
fluence the outcome of elections. These administrative agencies, bodies and offices
will be placed under direct supervision or control of UNTAC and will comply with
any guidance provided by it.
3 In accordance with Article 6 of the Agreement, the
Secretary-General's Special Representative, in consultation with the SNC, will iden-
tify which administrative agencies, bodies and offices could continue to operate in
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order to ensure normal day-to-day life in Cambodia, if necessary, under such super-
vision by UNTAC as it considers necessary.
4 In accordance with Article 6 of the Agreement, the authori-
ty of the Secretary-General's Special Representative will include the power to:
a) Install in administrative agencies, bodies and offices of all
the Cambodian Parties United Nations personnel, who will have unrestricted access
to all administrative operations and information;
b) Require the reassignment or removal of any personnel of
such administrative agencies, bodies and offices.
5 a) On the basis of the information provided in Article I,
paragraph 3, of annex 2, the Special Representative of the Secretary-General will de-
termine, after consultation with the Cambodian Parties, those civil police necessary
to perform law enforcement in Cambodia. All Cambodian Parties hereby undertake
to comply with the determination made by the Special Representative in this regard;
b) All civil police will operate under UNTAC supervision or
control, in order to ensure that law and order are maintained effectively and impar-
tially, and that human rights and fundamental freedoms are fully protected. In con-
sultation with the SNC, UNTAC will supervise other law enforcement and judicial
processes throughout Cambodia to the extent necessary to ensure the attainment
of these objectives.
6 If the Secretary-General's Special Representative deems it
necessary, UNTAC, in consultation with the SNC, will undertake investigations of
complaints and allegations regarding actions by the existing administrative structures
in Cambodia that are inconsistent with or work against the objectives of this com-
prehensive political settlement. UNTAC will also be empowered to undertake such
investigation on its own initiative. UNTAC will take, when necessary, appropriate
corrective steps.
SECTION C » MILITARY FUNCTIONS
7 UNTAC will supervise, monitor and verify the withdrawal
of foreign forces, the cease-fire and related measures in accordance with annex 2,
including:
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a) Verification of the withdrawal from Cambodia of all
categories of foreign forces, advisers and military personnel and their weapons, am-
munition and equipment, and their non-return to Cambodia;
b) Liaison with neighbouring Governments over any develop-
ments in or near their territory that could endanger the implementation of this
Agreement;
c) Monitoring the cessation of outside military assistance to
all Cambodian Parties;
d) Locating and confiscating caches of weapons and military
supplies throughout the country;
e) Assisting with clearing mines and undertaking training
programmes in mine clearance and a mine awareness programme among the Cam-
bodian people.
2 UNTAC will supervise the regrouping and relocating of all
forces to specifically designated cantonment areas on the basis of an operational
timetable to be agreed upon, in accordance with annex 2.
3 As the forces enter the cantonments, UNTAC will initiate
the process of arms control and reduction specified in annex 2.
4 UNTAC will take necessary steps regarding the phased
process of demobilization of the military forces of the parties, in accordance with
annex 2.
5 UNTAC will assist, as necessary, the International Commit-
tee of the Red Cross in the release of all prisoners of war and civilian internees.
SECTION D ELECTIONS
1 UNTAC will organize and conduct the election referred to
in Part II of this Agreement in accordance with this section and annex 3.
2 UNTAC may consult with the SNC regarding the organi-
zation and conduct of the electoral process.
3 In the exercise of its responsibilities in relation to the elec-
toral process, the specific authority of UNTAC will include the following:
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a) The establishment, in consultation with the SNC, of a sys-
tem of laws, procedures and administrative measures necessary for the holding of
a free and fair election in Cambodia, including the adoption of an electoral law and
of a code of conduct regulating participation in the election in a manner consistent
with respect for human rights and prohibiting coercion or financial inducement in
order to influence voter preference;
b) The suspension or abrogation, in consultation with the SNC,
of provisions of existing laws which could defeat the objects and purposes of this
Agreement;
c) The design and implementation of a voter education
programme, covering all aspects of the election, to support the election process;
d) The design and implementation of a system of voter regis-
tration, as a first phase of the electoral process, to ensure that eligible voters have
the opportunity to register, and the subsequent preparation of verified voter registra-
tion lists;
e) The design and implementation of a system of registration
of political parties and lists of candidates;
f) Ensuring fair access to the media, including press, television
and radio, for all political parties contesting in the election;
g) The adoption and implementation of measures to monitor
and facilitate the participation of Cambodians in the elections, the political campaign
and the balloting procedures;
h) The design and implementation of a system of balloting and
polling, to ensure that registered voters have the opportunity to vote;
i) The establishment, in consultation with the SNC, of coordi-
nated arrangements to facilitate the presence of foreign observers wishing to observe
the campaign and voting;
j) Overall direction of polling and the vote count;
k) The identification and investigation of complaints of elec-
toral irregularities, and the taking of appropriate corrective action;
/) Determining whether or not the election was free and fair
and, if so, certification of the list of persons duly elected.
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4 In carrying out its responsibilities under the present sec-
tion, UNTAC will establish a system of safeguards to assist it in ensuring the absence
of fraud during the electoral process, including arrangements for Cambodian represen-
tatives to observe the registration and polling procedures and the provision of an
UNTAC mechanism for hearing and deciding complaints.
5 The timetable for the various phases of the electoral
process will be determined by UNTAC, in consultation with the SNC as provided
in paragraph 2 of this section. The duration of the electoral process will not exceed
nine months from the commencement of voter registration.
6 In organizing and conducting the electoral process,
UNTAC will make every effort to ensure that the system and procedures adopted
are absolutely impartial, while the operational arrangements are as administratively
simple and efficient as possible.
SECTION E HUMAN RIGHTS
In accordance with Article 16, UNTAC will make provisions for:
a) The development and implementation of a programme of
human rights education to promote respect for and understanding of human rights;
b) General human rights oversight during the transitional
period;








1 All Cambodian Parties (hereinafter referred to as "the Par-
ties") agree to observe a comprehensive cease-fire on land and water and in the air.
This cease-fire will be implemented in two phases. During the first phase, the cease-
fire will be observed with the assistance of the Secretary-General of the United Na-
tions through his good offices. During the second phase, which should commence
as soon as possible, the cease-fire will be supervised, monitored and verified by
UNTAC. The Commander of the military component of UNTAC, in consultation with
the Parties, shall determine the exact time and date at which the second phase will
commence. This date will be set at least four weeks in advance of its coming into effect.
2 The Parties undertake that, upon the signing of this Agree-
ment, they will observe a cease-fire and will order their armed forces immediately
to disengage and refrain from all hostilities and any deployment, movement or ac-
tion that would extend the territory they control or that might lead to a resumption
of fighting, pending the commencement of the second phase. "Forces" are agreed
to include all regular, provincial, district, paramilitary and other auxiliary forces.
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During the first phase, the Secretary-General of the United Nations will provide his
good offices to the Parties to assist them in its observance. The Parties undertake to
cooperate with the Secretary-General or his representatives in the exercise of his good
offices in this regard.
3 The Parties agree that, immediately upon the signing of
this Agreement, the following information will be provided to the United Nations:
a) Total strength of their forces, organization, precise number
and location of deployments inside and outside Cambodia. The deployment will be
depicted on a map marked with locations of all troop positions, occupied or unoc-
cupied, including staging camps, supply bases and supply routes;
b) Comprehensive lists of arms, ammunition and equipment
held by their forces, and the exact locations at which those arms, ammunition and
equipment are deployed;
c) Detailed record of their minefields, including types and
characteristics of mines laid and information of booby traps used by them together
with any information available to them about minefields laid or booby traps used
by the other Parties;
d) Total strength of their police forces, organization, precise
numbers and locations of deployments as well as comprehensive lists of their arms,
ammunition and equipment and the exact locations at which those arms, ammuni-
tion and equipment are deployed.
4 Immediately upon his arrival in Cambodia, and not later
than four weeks before the beginning of the second phase, the Commander of the
military component of UNTAC will, in consultation with the Parties, finalize UNTAC's
plan for the regroupment and cantonment of the forces of the Parties and for the
storage of their arms, ammunition and equipment, in accordance with Article III of
this annex. This plan will include the designation of regroupment and cantonment
areas, as well as an agreed timetable. The cantonment areas will be established at
battalion size or larger.
5 The Parties agree to take steps to inform their forces at least
two weeks before the beginning of the second phase, using all possible means of
communication, about the agreed date and time of the beginning of the second phase,
about the agreed plan for the regroupment and cantonment of their forces and for
the storage of their arms, ammunition and equipment and, in particular, about
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the exact locations of the regroupment areas to which their forces are to report. Such
information will continue to be disseminated for a period of four weeks after the
beginning of the second phase.
6 The Parties shall scrupulously observe the cease-fire and
will not resume any hostilities by land, water or air. The commanders of their armed
forces will ensure that all troops under their command remain on their respective
positions, pending their movement to the designated regroupment areas, and refrain
from all hostilities and from any deployment or movement or action which would
extend the territory they control or which might lead to a resumption of fighting.
Article II Liaison system and Mixed Military
Working Croup
A Mixed Military Working Group (MMWG) will be established
with a view to resolving any problems that may arise in the observance of the cease-
fire. It will be chaired bv the most senior United Nations military officer in Cambo-
dia or his representative. Each Party agrees to designate an officer of the rank of
brigadier or equivalent to serve on the MMWG. Its composition, method of opera-
tion and meeting places will be determined by the most senior United Nations mili-
tary officer in consultation with the Parties. Similar liaison arrangements will be made
at lower military command levels to resolve practical problems on the ground.
Article III * Regroupment and cantonment of the forces of
the Parties and storage of their arms, ammunition and equipment
/ In accordance with the operational timetable referred to
in paragraph 4 of Article I of the present annex, all forces of the Parties that are not
already in desienated cantonment areas will report to designated regroupment areas,
which will be established and operated bv the military component of UNTAC. These
regroupment areas will be established and operational not later than one week pri-
or to the date of the beginning of the second phase. The Parties agree to arrange
for all their forces, with all their arms, ammunition and equipment, to report to
regroupment areas within two weeks after the beginning of the second phase. All
personnel who have reported to the regroupment areas will thereafter be escorted
bv personnel of the military component of UNTAC, with their arms, ammunition and
equipment, to designated cantonment areas. All Parties agree to ensure that personnel
164
reporting to the regroupment areas will be able to do so in full safety and without
any hindrance.
2 On the basis of the information provided in accordance
with paragraph 3 of Article I of the present annex, UNTAC will confirm that the
regroupment and cantonment processes have been completed in accordance with
the plan referred to in paragraph 4 of Article I of this annex. UNTAC will endeavour
to complete these processes within four weeks from the date of the beginning of
the second phase. On the completion of regroupment oi all forces and of their move-
ment to cantonment areas, respectively, the Commander of the military component
of UNTAC will so inform each of the four Parties.
3 The Parties agree that, as their forces enter the designated
cantonment areas, their personnel will be instructed by their commanders to immedi-
ately hand over all their arms, ammunition and equipment to UNTAC for storage
in the custody of UNTAC.
4 UNTAC will check the arms, ammunition and equipment
handed over to it against the lists referred to in paragraph 3. b) of Article I of this
annex, in order to verify that all the arms, ammunition and equipment in the posses-
sion of the Parties have been placed under its custody.
Article IV Resupply of forces during cantonment
The military component of UNTAC will supervise the resupply
of all forces of the Parties during the regroupment and cantonment processes. Such
resupply will be confined to items of a non-lethal nature such as food, water, cloth-
ing and medical supplies as well as provision of medical care.
Article V Ultimate disposition of the forces of the Parties
and of their arms, ammunition and equipment
1 In order to reinforce the objectives of a comprehensive po-
litical settlement, minimize the risks of a return to warfare, stabilize the security situ-
ation and build confidence among the Parties to the conflict, all Parties agree to
undertake a phased and balanced process of demobilization of at least 70 per cent
of their military forces. This process shall be undertaken in accordance with a detailed
plan to be drawn up by UNTAC on the basis of the information provided under Arti-
cle I of this annex and in consultation with the Parties. It should be completed prior
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to the end of the process of registration for the elections and on a date to be deter-
mined by the Special Representative of the Secretary-General.
2 The Cambodian Parties hereby commit themselves to
demobilize all their remaining forces before or shortly after the elections and, to the
extent that full demobilization is unattainable, to respect and abide by whatever de-
cision the newly elected government that emerges in accordance with Article 12 of
this Agreement takes with regard to the incorporation of parts or all of those forces
into a new national army. Upon completion of the demobilization referred to in para-
graph 1, the Cambodian Parties and the Special Representative of the Secretary-General
shall undertake a review regarding the final disposition of the forces remaining in
the cantonments, with a view to determining which of the following shall apply:
a) If the Parties agree to proceed with the demobilization of
all or some of the forces remaining in the cantonments, preferably prior to or other-
wise shortly after the elections, the Special Representative shall prepare a timetable
for so doing, in consultation with them;
b) Should total demobilization of all of the residual forces be-
fore or shortly after the elections not be possible, the Parties hereby undertake to
make available all of their forces remaining in cantonments to the newly elected
government that emerges in accordance with Article 12 of this Agreement, for con-
sideration for incorporation into a new national army. They further agree that any
such forces which are not incorporated into the new national army will be demobi-
lized forthwith according to a plan to be prepared by the Special Representative.
With regard to the ultimate disposition of the remaining forces and all the arms, am-
munition and equipment, UNTAC, as it withdraws from Cambodia, shall retain such
authority as is necessary to ensure an orderly transfer to the newly elected govern-
ment of those responsibilities it has exercised during the transitional period.
3 * UNTAC will assist, as required, with the reintegration into
civilian life of the forces demobilized prior to the elections.
4*a) UNTAC will control and guard all the arms, ammuni-
tion and equipment of the Parties throughout the transitional period;
b) As the cantoned forces are demobilized in accordance with
paragraph 1 above, there will be a parallel reduction by UNTAC of the arms, ammu-
nition and equipment stored on site in the cantonment areas. For the forces remain-
ing in the cantonment areas, access to their arms, ammunition and equipment shall
only be on the basis of the explicit authorization of the Special Representative of
the Secretarv-General;
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c) If there is a further demobilization of the military forces in
accordance with paragraph 2. a) above, there will be a commensurate reduction by
UNTAC of the arms, ammunition and equipment stored on site in the cantonment
areas;
d) The ultimate disposition of all arms, ammunition and equip-
ment will be determined by the government that emerges through the free and fair
elections in accordance with Article 12 of this Agreement.
Article VI Verification of withdrawal from Cambodia and
non-return of all categories of foreign forces
1 UNTAC shall be provided, no later than two weeks before
the commencement of the second phase of the cease-fire, with detailed information
in writing regarding the withdrawal of foreign forces. This information shall include
the following elements:
a) Total strength of these forces and their organization and
deployment;
b) Comprehensive lists of arms, ammunition and equipment
held by these forces, and their exact locations;
c) Withdrawal plan (already implemented or to be implement-
ed), including withdrawal routes, border crossing points and time of departure from
Cambodia.
2 On the basis of the information provided in accordance
with paragraph 1 above, UNTAC will undertake an investigation in the manner it
deems appropriate. The Party providing the information will be required to make
personnel available to accompany UNTAC investigators.
3 Upon confirmation o\ the presence of any foreign forces,
UNTAC will immediately deploy military personnel with the foreign forces and ac-
company them until they have withdrawn from Cambodian territory. UNTAC will
also establish checkpoints on withdrawal routes, border crossing points and airfields
to verify the withdrawal and ensure the non-return of all categories of foreign forces.
4 The Mixed Military Working Group (MMWC) provided for
in Article II oi this annex will assist UNTAC in fulfilling the above-mentioned tasks.
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Article VII Cessation of outside military assistance
to all Cambodian Parties
1 All Parties undertake, t'rom the time of the signing of this
Agreement, not to obtain or seek any outside military assistance, including weapons,
ammunition and military equipment from outside sources.
2 The Signatories whose territory is adjacent to Cambodia,
namely the Governments of the Lao People's Democratic Republic, the Kingdom
of Thailand and the Socialist Republic of Viet Nam, undertake to:
a) Prevent the territories of their respective States, including
land temtorv, territorial sea and air space, from being used for the purpose of providing
anv form of militarv assistance to any of the Cambodian Parties. Resuppiv of such
items as food, water, clothing and medical supplies through their territories will be
allowed, but shall, without prejudice to the provisions of sub-paragraph d beiow.
be subject to UNTAC supervision upon arrival in Cambodia;
b) Provide written confirmation to the Commander of the mili-
tarv component of UNTAC, not later than four weeks after the second phase of the
cease-fire begins, that no forces, arms, ammunition or militarv equipment of anv of
the Cambodian Parties are present on their territories:
c) Receive an UNTAC liaison officer in each of their capitals
and designate an officer of the rank of colonel or equivalent, not later than four vseevi
after the beginning of the second phase of the cease-fire, in order to assist UNTAC
in investigating, with due respect tor their sovereignty anv complaints that activities
are taking place on their territories that are contrarv to the orov isions oi the compre-
hensive political settlement.
3 * To enable UNTAC to monitor the cessation of outside as-
sistance to all Cambodian Parties, the Parties agree that, upon signature of this Agree-
ment, thev will provide to UNTAC anv information available to them about the routes
and means bv which militarv assistance, including weapons ammunition and mili-
tarv equipment, have been supplied to anv of the Parties. Immediatelv after the sec-
ond phase or the cease-fire begins. UNTAC will take the roilow easunes:
a) Establish checkpoints aiong :he routes ano at seiectec cr-
eations along the Cambodian side or the border ana at airfields inside Camoodia:
b) Patrol the coastai ana imana waterways of Cambod
I 6 S
c) Maintain mobile teams at strategic locations within Cam-
bodia to patrol and investigate allegations of supply of arms to any of the Parties.
Article VIII Caches of weapons and military supplies
7 In order to stabilize the security situation, build confidence
and reduce arms and military supplies throughout Cambodia, each Party agrees to
provide to the Commander of the military component of UNTAC, before a date to
be determined by him, all information at its disposal, including marked maps, about
known or suspected caches of weapons and military supplies throughout Cambodia.
2 On the basis of information received, the military compo-
nent of UNTAC shall, after the date referred to in paragraph 1, deploy verification
teams to investigate each report and destroy each cache found.
Article IX Unexploded ordnance devices
1 Soon after arrival in Cambodia, the military component of
UNTAC shall ensure, as a first step, that all known minefields are clearly marked.
2 The Parties agree that, after completion of the regroupment
and cantonment processes in accordance with Article III of the present annex, they
will make available mine-clearing teams which, under the supervision and control
of UNTAC military personnel, will leave the cantonment areas in order to assist in
removing, disarming or deactivating remaining unexploded ordnance devices. Those
mines or objects which cannot be removed, disarmed or deactivated will be clearly
marked in accordance with a system to be devised by the military component of
UNTAC.
3 UNTAC shall: a) Conduct a mass public education
programme in the recognition and avoidance of explosive devices;
b) Tram Cambodian volunteers to dispose of unexploded
ordnance devices;
c) Provide emergency first-aid training to Cambodian
volunteers.
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Article X Investigation of violations
1 After the beginning of the second phase, upon receipt of
any information or complaint from one of the Parties relating to a possible case of
non-compliance with any of the provisions of the present annex or related provi-
sions, UNTAC will undertake an investigation in the manner which it deems appropri-
ate. Where the investigation takes place in response to a complaint by one of the
Parties, that Party will be required to make personnel available to accompany the
UNTAC investigators. The results of such investigation will be conveyed by UNTAC
to the complaining Party and the Party complained against, and if necessary to the
SNC
2 * UNTAC will also carry out investigations on its own initia-
tive in other cases when it has reason to believe or suspect that a violation of this
annex or related provisions may be taking place.
Article XI Release of prisoners of war
The military component of UNTAC will provide assistance as
required to the International Committee of the Red Cross in the latter's discharge
of its functions relating to the release of prisoners of war.
Article XII Repatriation and resettlement of displaced
Cambodians
The military component of UNTAC will provide assistance as
necessary in the repatriation of Cambodian refugees and displaced persons carried
out in accordance with Articles 19 and 20 of this Agreement, in particular in the
clearing of mines from repatriation routes, reception centres and resettlement areas,




1 The constituent assembly referred to in Article 12 of the
Agreement shall consist of 120 members. Within three months from the date of the
election, it shall complete its tasks of drafting and adopting a new Cambodian Con-
stitution and transform itself into a legislative assembly which will form a new Cam-
bodian Government.
2 The election referred to in Article 12 of the Agreement will
be held throughout Cambodia on a provincial basis in accordance with a system
of proportional representation on the basis of lists of candidates put forward by po-
litical parties.
3 All Cambodians, including those who at the time of sig-
nature of this Agreement are Cambodian refugees and displaced persons, will have
the same rights, freedoms and opportunities to take part in the electoral process.
4 Every person who has reached the age of eighteen at the
time of application to register, or who turns eighteen during the registration period,
and who either was born in Cambodia or is the child of a person born in Cambodia,
will be eligible to vote in the election.
5 Political parties may be formed by any group of five thou-
sand registered voters. Party platforms shall be consistent with the principles and
objectives of the Agreement on a comprehensive political settlement.
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6 Party affiliation will be required in order to stand for elec-
tion to the constituent assembly. Political parties will present lists of candidates stand-
ing for election on their behalf, who will be registered voters.
7 Political parties and candidates will be registered in order
to stand for election. UNTAC will confirm that political parties and candidates meet
the established criteria in order to qualify for participation in the election. Adher-
ence to a Code of Conduct established by UNTAC in consultation with the SNC will
be a condition for such participation.
8 Voting will be by secret ballot, with provision made to as-
sist those who are disabled or who cannot read or write.
9 The freedoms of speech, assembly and movement will be
fully respected. All registered political parties will enjoy fair access to the media,








7 As part of the comprehensive political settlement, every as-
sistance will need to be given to Cambodian refugees and displaced persons as well
as to countries of temporary refuge and the country of origin in order to facilitate
the voluntary return of all Cambodian refugees and displaced persons in a peaceful
and orderly manner. It must also be ensured that there would be no residual problems
for the countries of temporary refuge. The country of origin with responsibility towards
its own people will accept their return as conditions become conducive.
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1PART II CONDITIONS CONDUCIVE TO THE
RETURN OF REFUGEES AND DISPLACED PERSONS
2 The task of rebuilding the Cambodian nation will require
the harnessing of all its human and natural resources. To this end, the return to the
place of their choice of Cambodians from their temporary refuge and elsewhere out-
side their country of origin will make a major contribution.
3 Every effort should be made to ensure that the conditions
which have led to a large number of Cambodian refugees and displaced persons
seeking refuge in other countries should not recur. Nevertheless, some Cambodian
refugees and displaced persons will wish and be able to return spontaneously to
their homeland.
4 There must be full respect for the human rights and fun-
damental freedoms of all Cambodians, including those of the repatriated refugees
and displaced persons, in recognition of their entitlement to live in peace and secu-
rity, free from intimidation and coercion of any kind. These rights would include,
inter alia, freedom of movement within Cambodia, the choice of domicile and em-
ployment, and the right to property.
5 In accordance with the comprehensive political settle-
ment, every effort should be made to create concurrently in Cambodia political, eco-
nomic and social conditions conducive to the return and harmonious integration
of the Cambodian refugees and displaced persons.
6 With a view to ensuring that refugees and displaced per-
sons participate in the elections, mass repatriation should commence and be com-
pleted as soon as possible, taking into account all the political, humanitarian, logistical,
technical and socio-economic factors involved, and with the cooperation of the SNC.
7 Repatriation of Cambodian refugees and displaced persons
should be voluntary and their decision should be taken in full possession of the facts.
Choice of destination within Cambodia should be that of the individual. The unity
of the family must be preserved.
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PART III OPERATIONAL FACTORS
8 Consistent with respect for principles of national
sovereignty in the countries of temporary refuge and origin, and in close coopera-
tion with the countries of temporary refuge and origin, full access by the Office of
the United Nations High Commissioner for Refugees (UNHCR), ICRC and other rele-
vant international agencies should be guaranteed to all Cambodian refugees and dis-
placed persons, with a view to the agencies undertaking the census, tracing, medical
assistance, food distribution and other activities vital to the discharge of their man-
date and operational responsibilities; such access should also be provided in Cam-
bodia to enable the relevant international organizations to carry out their traditional
monitoring as well as operational responsibilities.
9 In the context of the comprehensive political settlement,
the Signatories note with satisfaction that the Secretary-General of the United Na-
tions has entrusted UNHCR with the role of leadership and coordination among in-
tergovernmental agencies assisting with the repatriation and relief of Cambodian
refugees and displaced persons. The Signatories look to all non-governmental or-
ganizations to coordinate as much as possible their work for the Cambodian refu-
gees and displaced persons with that of UNHCR.
10 The SNC, the Governments of the countries in which the
Cambodian refugees and displaced persons have sought temporary refuge, and the
countries which contribute to the repatriation and integration effort will wish to mon-
itor closely and facilitate the repatriation of the returnees. An ad hoc consultative
body should be established for a limited term for these purposes. The UNHCR, the
ICRC, and other international agencies as appropriate, as well as UNTAC, would be
invited to join as full participants.
11 Adequately monitored short-term repatriation assistance
should be provided on an impartial basis to enable the families and individuals return-
ing to Cambodia to establish their lives and livelihoods harmoniously in their socie-
ty. These interim measures would be phased out and replaced in the longer term
by the reconstruction programme.
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12 Those responsible for organizing and supervising the
repatriation operation will need to ensure that conditions of security are created for
the movement of the refugees and displaced persons. In this respect, it is imperative
that appropriate border crossing points and routes be designated and cleared of mines
and other hazards.
73 The international community should contribute generous-






1 The constitution will be the supreme law of the land. It
may be amended only by a designated process involving legislative approval, popu-
lar referendum, or both.
2 Cambodia's tragic recent history requires special measures
to assure protection of human rights. Therefore, the constitution will contain a decla-
ration of fundamental rights, including the rights to life, personal liberty, security,
freedom of movement, freedom of religion, assembly and association including po-
litical parties and trade unions, due process and equality before the law, protection
from arbitrary deprivation of property or deprivation of private property without just
compensation, and freedom from racial, ethnic, religious or sexual discrimination.
It will prohibit the retroactive application of criminal law. The declaration will be
consistent with the provisions of the Universal Declaration of Human Rights and other
relevant international instruments. Aggrieved individuals will be entitled to have the
courts adjudicate and enforce these rights.
3 The constitution will declare Cambodia's status as a sover-
eign, independent and neutral State, and the national unity of Cambodian people.
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4 The constitution will state that Cambodia will follow a sys-
tem of liberal democracy, on the basis of pluralism. It will provide for periodic and
genuine elections. It will provide for the right to vote and to be elected by universal
and equal suffrage. It will provide for voting by secret ballot, with a requirement that
electoral procedures provide a full and fair opportunity to organize and participate
in the electoral process.
5 An independent judiciary will be established, empowered
to enforce the rights provided under the constitution.
6 The constitution will be adopted by a two-thirds majority








Prince Norodom Sihanouk crowned king by French
Founding of Communist party of Kampuchea (precursor to Khmer
Rouge)
Geneva conference ending First Indochina war
Sihanouk abdicates throne to form Sangkum Reastr Niyum (People's
Socialist Community)
1965
April Cambodia breaks off diplomatic relations with the US ostensibly over
aticle appearing in Newsweek magazine critical of Sihanouk
1M1
January Irate villagers attack a tax collection brigade near Samlaut in





US forces begin B-52 bombing of Cambodia in 'Operation Menu'
Nixon sends note to Sihanouk affirming that the United States
recognized and respected "the sovereignty, neutrality and territorial
integrity of the Kingdom of Cambodia withi is present frontiers."
Full diplomatic relations restored between Washington and Phnom
Penh
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August Sihanouk creates Government of the Last Resort, naming General




Prince Norodom Sihanouk overthrown by Lon Nol ~ Khmer
Republic





Paris Peace Accords signed, ending US combat role in Vietnam and
Laos
US bombing of Cambodia, Arclight, ends
1974











Khmer Rouge (CPK) launches offensive against Khmer Republic
President Lon Nol resigns and departs country
US embassy personnel evacuated from Phnom Penh by helicopter
Khmer Rouge capture Phnom Penh -- Democratic Kampuchea
Seizure of Mayaguez
American rescue mission: Air Force & Marines from Utapao
-39 crew — already off ship
-15 killed
visit to Vietnam by Pol Pot
visit to China by Pol Pot - hero's welcome by Mao
Le Duan, Pham Hung, Xuan Thuy visit Phnom Penh
U2A
February 10 Cambodia & China sign agreement on military aid
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1277




Vietnam and the Soviet Union enter into a Treaty of Friendship and
Cooperation





Vietnamese forces capture Phnom Penh
Heng Samnn installed as head of state of Vietnamese-controlled
People's Republic of Kampuchea
Chinese troops invade Vietnam to "teach them a lesson"
1M1
June 27 Adoption of PRK Constitution
1M2
June 22 Formation of tripartite Coalition Government of Democratic
Kampuchea
UM
China announces that it does not seek restoration of Khmer Rouge to




People's Republic of Kampuchea becomes State of Cambodia
Vietnam withdraws its forces from Cambodia
1990






Perm 5 create framework for resolution of war:
-direct UN supervision/control of ministries & agencies
concerned manipulation of electoral results
-SNC led by Prince Sihanouk
-omission of genocide by Rouge
1st Sino-Viet summit since '77
Cambodian factions meet & issue joint communique agreeing to:
1
)
immediate & indefinte ceasefire;
2) acceptance of the Perm Five framework for a
comprehensive political solution;
3) formation of the Supreme National Council
UN Security Council adopts resolution 668 endorsing framework







United Nations Advance Mission in Cambodia (UNAMIC)
established by Security Council Resolution 717 (1991)
Agreement on a Comprehensive Political Settlement on the Cambodia
Conflict signed in Paris — victory for China policy
Sihanouk returns in triumph to Phnom Penh after 22 years of exile or
house arrest
KR leaders Khieu Samphan and Son Sen return to Phnom Penh after
13 years in exile; met by government organized mob, both narrowly
escape lynching
letter signed by more than half the members of the Congress
addressed to President Bush calling for stronger efforts to curb the
Khmer Rouge - support for peace plan wavering if seen to be playing
into hands of KR
UNAMIC opens its office in Phnom Penh







Under Secretary General Yasushi Akashi appointed Special
Represntative for Cambodia as per Security Council Resolution 918
(1991)
United Nations Transitional Authority in Cambodia (UNTAC)
established by Security Council Resolution 745 (1992)
UNAMIC absorbed into UNTAC
UN Secretary General requests $764 million for next 6 months of
peacekeeping operations; gets approval for $606 million in addition to















32-nation conference in Tokyo pledges $880 million in aid to rebuild
Cambodia
UNTAC facing increasing KR intransigence to complying with Phae
II of the peace plan, demobilization, aserting that Vietnamese troops
are still present inthe country and that UNTAC has strengthed
legitimacy of the SOC faction
Voter registration begins
10-nation meeting in Beijing on Camodian peace plan fails
Sihanouk suffers mild stroke
6 UN peacekeepers taken hostage by Khmer Rouge guerillas in
Kompong thorn province
Imposition of UN sanctions upon Khmer Rouge: oil supplies to, logs
from Khmer Rouge-controlled areas
Sihanouk announces he is ceasing coopertion with UNTAC as a
result of continued political violence
UNTAC chief Akashi persuades Sihanouk to stay on as SNC
president
SOC initiates armed offensive against KR areas
UNTAC deadline for KR cooperation and participation in elections
34 Vietnamese settlers killed in village on Tonle Sap river ~ Khmer
Rouge blamed
grenades explode in Phnom Penh targeting establishments of
Vietnamese immigrants
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April 8 UN civilian volunteer, Atsuhito Nakata, murdered by Khmer Rouge
in Kompong Thorn
April 13 Khmer Rouge shut office in Phnom Penh and slip out of city
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